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This report is part of a broader research and publication
project on U.S.-Vietnam relations being conducted by
The Asia Foundation in cooperation with Vietnam’s
Institute for International Relations (IIR), with funding
support from the Henry Luce Foundation. The project
supports research activities that examine domestic and
international factors affecting the bilateral relationship,
especially in the context of economic normalization
between the two countries and a changing international
environment in the Asia-Pacific region. Ultimately, it
aims to promote greater understanding among
Americans and Vietnamese about domestic conditions
and international factors that affect bilateral relations,
leading to more informed policymaking on both sides.
This first volume examines domestic factors in both
countries that influence bilateral relations. A second vol-
ume will address regional and global factors, and a third
will summarize the research findings and recommend
next steps for improved policies and cooperation.
Political and Economic Normalization
The project is being conducted in the wake of far-reach-
ing changes in the bilateral relationship. Starting from
the early 1990s, the evolution of U.S.-Vietnam relations
can be divided roughly into two periods: political nor-
malization that culminated in the establishment of
diplomatic relations in July 1995, and economic nor-
malization that culminated in the ratification of the
Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) in late 2001. In the
early 1990s, the main focus of U.S. policy toward
Vietnam was obtaining the fullest possible accounting of
U.S. personnel listed as prisoners-of-war/missing-in-
action (POW/MIAs).1 To this end, the United States
welcomed Vietnam’s agreement to host a U.S. office in
Hanoi to work on POW/MIA affairs in 1991.
Subsequently, the United States ended restrictions on
American nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
working in Vietnam in 1992; withdrew its opposition to
lending from international financial institutions in 1993;
and then, in February 1994, lifted the U.S. trade embar-
go against Vietnam that had been in effect since 1975.
The embargo was lifted after several months of high-
level U.S. interactions with Vietnam aimed at resolving
POW/MIA cases, and a January 1994 vote in the U.S.
Senate urging that the embargo be removed.2 All of
these developments paved the way for the normalization
of diplomatic relations, which President Bill Clinton
announced from the White House on July 11, 1995.
Diplomacy for economic normalization began in earnest
in May 1996, when the United States presented
Vietnam with a blueprint for a draft trade agreement. At
that stage, Vietnamese exports to the United States faced
tariffs averaging roughly 40 percent rather than the 3-4
percent faced by exports from countries enjoying “Most
Favored Nation” status (now called “Normal Trade
Relations" or NTR). Owing to requirements stipulated
in the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Act of
1974, two things needed to occur for Vietnam to receive
NTR: (1) a U.S. presidential determination that
Vietnam permits free and unrestricted emigration (or a
presidential waiver indicating that this waiver as well as
U.S.-Vietnam Relations: An Overview
Jonathan R. Stromseth and Chadwick Bolick
The Asia Foundation
1 The United States announced a framework for normalization in April 1991. According to this "roadmap," normalization was dependent upon Vietnam providing
full cooperation in two main areas: 1) resolution of POW/MIA cases, and 2) implementation of a comprehensive peace settlement in Cambodia. For further dis-
cussion of the normalization process, see the articles by Frederick Z. Brown and Le Linh Lan in the bibliography of this volume.
2 See Mark Manyin, The Vietnam-U.S. Normalization Process, CRS Issue Brief for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated July 24,
2002), p. 4.
7 |  Introduction
current government practices in Vietnam promote unre-
stricted emigration); and (2) conclusion of a bilateral
trade agreement. Vietnam first received a presidential
waiver of the Jackson-Vanik emigration requirements in
1998; however, Vietnam did not receive NTR status
until the BTA came into effect in December 2001.3
The complex story of the negotiation and completion of
the BTA — which involved significant delays and rene-
gotiation — is conveyed in the chapters in this volume
by Edward Gresser and Nguyen Van Long.
Inked in July 2000 and ratified by the legislatures of
both countries in late 2001, the BTA is the most com-
prehensive bilateral trade agreement ever signed by
Vietnam or the United States. The BTA is described as 
a modern trade and investment agreement because it
includes extensive obligations related not just to import
tariffs and quotas, but also to transparency, investment,
intellectual property protection, market access for services,
and business facilitation. Although a number of
Vietnam’s obligations were due immediately when the
agreement came into effect, other obligations will be
phased in over time periods ranging from one to ten
years (see Appendix III), with most key commitments
due within the first three years. Of course, the most sig-
nificant immediate result was the U.S. granting NTR
status to Vietnam on December 10, 2001, which
reduced average U.S. tariffs on Vietnam’s imports from
around 40 percent to 3-4 percent. The results have been
dramatic. Fueled by garments, seafood products, and
footwear, the total value of Vietnam’s exports to the
United States increased from $1.05 billion in 2001 to
$2.4 billion in 2002. During the first six months of
2003, moreover, Vietnam’s exports to the United States
nearly equaled the entire amount from last year —
reaching $2.24 billion.4
U.S. exports to Vietnam have increased as well, growing
from $367 million in 2000 to more than $580 million
in 2002. In the first six months of 2003, U.S. exports to
Vietnam totaled $711 million — on track to top $1
billion in 2003. U.S. exports fall largely into the cate-
gories of aircraft, fertilizer, steel, and computers and
parts. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Vietnam by
U.S. business interests currently totals more than $1.1
billion, making the United States the eleventh largest
investor in Vietnam, with the majority of projects focus-
ing on the energy sector. However, this amount does not
include large investments made via U.S. subsidiaries or
third countries in Asia.5
Symbolically, the most significant bilateral event over 
the past decade was the visit to Vietnam by President
Clinton in November 2000, the first visit by a U.S.
president since Richard Nixon traveled to the former
Saigon in July 1969. Clinton’s visit not only provided
closure to the earlier period of war and confrontation,
but also underscored the new areas of cooperation that
had been developing during the previous decade of
political and economic normalization. The visit achieved
practical results as well: U.S. and Vietnamese officials
agreed to meet later to discuss joint research on the
effects of Agent Orange; bilateral de-mining efforts were
expanded; agreements were signed on science and tech-
nology and bilateral labor cooperation; and the United
States provided materials to help locate the estimated
300,000 Vietnamese troops still missing from the
Vietnam War. Also during Clinton’s visit, the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) formally
opened an office in Hanoi. As discussed below, ties have
developed further under the administration of President
George W. Bush, while the level of official U.S. assistance
has grown.
3 Until the BTA came into effect in December 2001, the practical effect of the Jackson-Vanik waiver was to make Vietnam eligible for certain U.S. government
credits, or investment or credit guarantee programs (e.g., of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the Export-Import Bank of the United States).
4 For a comprehensive review of the BTA's impact to date, see CIEM and STAR-Vietnam (USAID), An Assessment of the Economic Impact of the United States-
Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement: Annual Economic Report for 2002 (Hanoi: National Political Publishing House, 2003). U.S. Census Bureau figures for imports
from and exports to Vietnam are available at http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5520.html.
5 Singapore holds the number one FDI spot with more than $7.3 billion invested, followed by Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. For information on U.S. foreign
direct investment in Vietnam, see Vietnam Economic Times, Supplement Issue 114, August 2003, pp. 6, 12-14.
Expanding Aid, Educational Exchange, and Cultural
Contacts
Vietnam and the United States are increasingly expanding
relations and exchanges in areas beyond trade, such as
economic assistance, development, education, and culture.
For example, programs administered by USAID have
increased significantly in recent years from about $6
million in 2000 to $16 million in 2003. This aid is
divided among programs that support improved urban
and industrial environment management ($2 million);
improved access to services for vulnerable groups, such
as flood victims, persons with disabilities, and people
living with HIV/AIDS ($6.5 million); and an accelerated
transition to a market economy ($7.5 million). The last
includes a large technical assistance project to support
timely and effective implementation of the BTA. Total
annual U.S. assistance now exceeds $30 million. In addi-
tion to the USAID initiatives noted above, U.S. support
includes funds for land mine victims, technical assistance
on labor issues, and food aid in the form of commodity
monetization programs.
U.S. assistance also includes a large Fulbright educational
exchange program. With about $4 million in annual
funding, the Vietnam program is the largest Fulbright
program in the world in dollar terms.6 In addition, the
newly established Vietnam Education Foundation (VEF)
supports separate educational exchanges valued at $5
million per year. Under U.S. law, Hanoi is required to
repay outstanding loans made to the former Saigon gov-
ernment prior to 1975, and the VEF applies these debt
repayments to educational exchanges in science and
technology. At present, about 2,500 Vietnamese students
are studying in the United States. While many are sup-
ported by fellowships from Fulbright and the VEF, as
well as from private sources like the Ford Foundation,
the vast majority are self-funded students pursuing
undergraduate degrees at American universities. The
number of Vietnamese students in the United States
remains small compared to students from other Asian
countries — for example, 47,000 from Japan, 29,000
from Taiwan, and 12,000 from Thailand — but is
growing steadily. Meanwhile, the number of young
Americans studying and working in Vietnam is growing
as well, and is increasingly drawn from the new genera-
tion of the large Vietnamese-American population in the
United States.
Besides education and business, another major growth
area is that of development programs undertaken by
American NGOs. Of the approximately 380 interna-
tional NGOs with offices or permits to operate in
Vietnam, slightly more than 100 are American — the
largest total from any country. Partnering with Vietnamese
organizations and agencies throughout Vietnam,
American NGOs are addressing such urgent development
problems as poverty alleviation, women’s reproductive
health, HIV/AIDs, education, injury prevention, demi-
ning, and the trafficking of women and children. 
Finally, in the cultural realm, Americans are obtaining
insights into modern Vietnamese life through a popular
exhibition organized jointly by the Vietnam Museum of
Ethnology and the American Museum of Natural
History (AMNH) in New York City. The exhibit,
Vietnam: Journeys of Body, Mind & Spirit, opened in
New York City in March 2003. It is intended to pro-
vide a snapshot of contemporary Vietnamese culture by
displaying everyday objects and incorporating video
footage of a modernizing Vietnam. The AMNH exhibit
has also benefited Vietnamese museums via an exchange
program that trains Vietnamese museum employees and
curators in modern museum techniques and conserva-
tion. While originally designed as a training program,
the exhibit has spawned numerous Vietnamese art
shows in Manhattan galleries and is contributing to
growing American interest in a Vietnam that is no
longer associated with war.
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6 In addition to supporting approximately 50 Vietnamese and American students and scholars in country-to-country exchanges, activities include the Fulbright
Economic Teaching Program in Ho Chi Minh City that trains about 60 mid-level managers per year in market economics. This teaching program is managed by
the John F. Kennedy School of Government's Center for Business and Government at Harvard University. 
Continued Political Tensions and New Trade Disputes
Amidst this increasing cooperation and growing interac-
tion in many areas, political irritants continue to aggra-
vate the bilateral relationship. The most divisive issue is
human rights. In September 2001, the U.S. House of
Representatives passed the Vietnam Human Rights Act
(H.R. 2833) by a vote of 410-1. The act called for a ban
on increases in non-humanitarian aid to the Vietnamese
government if the president did not certify that Vietnam
is making “substantial progress” in human rights.
Vietnamese officials harshly criticized the bill at the time,
insisting that U.S.-Vietnam ties must strictly adhere to
the principle of non-interference in each other’s internal
affairs. Although the bill eventually stalled in the Senate,
as described in the chapter in this volume by Mark
Manyin, a new Vietnam Human Rights Act (H.R. 1587)
was introduced by 31 U.S. congressmen in the House of
Representatives in April 2003. A revised version of this
act was subsequently added as an amendment to the
House Foreign Relations Authorization Act (H.R. 1950),
which the House passed on July 15, 2003. The authori-
zation bill is now pending in the U.S. Senate.
Further aggravating relations are recent state-level initia-
tives in the U.S. aimed at authorizing that the flag of the
former South Vietnam government be flown in public
buildings. The issue first arose in Virginia in January
2003, when State House legislators passed such a bill.
The U.S. Department of State then contacted the bill’s
sponsor and said the legislation, if passed by Virginia’s
Senate, could set back progress in U.S.-Vietnam rela-
tions and could have “potentially serious adverse conse-
quences” on the way the United States carries out foreign
policy.7 The bill died in February. This did not deter
the State of Louisiana, however. On July 14, 2003,
Louisiana’s governor signed into law a bill requiring that
only the South Vietnam flag be flown in public schools
or during state functions.
Alongside these political tensions, new trade disputes
have emerged over garment quotas and Vietnamese cat-
fish. In late 2001, the catfish issue came to the fore
when U.S. lawmakers moved to restrict Vietnamese
catfish exports to the U.S. despite the recent signing of
the BTA. In particular, an appropriations bill included
a provision that required only the American ictaluridae
species be called “catfish.” This bill passed, forcing the
Vietnamese to market their catfish product as tra and
basa. A domestic association, the Catfish Farmers of
America, then filed an anti-dumping petition before
U.S. government agencies alleging that certain
Vietnamese enterprises were “dumping” (i.e., selling at
less than fair market value) frozen catfish fillets in the
U.S. market. After a yearlong proceeding — during
which Vietnam was judged to be a “non-market econo-
my” — the U.S. Department of Commerce agreed with
the petitioners and found that the frozen Vietnamese
catfish fillets had been dumped in the U.S. market.
Shortly thereafter, the U.S. International Trade
Commission concluded that the dumped catfish fillets
caused material injury to the domestic industry. As a
result of these findings, the Department of Commerce
has imposed anti-dumping duties on these products
ranging from 37 to 64 percent. These developments
recently prompted the Vietnam Association of Seafood
Exporters and Producers to comment that the U.S.
seems inclined to impose another “economic embargo
on Vietnam, one product at a time.”8
Tensions also surfaced over the negotiation of a garment
and textile agreement, initialed in Washington on April
25, 2003 and signed in Hanoi on July 17. Under the
agreement, 38 categories of garments and textiles are
subject to quotas for the first time. U.S. trade officials
have estimated that the agreement will allow the ship-
ment of $1.65 billion in Vietnamese goods to the
United States in 2003. In later years, the quotas will
increase 7 percent annually for cotton products and 2
percent for wool items. At the signing ceremony in July,
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7  "Va. Bill Promoting S. Vietnam Flag Dies," The Associated Press, 17 February 2003. Available at www.usvtc.org.
8 Margot Cohen and Murray Hiebert, "U.S.-Vietnam Relations: Rocky Road," Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 July 2003, p. 22. See also "The Great Catfish
War," The New York Times, 22 July 2003.
U.S. Ambassador to Hanoi Raymond Burghardt said:
“Reaching this agreement is one more piece in place in
the normalization of our trade relationship.” In contrast,
Vietnamese Trade Minister Truong Dinh Tuyen said
Vietnam “would like to lengthen the period of unfet-
tered export of products to the U.S.,” adding that Hanoi
would have preferred not to sign the agreement.9 The
Vietnamese government has repeatedly voiced concerns
that the imposition of quotas will have detrimental
effects on its domestic garment and textile industry,
which supports about two million jobs. Nevertheless,
American textile manufacturers reportedly pushed hard
for strict quotas on Vietnam, arguing that Vietnamese
exports had grown too rapidly at a time when domestic
mills were suffering under a weak U.S. economy.10
World Trade Organization (WTO) members will phase
out similar textile quotas by January 2005. However, as
a non-WTO member, Vietnam will not benefit from
this phase out and will likely continue to face such quo-
tas until it joins the WTO.
The Domestic Determinants of Foreign Policy
In the world of diplomacy, policymakers are acutely
aware of the internal pressures shaping their own policies,
but rarely are very cognizant of how similar pressures
influence the policies of their foreign counterparts. Yet,
domestic factors and developments often exert a major
impact on bilateral relations between countries, and the
key to developing an effective partnership is the ability
of each country to understand the internal pressures of
another and anticipate or respond to those pressures in a
responsible fashion. As a seasoned American observer of
East Asia has stated with regard to relations between the
United States and China, such an understanding is nec-
essary if the two countries “are to establish mutual trust
and to craft effective, realistic policies that take into
account the domestic political realities that inevitably
impinge on the relationship in each country.”11
Domestic factors are particularly conspicuous in U.S.
foreign policy. Whether due to the proliferation of insti-
tutional actors or the growing influence of societal
groups, U.S. foreign policy is replete with examples of
how domestic politics shape and restrain U.S. actions
abroad, especially in the post-Cold War world. This fact
has not been lost on Vietnamese observers. Writing in
1999, a Vietnamese researcher noted that the Vietnamese
need to comprehend the U.S. political system and how
it affects foreign policy. “There are different private
interest groups and government agencies in America
which have different opinions about the normalization
with Vietnam,” he said. “They will influence the pace at
which the U.S. government can move its relations with
Vietnam forward.”12
Indeed, the process of economic normalization in U.S.-
Vietnam relations has required Vietnamese officials to
interact with a broader spectrum of governmental and
societal actors in the United States than was the case
during political normalization in the early 1990s. Policy
choices on economic issues involve a variety of actors in
addition to the White House and the State Department,
such as the Office of the United States Trade
Representative, the Department of Commerce, and the
Department of the Treasury. Congress has become more
central to the relationship as well. The annual waivers of
the Jackson-Vanik amendment and ratification of the
BTA have involved congressional action. In addition,
these legislative actions have provided opportunities for
U.S. advocacy groups focusing on human rights, labor
issues, and religious freedom to influence relations with
Vietnam. Until Vietnam joins the WTO, it will contin-
ue to depend on annual presidential extensions of NTR
based on the Jackson-Vanik legislation. The extensions
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9 "Vietnam-U.S. Garment and Textile Deal Becomes Official," Financial Times Information (Global News Wire - Asia Africa Intelligence Wire), 18 July 2003.
10 Margot Cohen, "U.S., Vietnam Sign a Trade Pact Setting Limits on Textile Exports," The Wall Street Journal, 28 April 2003.
11 Kenneth Lieberthal, "Domestic Forces in Sino-U.S. Relations," in Living with China, ed. Ezra F. Vogel (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), p. 275.
12 Bui Thanh Son, "Vietnam-U.S. Relations and Vietnam's Foreign Policy in the 1990s," in Vietnamese Foreign Policy in Transition, ed. Carlyle Thayer and
Ramses Amer (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), pp. 212-14.
are likely to be forthcoming, as explained in the chapter
by I.M. Destler, but they also will provide opportunities
for members of Congress and interest groups to high-
light concerns about Vietnam generally.
While recent analyses of bilateral relations have tended
to focus on the complications caused by new actors in
the U.S. policy environment, few observers recognize
that profound complexities are also emerging in
Vietnamese foreign relations as a result of the reform
program that has been underway since the mid-1980s.
Shortly after initiating doi moi (“renovation”) reforms in
1986, Hanoi adopted a “multi-directional” foreign poli-
cy that led to Vietnam’s military withdrawal from
Cambodia in 1989, rapprochement with China in 1991,
restoration of official assistance from Japan in 1992, and
then, in 1995, normalization of relations with the
United States, membership in the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the signing of a
framework agreement with the European Union. These
changes were implemented to help create external condi-
tions favorable to Vietnam’s economic reform program,
as explained in the chapter by Vu Xuan Truong, but over
time the reforms themselves have affected both the
determinants and the decisionmaking processes of
Vietnamese foreign policy. 
Prior to doi moi, Vietnamese foreign policy was primari-
ly the responsibility of the Politburo of the Communist
Party, the External Relations Commission of the Party
Central Committee, and three government ministries:
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense,
and Ministry of Interior. During the reform period,
however, Vietnam has witnessed a broadening and
decentralization of the foreign policymaking process, as
economic reform and international economic integration
have necessitated that the government specialize in a
widening array of issues — the full range of which
exceeds the policy expertise of the traditional decision-
making bodies. Particularly noticeable, with the increas-
ing importance of foreign economic policy in Vietnam,
has been the growing role of economic ministries such as
the Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Finance, and the
Ministry of Planning and Investment. The National
Assembly is playing a more active role as well, as
described in the chapter by Pham Quoc Bao.13
Investigating Domestic Determinants in Vietnam and the
United States
The chapters in this volume emerged from papers 
presented at a bilateral conference at Georgetown
University in November 2001, organized by The Asia
Foundation in cooperation with Vietnam’s Institute for
International Relations. The papers were subsequently
revised and expanded based on discussion at the confer-
ence, and also were updated to cover events through the
end of 2002. The volume begins with chapters on the
institutional setting in which policy is made in both
countries, proceeds to an analysis of the socioeconomic
environment in which policy takes place (focusing espe-
cially on business interests and the rising importance of
foreign economic policy), and ends with a specific case
study on the negotiation, signing, and ratification of the
landmark Bilateral Trade Agreement. Taken together, the
chapters provide a fresh and penetrating look at the
domestic institutions, groups, and issues that affect not
only the overall foreign policies of each country but also
the bilateral relations between them.
The Vietnamese chapters offer the first extensive dis-
cussions by Vietnamese authors about the domestic
determinants of Vietnam’s foreign policy in a bilateral
context. The chapter by Phan Doan Nam, a former
Assistant Foreign Minister who currently serves as an
advisor to IIR, describes how various internal pressures
and institutions have affected Vietnamese foreign policy.
Discussing the origins of doi moi, he points out that the
impetus for renovation — and by extension, the diversi-
fication of Vietnam’s foreign relations that followed —
came not from the collapse of the Soviet Union but
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13 For American perspectives on the domestic sources of Vietnamese foreign policy, see the articles by Zachary Abuza, Kent Bolton, and Mark Sidel listed in
the bibliography of this volume.
from the government’s response to an economic crisis
that had domestic roots. With regard to institutions, he
describes the predominant role of the Communist Party
in developing the general lines of foreign policy as well
the interaction between the Party and executive agencies,
most notably the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in putting
this line into effect. He also notes that the process of 
foreign policy decisionmaking can be especially protracted
where the United States is concerned. Drawing an his-
torical example from the late 1970s, he describes how
lengthy deliberations within the Politburo (on whether
to drop Vietnam’s demand for post-war reconstruction
aid) precluded more rapid diplomatic moves by Vietnam
during the failed 1977-78 negotiations with the Carter
administration on normalizing relations.14
In the next Vietnamese chapter, Pham Quoc Bao offers
an original discussion of the National Assembly’s role in
foreign policymaking in the context of broader reforms
to the legislature under doi moi. In particular, he explains
how the National Assembly ratifies international agree-
ments with foreign governments and organizations,
adopts general foreign policy orientations that are
expressed in annual resolutions, and addresses specific
bilateral issues on a case-by-case basis. He also highlights
the role and activities of the Foreign Affairs Committee
of the National Assembly between and during the bi-
annual sessions of the Assembly, showing how it interacts
with the National Assembly Standing Committee
(NASC), other Assembly committees, government min-
istries, and Assembly members in the process of prepar-
ing and examining bills and resolutions. To illustrate this
process, Bao concludes his chapter by recounting the
procedures, dynamics, and actual debates that led to the
ratification of the BTA in November 2001. Although it
was approved by a safe margin, the debate revealed a
“mixed mood” among Assembly members — one col-
ored by opposition to the Vietnam Human Rights Act,
recently passed in the U.S. House of Representatives,
and concern over new labeling requirements for
Vietnamese catfish.
A third Vietnamese chapter, written by Vu Xuan Truong,
depicts the rising importance of foreign economic policy
since Vietnam initiated doi moi in 1986. The chapter
not only discusses the origins of the “new thinking”
embodied in doi moi, showing how foreign policy has
been reoriented to support economic reform, but also
recounts key developments in Vietnam’s path toward
international economic integration — including its
membership in ASEAN in 1995 and the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in 1998, the
signing of the BTA in July 2000, and its ongoing negoti-
ations to join the WTO. On a practical level, the chapter
points to a new emphasis in Vietnamese foreign policy,
which the author describes as “diplomacy serving eco-
nomic development.” Vietnamese diplomats are allocating
more time and effort to expanding Vietnam’s external
economic relations, Truong notes, often by lobbying
individuals and groups to facilitate the entry of
Vietnamese goods and services into their host countries.
He also describes recent meetings within Vietnam
between Vietnamese diplomats and local business people.
First convened in late 2001, these meetings have provided
the diplomats with first-hand knowledge of local business
needs, and presented opportunities for business people
to learn how Vietnamese embassies and consulates can
promote their interests overseas.
Picking up on this theme, the ensuing chapter by Pham
Chi Lan shows how Vietnamese business interests have
been expressed in Vietnamese foreign policy both before
and during doi moi. Lan focuses especially on the role of
the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry
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14 These negotiations occurred between May 1977 and October 1978. Until late in the negotiations, the Vietnamese insisted that as a condition of normaliza-
tion, the United States provide Vietnam with reconstruction aid based on Article 21 of the Paris Peace Agreement of 1973 and a letter sent from President
Richard Nixon to Prime Minister Pham Van Dong in February 1973. The American negotiating team refused to comply with this demand. The American position,
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letter, had been invalidated by Hanoi's violations of the agreement in 1974-75. For a neutral account of the negotiations, see Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy
(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986), pp. 136-157, 263-272.
(VCCI) in advancing and diversifying Vietnam’s foreign
economic relations.15 As early as 1976, she notes, VCCI
merged with the Saigon Chamber of Commerce and
began developing relations with other chambers of com-
merce in Asia and Europe. In the early 1980s, it also
became actively involved in developing a policy proposal
to the government to diversify Vietnam’s import-export
trade. As a result, the trade monopoly of the Ministry of
Foreign Trade came to an end, and new business links
were developed with partners in non-socialist countries.
The author also depicts Vietnam’s urgent need to further
diversify trade relations in the early 1990s following the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the Soviet-led Council
for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). She
explains that it was the demand for economic develop-
ment and trade promotion that ultimately forced
Vietnam to escape from economic isolation, diversify its
trade partnerships, and improve relations with foreign
countries and international institutions. The chapter
concludes with three brief case studies — on South
Korea, Taiwan, and Israel — showing how business
interests have been the decisive factor influencing the
evolution of Vietnam’s relations with these countries. 
The final Vietnamese chapter, written by Nguyen Van
Long, discusses the BTA negotiations as well as the chal-
lenges for Vietnam in implementing its commitments
under the agreement. He explains how the Ministry of
Trade played the key role in negotiating the BTA over
nine rounds of negotiations that began in 1996 and
ended in July 2000. Owing to the broad scope of the
agreement, however, many other ministries participated
as well, including those of Planning and Investment;
Finance; Industry; Agriculture and Rural Development;
Science, Technology and Environment; Justice; Culture
and Information; Fisheries; and Foreign Affairs. It was
the responsibility of the Ministry of Trade to coordinate
with these ministries and guide the overall negotiations
with the United States. The chapter also reviews
Vietnam’s commitments in the BTA in the areas of trade
in goods, intellectual property rights, trade in services,
investment, and transparency. In discussing implementa-
tion issues, the author emphasizes the tremendous chal-
lenge for Vietnam not only in carrying out the broad
legal reforms required by the BTA, but also in enhancing
the competitiveness of Vietnamese goods and services as
domestic tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and other protec-
tionist barriers are phased out.
Like the chapters by Vietnamese authors described
above, the American chapters address the institutions
that formulate U.S. foreign policy, the socioeconomic
environment in which it is made, and the negotiations
that led to the BTA. 
The first chapter, by Frederick Z. Brown, discusses the
interactions and dynamics among the principal foreign
policy institutions in the United States as well as the far-
reaching impact of the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001. The chapter examines the formal institutions
involved in foreign policy (i.e., the National Security
Council, Department of State, Department of Defense,
and Central Intelligence Agency), the role of Congress,
and the growing influence of the media, public opinion,
and organized pressure groups. It also reviews the emer-
gence of other institutional foreign policy actors, such as
the Office of the United States Trade Representative
(USTR) and the recently established Department of
Homeland Security. Brown concludes that the main
focus of U.S. foreign affairs, including all bilateral rela-
tions, is now on handling the threat of international
terrorism successfully. Bilateral relations with no con-
nection to this fight will not be ignored, but they will
receive a lower priority of attention. He also notes that
human rights will remain a contentious issue in U.S.-
Vietnam relations due to the presence of human rights
and religious freedom advocates in American society and
government. With the normalization of relations, he
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adds, it is necessary to recognize the existence of such
interests “as part of the American system, just as
Americans must recognize certain political realities in
Vietnam.” Still, Brown maintains that these problems
can be managed by both sides and need not impede
overall consolidation of the bilateral relationship.
The next chapter, written by Mark Manyin, focuses on
how Congress influences U.S. foreign policy in general
and policy toward Vietnam in particular. The chapter
first reviews the tools that members of Congress use to
affect foreign policy (e.g., amendments to appropriations
legislation, public hearings, and congressional resolu-
tions), and then examines the factors that heighten or
diminish Congress’s foreign policy influence. Manyin
also explores changing congressional attitudes toward
Vietnam over time, analyzing the ways in which
Congress has both hindered and promoted the relation-
ship. Until the early 1990s, he notes, the vestiges of the
Vietnam War hurt Vietnam’s standing in Congress. But
afterward, Congress began to take a more supportive
view of normalizing relations with Vietnam. 
According to Manyin, an important influence on this
change was the 1991-1992 bipartisan Senate Select
Committee on POW/MIA affairs, which helped defuse
the passion surrounding the POW issue. Another turning
point came in January 1994, when the Senate passed a
resolution urging the lifting of the U.S. trade embargo
on Vietnam. Manyin recounts how several members of
Congress who were Vietnam War veterans played a crucial
role in convincing colleagues — and the Clinton adminis-
tration — that the time was right to normalize relations.
Without this bipartisan “political cover,” he writes, the
Clinton administration would have taken longer to move
toward a policy of normalization. Finally, Manyin
describes how human rights have replaced the POW/MIA
issue as a vehicle for congressional critics of Vietnam. He
also cautions that with bilateral trade increasing rapidly,
Vietnamese officials need to be prepared for high levels of
congressional attention to economic relations and
Vietnam’s implementation of the BTA. A key challenge
for Vietnam, he adds, will be to identify new champions
of the relationship who can carry it into the future.
Next, I.M. Destler examines the role of organized business
and the rise of foreign economic policy in the United
States. He opens the chapter with the observation that
economic interests have not been the dominant force
shaping U.S. trade relations with Vietnam over the past
quarter century. Rather, those with stakes in the legacy
of the war have played that role. But organized U.S.
business has been an important supplemental player in
the liberalizing events of the past decade, he says, and is
likely to play a growing role in the years ahead. In the
main body of his chapter, Destler traces the increasing
role of economic interests and business engagement in
American foreign policy with the establishment of the
USTR and the end of the Cold War. The latter weak-
ened the influence of national security concerns on U.S.
trade and economic policy, he notes. This was reflected
in President Clinton’s creation of the National Economic
Council and his initiatives on free trade agreements.
Destler also characterizes Clinton’s 1994 decision on
China to de-link trade and human rights as a “coming of
age” for organized U.S. business, which had mobilized
and lobbied the government to sever this linkage.
Destler points out that Vietnam brings a weak hand to
trade negotiations with the United States because, unlike
China and other major trading partners, it occupies only
a small share of overall U.S. international commerce. In
the short run, he argues, Vietnamese officials must make
the most of the present situation and cultivate allies
outside established negotiating channels. He suggests
focusing on (1) individuals and groups committed, for
non-economic reasons, to deepening the bilateral rela-
tionship; (2) business firms with important investments
in Vietnam; (3) business firms with important exports to
Vietnam; and (4) distributors and industrial users of
imports from Vietnam. As long as trade remains modest
in U.S. terms, Destler says the first category will be the
most influential and the fourth will be the least impor-
tant. However, he maintains that Vietnam can aspire to
have much greater influence on U.S. trade policy over
the long term if it continues to open up its economy. 
If American firms increasingly find Vietnam to be a
hospitable place to invest and initiate or expand trade,
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he writes, U.S. business interests will “give increased
political priority to lobbying on issues affecting Vietnam
because it will be in their interest to do so.”
In the final American chapter, Edward Gresser describes
the story of the BTA’s development and ratification on
the U.S. side. Gresser identifies three phases in the BTA’s
development: an initial phase from 1993-1995 that set
the foundation for trade normalization through a series
of small economic steps; a bumpy negotiation phase
from 1996-2000; and finally a ratification phase lasting
from 2000-2001. He also provides a close analysis of the
American interest groups that had a stake in promoting
or opposing an agreement. These included the familiar
business, labor, and foreign policy groups as well as
Vietnamese-American community associations, veterans
organizations, and families of soldiers listed as MIA.
Gresser describes the objectives, internal deliberations,
and tactics of the Clinton administration in vivid detail
— including considerations of the BTA’s risks to the
Democratic Party and to the president himself. He also
reveals how domestic politics caused delays in U.S. rati-
fication both at the end of the Clinton administration
and at the beginning of the current Bush presidency. In
the end, of course, the BTA passed both houses of
Congress with a broad consensus supporting economic
normalization with Vietnam. For Gresser, this quiet
conclusion is a sign that the “final stone in the arch of
reconciliation is firmly set.”
Conclusion
As the chapters in this volume make clear, future progress
in U.S.-Vietnam relations will depend increasingly on
each side’s appreciation of the domestic influences at
play as the two countries engage across a broader range
of bilateral issues. A common theme running through-
out the volume is the growing importance of foreign
economic policy. For Vietnam, this was first reflected
in the “diversification and multilateralization” of foreign
relations early in the doi moi period, designed to create
external conditions that would support the country’s
ambitious economic reform program. Subsequently, it
has been seen in Vietnam’s drive for international eco-
nomic integration. For the United States, it is reflected
in the increasing significance of foreign trade policy in
U.S. foreign relations. In both countries, these changes
have led not only to more complex bureaucratic inter-
actions in the way that foreign policy is made, but also
to growing influence by societal actors and economic
trends on the foreign policymaking process. The terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001 have complicated this
picture for the United States, bringing national security
concerns to the fore once again, but have not reversed
the overall trends.
What are the lessons that each country can take away
from this study? For Vietnam, as the chapters by the
American authors would suggest, it is no longer
enough simply to enhance understanding about the
domestic sources of U.S. foreign policy. In the new
bilateral context in which legacy of war issues are
receding and the politics of trade are becoming more
salient, Vietnam will need to make strategic choices
when cultivating friends and allies in American politics
and society. The growing trade and investment rela-
tionship has created newly shared interests between the
two countries, but it also has engendered new conflicts
and disputes. In this context, and with Congress and
U.S. lobby groups becoming more central to bilateral
relations, who are the future champions in the United
States for improved relations with Vietnam? In the
long term, as one author in this volume argues, the
most politically influential allies will come from key
sectors of U.S. business as long as trade and investment
continue to develop. But other groups are likely to be
receptive as well — including U.S. NGOs with programs
in Vietnam, and even young Americans who have studied
or worked in the country.
Finally, what lessons does this study suggest for the
United States? First, it is no longer possible to view
Vietnam as a unitary state that is immune to societal
pressures. With a shrinking state sector and a labor
force growing at 1.5 million workers per year, Vietnamese
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policymakers are under considerable pressure to create
jobs by promoting faster growth and increased exports.
Meanwhile, a formal private sector has emerged in recent
years, tripling in size since a landmark Enterprise Law
came into effect in January 2000. Through a process of
public consultations that has expanded under doi moi,
the aspirations and grievances of business people are
being increasingly felt in domestic policies and laws. As
described in one chapter in this volume, such consulta-
tions are now also being extended into the foreign policy
arena to ensure that Vietnamese diplomats can represent
the country’s business interests overseas. Lastly,
Vietnamese diplomats are no longer the only actors in
Vietnam’s foreign relations. While the general lines 
of foreign policy are set by the Party and carried out
principally by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, other
government ministries are becoming involved as the
widening array of international issues requires special-
ized expertise. In sum, it is important for Americans to
view Vietnam in all of its complexity, both in terms of
decisionmaking about foreign policy and the socioeco-
nomic pressures which affect the decisions that are made.
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The Institutional Setting
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This essay discusses the dynamics of the principal U.S.
institutions involved in the formulation and execution of
American foreign policy. Those institutions include the
Office of the President and some of the foreign policy
entities that serve it: the National Security Council, the
Departments of State, Defense, and the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA). The U.S. Congress, the
media, public opinion, and organized pressure groups
also qualify as “institutions” in any discussion of policy.
The essay then discusses the far-reaching impact of the
events of September 11, 2001; speculates on how
American foreign policy may be focused in the years
ahead; and offers some thoughts on how the war against
international terrorism may affect the conduct of U.S.-
Vietnam bilateral relations.
Institutional Change
How the U.S. government formulates foreign policy can
be only partially explained through a simple organiza-
tional chart showing the executive branch with its vari-
ous departments, agencies, commissions, and special rep-
resentatives. In theory, these organs are under the firm
direction of, and rigorously responsive to, the president;
in practice, such discipline is rarely the case. The U.S.
constitution written by our country’s Founding Fathers
only briefly prescribed the powers in foreign affairs given
to various actors in the government, and it provided no
instruction on how these powers would be used in real
life situations two centuries later. The constitution gave
the Senate powers to “advise and consent” in certain
areas of foreign affairs, gave the House of
Representatives the authority to originate money bills
(which has become influential and frequently decisive in
the conduct of foreign affairs), and named the president
as commander in chief of the military establishment.
But the men who wrote that document were savvy
politicians, and they were far too pragmatic to expect
that their 18th century view of ways and means to con-
duct the nation’s external affairs could be a precise guide
to the future. The passage of time has naturally seen
many changes in America’s place in the world and, con-
sequently, how foreign policy is devised and conducted.
The prime actors — the president and the Congress —
have often disagreed and accused each other of over-
stepping their respective constitutional boundaries.
There have been many institutional changes in the past
half-century that bear upon the conduct of American
foreign policy. Four major changes, including the recently
created Department of Homeland Security, are discussed
in this paper.
First, in response to Cold War pressures and the United
States’ emergence as a global power after World War II,
the National Security Act of 1947 enhanced the execu-
tive powers of the president by creating the National
Security Council, headed by a national security advisor,
to develop policy alternatives and to coordinate their
implementation. The Department of Defense replaced
the War Department. Within it were created the depart-
ments of the Army, Navy and Air Force headed by civil-
ian secretaries. To unify military planning and imple-
mentation, a Joint Chiefs of Staff under a senior military
commander as chairman replaced the organizational
structure that had overseen the conduct of World War
II. The Central Intelligence Agency was created to
replace the Office of Strategic Services and a gaggle of
other wartime intelligence services. The CIA director
was given a second hat as “Director of Central
Intelligence” (DCI) or senior coordinator for all
American intelligence functions (State, Defense, Federal
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Bureau of Investigation, etc.). This responsibility of the
DCI has taken on considerable breadth since the events
of September 11.
A second significant development was the War Powers
Act passed by Congress in 1973 to restrain the “imperial
presidency” of Richard M. Nixon and to assert
Congress’s own constitutional authority. Under the Act,
which was approved over Nixon’s veto, the president is
obligated to consult Congress before committing troops
overseas and to report to Congress immediately after-
ward about the need to continue the mission. The presi-
dent must terminate the mission within 60 days unless
Congress agrees to extend it, a provision designed to
forestall the kind of “mission creep” that occurred in
Vietnam. The act was a reaction to the August 1964
Tonkin Gulf Resolution that authorized President
Lyndon B. Johnson “to take all necessary measures to
repel any armed attack against the forces of the United
States…” in practical effect tantamount to a declaration
of war, a power constitutionally reserved to the
Congress. (The House of Representatives passed the
Tonkin Gulf Resolution 416-0; the Senate approved the
measure 88-2.) Although rejected by later presidents as
unconstitutional and rarely invoked by Congress, the
War Powers Act symbolizes the national mood that
blamed the war on excessive presidential power. To my
knowledge, there was very little discussion in Congress
regarding possible implementation of the War Powers
Act with regard to President Bush’s deployment of
American military forces to Afghanistan.
Thirdly, with the end of the Cold War and the emer-
gence of the United States as the “unipole” in world
affairs, the phenomenon of globalization and the prima-
cy of international economics and trade became promi-
nent themes of what became known as the new world
order. A major institutional change in the United States
government was the creation of the United States Trade
Representative (USTR), an office that quickly accrued
great power in foreign affairs by reason of its responsibility
for negotiating international trade agreements. Having
been elevated to cabinet status, USTR in effect now
eclipses the Department of Commerce, and in some
instances even the Department of State, in international
matters, simply because there is no longer a separation of
economic and commercial affairs from the political rela-
tionships between nation states. Similarly, the
Department of the Treasury has become a major player
in foreign policy deliberations, again because the U.S.
dollar has become the virtual common currency of glob-
alization. Nowhere have these new realities been more
evident than in the long process of political and eco-
nomic normalization of relations between Vietnam and
the United States.
The Framework for Foreign Policy Decisionmaking
The president is obviously at the center of the executive
branch’s bureaucracy, which formulates the issues for
decision and tasks agencies and departments to gather
information. The other actors — Congress, public opin-
ion, the media, and various pressure groups — surround
the chief executive, attempting either to restrain his
actions or, conversely, to urge him onward. But the criti-
cal question is how faithfully the president’s decisions are
actually implemented. President Dwight D. Eisenhower,
a former general, noted: “I give the orders as president
and nobody follows them.” This complaint has been
echoed by Eisenhower’s successors. It is not so much the
structure of the executive branch that determines policy,
as it is the myriad political, economic, and psychological
factors that act upon the projection of the president’s
power. In 1939-40, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in
his efforts to assist Great Britain during the darkest days
of World War II, was hemmed in by isolationist senti-
ment in public opinion and hostility in Congress to
American involvement in the war. Presidents Johnson
and Nixon were similarly constrained by public opinion
(and increasingly by Congress after the Tet offensive of
1968) in their conduct of the war in Vietnam. President
Bill Clinton’s foreign policy team and the president him-
self were notoriously sensitive to what they perceived as
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public opinion as measured by polling data. The Clinton
administration was sharply criticized for its vacillation
and actual missteps on policies toward Haiti, Somalia,
Bosnia, and Kosovo, among others.
In addition to the statutory changes and specific cases
cited above, it is important to understand the quantum
shift in attitude of American society with regard to the
U.S. government that took place in the late 1960s and
early 1970s. This shift was due to the activist spirit of
the 1960s, the turmoil of the domestic civil rights move-
ment, dismay over the assassinations of President John F.
Kennedy, Martin Luther King, and Senator Robert F.
Kennedy, and of course, popular disagreement over the
war in Vietnam. During this period, Indochina domi-
nated the deliberations of the U.S. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. Within the Congress, in the
media, and among Americans of all political persuasions,
American foreign policy — indeed many aspects of our
value system — were examined in the light of the war.
The repercussions went well beyond Indochina. The
bipartisan congressional consensus that had been the
basis for foreign policy under Presidents Harry S.
Truman and Eisenhower and that extended into the
Kennedy era was soundly shaken. The Watergate scandal
and Nixon’s forced resignation were the direct result of
the president’s anxiety over the antiwar movement.
These events and the congressional elections of
November 1974 ended official U.S. financial and mate-
rial support for the government of South Vietnam.
President Kennedy’s inaugural address call to “go any-
where and pay any price” no longer rang true with either
Congress or the American public. At that time, the
effects of the Vietnam experience were felt throughout
our national life and in particular on the traditional
belief about the benign role of America in the world.
The Vietnam War era changed profoundly the relation-
ship between the executive and legislative branches of
government in making and managing foreign policy.
The concept of government service as a noble calling for
young Americans was shaken. 
The information and communication revolution is a fac-
tor that intrudes into every institution involved in the
foreign policy process. Compared to a generation ago,
there is vastly more information relevant to public policy
now available, and it is communicated instantaneously
from many sources. Not only is that information mas-
sive in quantity and instantly available, it is all too often
indiscriminate, undifferentiated, and even contradictory.
How can policymakers and the general public evaluate
the avalanche of raw data that descends upon them
every day? The president, of course, has his experts to
organize and evaluate the data.  In the past, American
foreign policy officials would listen to a relatively small
band of elite commentators in the print media (e.g.
Walter Lippmann, James Reston). But with the advent
of television, popular attitudes were influenced rapidly
and deeply: for example in February 1968, Walter
Cronkite, reporting from Hue for CBS-TV, bluntly
questioned the United States’ capability to achieve its
objectives in Vietnam. This is but one case where media
reporting helped shape perceptions of the American peo-
ple and influenced the decisions of their government.
Today, heads of state and their foreign ministers gain
their impressions of breaking foreign news before
receiving reports from their diplomats. In sum, in the
realm of foreign affairs the media is an institution in its
own right that must be taken into account by
American policymakers.
It would be impossible to over-emphasize the importance
of individual personalities in the high reaches of the U.S.
government. We are all familiar with how former
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, a man of
extraordinary intellect and massive ego to match, eclipsed
Secretary of State William Rogers, excluding Rogers from
negotiations with Vietnam from 1969-73 and then
replacing him as secretary in September 1973. Similarly,
Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Jimmy Carter’s national
security advisor, 1977-81, was often at odds with then
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, for example on the issue
of normalization of relations with Vietnam.
Bush I and Bush II
During the administration of the elder George Bush,
1989-93, American foreign policy was wrenched from
its Cold War framework. With the sudden demise of the
Soviet Union and the collapse of Soviet power in Eastern
Europe and Central Asia, the United States found itself
indisputably the single most powerful nation in the
world. This new reality was confirmed by the rapid
allied victory over Iraq in the 1990-91 Gulf War, under-
scored by a stunning display of technological sophistica-
tion. While some Democrats were critical of President
Bush’s determination to roll back Iraq’s conquest by
force, the Gulf War was conducted for the most part
with a high degree of political bipartisanship. What the
elder Bush failed to reckon with was that although
Americans honor military success, they vote with their
pocketbooks. The economic downturn of the early
1990s ended the Bush I administration, and it reaf-
firmed those indelible truths of American political life:
“All politics are local” and “it’s the economy, stupid.”
The foreign policy decisionmaking process worked well
in Bush I (with the president himself making the final
decision over strong objections of some of his advisors)
in confronting the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, if not dis-
posing of Saddam. The implementation of that policy in
forming a broad coalition, including the major Arab
countries, and then bringing off a brilliantly efficient air
and land campaign against Iraq was widely praised.
But that was then. The administration of his son,
George W. Bush, which took office eight years later in
January 2001, initially adopted a general approach to
foreign policy that has been seen by many observers, for-
eign and domestic, as starkly unilateralist and dismissive
of the views of America’s allies. What the administration
describes as “consultation” often appears to be a stance
where the United States simply informs its friends of
decisions already taken. The rapid American military
victory over the Taliban in Afghanistan, underscoring as
it did the superiority of American technology and ability
to deploy its military might in a terrain where the
Soviets had foundered, has reinforced the impression
that the United States (with some support from Great
Britain) intends to “go it alone.” At the same time, the
president’s black and white approach of “you are either
for us or against us” has blunted the willingness of some
countries normally disposed favorably toward the United
States to cooperate.
The Impact of September 11 and a Fourth Institutional
Change
September 11 has radically altered the character of
American foreign policy. For the first time in American
history, international terrorism is seen as a threat to the
survival of the United States government, and indeed
our whole society. Americans used to say that where 
foreign policy was concerned, politics stopped “at the
water’s edge.” This myth has been shattered — now for-
eign policy begins explicitly at home and is an integral
part of our national defense. The game is no longer vic-
tory or defeat on a single Cold War battlefield. During
the Cold War, mutually assured destruction (MAD) car-
ried an inherent limitation. As the theology of nuclear
war developed, both the Soviet and the American sides
became convinced of the certainty of global suicide should
either employ the ultimate weapon. Arguably, MAD was
the key stabilizer in the U.S.-Soviet competition.
Not so in the war against international terrorism. The
reason is simple. The cold war was waged between
“rational actors,” especially where MAD was concerned.
The implications of international terrorism are today
vastly different. Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda net-
work have stated unequivocally that their objective is the
destruction of the United States. Whether they actually
possess the physical capability to grievously injure the
country is another matter. The American government
has no choice but to take bin Laden’s vows seriously, to
prepare the strongest defense possible, and to plan for
worst-case scenarios in the event of further attacks. At
issue is the possible use of nuclear devices or other
weapons of mass destruction against the territory of the
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United States and its population. It has become axiomat-
ic that September 11 has changed everything.
On November 25, 2002, President Bush signed into law
a bill that created a new cabinet-level entity, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), marking a
change in the organization of the executive branch of the
United States government that ranks in importance with
the National Security Act of 1947. This DHS joins
together 22 federal agencies, with 170,000 employees,
that have national security responsibilities. These include
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the U.S.
Customs Service, the Federal Emergency Management
Administration, and the U.S. Coast Guard. The objective
of the DHS is to preempt, intercept, and counter inter-
national terrorist attacks. Significantly, the CIA and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, two powerful actors in
the campaign against international terrorism, are not
included in the Department of Homeland Security, an
exclusion that could seriously complicate its operations.
The CIA has been resurrected from a bureaucratic
decline caused by internal security scandals, the “Iran-
Contra” affair in the 1980s, and the decimation of its
clandestine service under the drastic personnel reorgani-
zations in the 1970s. Its role has been significantly
expanded as a consequence of September 11. It was
deeply involved in information-gathering and clandestine
operations during the war in Afghanistan, and remains
the lead U.S. agency in the continuing effort to pinpoint
and neutralize Osama bin Laden. In early November
2002, for example, the CIA, operating in Yemen, neutral-
ized a senior al Qaeda official through the use of a guided
missile-bearing “Predator” remotely controlled aircraft. 
U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Relations
What does all this mean for the bilateral relationship
between Vietnam and the United States? First of all, the
primary focus of U.S. foreign affairs, including all bilat-
eral relations, is now on handling the threat of interna-
tional terrorism successfully. U.S. bilateral relationships
generally will be conducted within that framework.
Vietnam no doubt understands the concerns of the
United States in this regard. This is not to say that
aspects of bilateral relations that have no direct connec-
tion to this fight will be ignored, only that they will
receive a lower priority of attention.
Immediately after September 11, Vietnam appeared to
be relatively forthcoming with regard to sharing infor-
mation. Enhancement of such cooperation would be a
highly positive factor in the bilateral relationship.
However, since 2000 the issue of the United States
granting asylum to Central Highlanders fleeing Vietnam
into Cambodia has become an obvious irritant that
would seem to make active cooperation more difficult.
Second, consolidation of bilateral relations will depend
in large measure on how well the Bilateral Trade
Agreement (BTA) is implemented. The USTR was
responsible for concluding successfully the BTA over a
period of five years. USTR remains a key player in the
bilateral relationship. We are constantly urged to recog-
nize that “Vietnam is a country, not a war,” and this
frame of reference should certainly be borne in mind.
But the concerted and energetic drive to normalize eco-
nomic relations spurred on by American firms seeking to
do business in Vietnam from 1995 onward has largely
succeeded. The impetus for further progress will depend
heavily on Vietnam’s willingness to implement the BTA,
particularly if American investors and commercial part-
ners meet with disappointment in the application of the
BTA on the ground. While we can hope that situations
such as the current U.S. restraints affecting the importa-
tion of Vietnamese catfish are the exception rather than
the rule, such problems must be addressed realistically
yet imaginatively by both sides.
Third, the operation of the BTA will have the effect of
significantly increasing Vietnam’s exports over the next
decade. Already, Vietnam’s exports to the United States
have increased from about 1.05 billion in 2001 to
almost 2.4 billion in 2002. Assuming full implementa-
tion, American direct investment can also increase 
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substantially. Both developments will be beneficial to
Vietnam’s economy and will in turn enhance the pros-
perity (and hence the stability) of Vietnamese society.
However, it would be a mistake to conclude that the
consumption capacity of the large American middle class
— no matter how many shopping malls we build — is
infinite. The American market’s ability to absorb manu-
factured goods imported from Asia is large but nonethe-
less limited. The economy has yet to bounce back fully
from the recent recession. Consequently, the BTA by
itself cannot be seen as the savior of the Vietnamese
economy.
Fourth, the presence of human rights and religious free-
dom advocates on the White House staff and in the
Congress means that the Vietnam Human Rights Act
(known as H.R. 2833), which the government of
Vietnam strongly objects to, will remain a contentious
bilateral issue. The Congress has displayed an active
interest in promoting the observance of human rights
internationally since 1975, when it levied on the
Department of State a country-by-country reporting
requirement. In 1998, Congress passed the International
Religious Freedom Act and created the U.S. Commission
on International Religious Freedom, which recommends
the use of sanctions on countries that are deemed abusive
of religious freedom. The Commission concerns itself
with many other countries besides Vietnam.
H.R. 2833 was passed by a wide margin in the House of
Representatives but did not come to the floor of the
Senate in 2001. The Senate did not take up the bill dur-
ing 2002. However, its supporters remain determined to
see this legislation, or similar legislation, enacted in
2003. With a larger Republican majority in the House
of Representatives and with the Senate now in
Republican hands as a result of the November 2002
elections, the issue is by no means closed. The U.S.
Commission on International Religious Freedom has
supported adoption of the Act. With normalization of
our bilateral relations, both sides must recognize the
existence of such interest groups — and the American
sentiments they represent — as part of the American
system, just as Americans must recognize certain politi-
cal realities in Vietnam. Again, these are problems that
must be managed by both sides; they must not impede
the overall consolidation of the bilateral relationship.
Lastly, in my opinion a key element in broadening the
foundation of the bilateral relationship is to strengthen
the strategic dialogue on Asian security issues with the
administration and the Congress. The strategic dialogue
obviously includes enhancement of military-to-military
relations. Vietnam’s membership in the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its unique 
geographic location carry an inherent significance for
the United States that should work to the advantage 
of Vietnam. There has been considerable speculation
regarding the future of Cam Ranh Bay once the
Russians depart definitively. While Vietnam has made
perfectly clear that Cam Ranh will never again become 
a base for foreign forces, it would seem logical that it 
can eventually become the site of ship visits, commercial
development, and a tourist destination.
But a strategic dialogue comprehends much more than
this. People-to-people and institution-to-institution
contacts should be increased rapidly, including com-
munication between the National Assembly and the
Congress. There should be room to expand the existing
modest program in higher education sponsored by the
Ford Foundation and Fulbright Program, among others.
The kind of constructive program conducted by The
Asia Foundation and other nongovernmental organiza-
tions can be immensely helpful to Vietnam — and also
to Americans seeking to understand Vietnam. The 
creation of the Vietnam Education Foundation, with
funds that come from debt payments Vietnam is making
to the United States, should become an important ele-
ment in this effort. 
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As in other countries, foreign policymaking in Vietnam
is a long and complicated process because it concerns
relations with many countries and important interna-
tional institutions. Apart from that, a country’s foreign
policy always follows its internal policy in order to best
serve national interests. It means that the interests of
every stratum of the people should be reflected in its 
foreign policy. In this connection, this chapter will
describe at length the processes and institutions involved
in Vietnamese foreign policymaking as well as the corre-
sponding domestic factors that affect it.
To show the complications in this foreign policymaking
process, the chapter will also deal with the relationship
and interplay between policymaking institutions in
Vietnam when foreign policy is actually formulated. In
order to help the reader get a clearer picture of this
process, some concrete examples from recent historical
experiences will be provided. As this paper will discuss
the implications of Vietnam’s foreign policymaking
process for its policy toward the United States, two
examples are provided from the experience of Vietnam-
U.S. relations: (1) Vietnam’s attitude toward the 
question of the U.S. government’s promise to help
Vietnam heal the wounds of war as stipulated in
Article 21 of the Paris Agreement on Vietnam signed
in January 1973; and (2) the issue of troops listed as
missing-in-action (MIA), which has been the main
concern of the United States.
In the conclusion, the author will try to draw some
implications for Vietnamese foreign policy toward the
United States in the future. 
The Formulation of Vietnamese Foreign Policy
The main objective of this chapter is to describe how
our foreign policy is formulated. Vietnam is a socialist
country under the leadership of the Communist Party of
Vietnam. The Party exercises its leadership through its
strategy and policy, which are carried out not only by
Party members but also by the whole society. To work
out strategy and policy, the Party convenes its National
Congress every five years. At each National Congress,
the general secretary of the Party has to present a politi-
cal report in which the general lines of the Party on
domestic and foreign policy are laid down. This policy-
making process is a collective one. It takes months, even
years, to come to the final draft. In preparing the work
of the National Congress, the Party sets up various ad
hoc committees on various subjects. The Committee for
Foreign Affairs has the responsibility to draft the section
of the political report dealing with the international situ-
ation and foreign policy in the following five or ten years.
The second step in the preparation of the Party political
report is the discussion and approval of the draft by the
Central Committee. The third step is the decision of the
Central Committee to make public the draft of the
political report for national discussion. Every citizen of
Vietnam, whether a Party member or not, has the right
to participate in the discussion of the political report.
They have the right to make recommendations to the
Central Committee. The fourth step includes discussions
in the Central Committee about the recommendations
and amendments put forward by the people through
public discussion. Only after that can the draft of the
political report be presented to the National Congress.
Here again the delegates to the Party Congress will make
recommendations and amendments before the report 
is adopted.
Institutions and Processes in Vietnamese Foreign Policymaking:
Implications for Policy Toward the United States
Phan Doan Nam
Advisor, Institute of International Relations
Former Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs
25 |  The Institutional Setting
Once the general lines of the Party strategy and policy
are adopted by the National Congress of the Party, the
whole nation — specifically the executive branch and all
mass organizations — have the duty to work out their
concrete plans of action to carry out the Party directions.
The next phase of our policymaking process is for the
government to present to the National Assembly its pro-
grams for carrying out the Party line; the prime minister
himself is responsible for this task. In the domain of for-
eign policy, sometimes the prime minister entrusts the
foreign minister to report to the National Assembly. The
foreign minister has to explain or reply to all questions
put forward by members of the National Assembly.
Based on the general line worked out by the National
Party Congress and approved by the National Assembly,
the Foreign Ministry formulates its plan of action to put
the Party line on international affairs into effect. The
Foreign Ministry has the duty to handle the daily rela-
tions with foreign countries and international agencies.
Deputy foreign ministers and assistant foreign ministers
support the foreign minister to fulfill his duty. Each is in
charge of one geographical region or specific interna-
tional domain with the help of the regional departments,
departments on international law and treaties and
national borders, and departments on international insti-
tutions. In order to coordinate the work of all regional
and functional departments since 1978, we have estab-
lished the foreign policy planning staff and now the
Department of Foreign Policy, which serves as a direct
assistant to the leadership of the ministry.
The role of the Institute for International Relations
(IIR) in the policymaking process of the Foreign
Ministry is also significant. IIR is entrusted by the for-
eign minister with two functions: first, to train young
diplomats for the ministry and other departments for
international relations; and second, to carry out strategic
research as a think tank for the ministry in its foreign
policymaking process.
The Foreign Ministry is a strong institution within
Vietnam’s executive system and is usually headed by a
member of the Politburo. In handling its daily work, in
case of very important matters, it can seek the approval
of the whole Politburo or its key members like the party
secretary general, the president of state, and the prime
minister. In case of an emergency, especially during
wartime, the Foreign Ministry can recommend that the
Politburo convene a special session of the Central
Committee to discuss the problems and adopt the neces-
sary resolution which the whole Party will follow. An
example of this is the resolution to launch a diplomatic
offensive adopted by the Party Central Committee in
1967 leading to the Paris talks in May 1968 between
Vietnam and the United States to reestablish peace in
Vietnam. Another example is the resolution of the
Politburo in July 1972 deciding to change the strategy
from war to peace, leading to the signing of the Paris
Agreement in January 1973.
In sum, the overall responsibility for the conduct of our
external relations lies with the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. To carry out the Party line on foreign policy,
however, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has to cooperate
with the Party’s Commission for External Relations on
matters relating to political parties in power in other
countries; as well as with the Defense Ministry on secu-
rity-related matters, and with the Finance and Trade
ministries on international trade and commerce. Apart
from the Commission for External Relations, the other
ministries mentioned above are not foreign policy insti-
tutions, but their cooperation is very important for the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to carry out successfully the
tasks entrusted to it by the Party. In some cases, these
ministries have a big say in helping the Party to formu-
late its foreign strategy. 
So in reality, Vietnam has many institutions, formal and
informal, involved in the foreign policymaking processes,
but all of them are under the leadership of the Party,
which has the final say in deciding a foreign policy.
Once the leadership of the Party passes a resolution,
every ministry must carry it out.
Domestic Factors in the Vietnamese Foreign
Policymaking Process
Since independence in 1945, Vietnam has experienced
severe problems with some major powers and neighbors.
Resolution of such problems is vital to the survival of
any nation, particularly when they concern national
defense and reconstruction. Usually national defense is a
priority that follows the construction of a country’s basic
institutions, but in this case the reverse was true. From
1945 to the end of the Cold War, Vietnam suffered
successive aggression from different great powers in 
collaboration with its neighbors. Thus, during this period,
the question of national defense was of first priority.
Only after the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement on
Cambodia in 1991 could Vietnam dedicate itself fully to
the task of national construction.
I say “fully” because in reality Vietnam had already
adopted doi moi (renovation) after the Sixth Party
Congress in 1986. Many people still think that the
change in Vietnam’s foreign policy resulted from the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European
socialist countries, which were the country’s main sup-
porters. This is not true, even though at that time
Vietnam still received a great deal of aid from the Soviet
Union, equivalent to $2 billion annually. In fact, the
driving forces behind the course of renovation were
domestic. In 1985-1986, Vietnam suffered from a severe
economic crisis. Our economy was on the brink of col-
lapse due to poor management. The economic policy
carried out during wartime, based on state subsidies,
state command and bureaucracy, became an obstacle to
the development of production, so Vietnam had to
enact reforms and change its basic economic thinking
and governance.
A related question is why Vietnam was able to carry out
the renovation course only since 1986. Many of our
leaders, especially at the provincial level, actually wanted
and tried to initiate some kind of reform of the economy
as early as the end of the 1970s, but they were unable to
do so due to disagreement in the top leadership about
the basic theories and priorities of socialism. Fortunately,
Vietnam had a new leadership by mid-1986, which
decided to launch doi moi to save the economy from
collapse. As a result, Vietnam also had to modify its
foreign policy to support the reforms enacted as part of
the renovation process.
In reality, only after the settlement of the Cambodian
crisis could Vietnam enter a new phase of development
in which national reconstruction became the first priority
of any agenda. The seventh, eighth, and ninth National
Party Congresses in 1991, 1996, and 2001, respectively,
set forth the task of our foreign policy as follows: create
favorable international conditions for the reconstruction
and defense of the country. In order to implement the
new strategy formulated by the Party, the general
approach of Vietnam’s foreign policy is to be friends to
all countries in the world community striving for peace,
cooperation, and development. The Party also set forth
the guiding principles for a foreign policy of independ-
ence, self-reliance, and multilateralization and diversifi-
cation of relations with other countries and international
institutions. This policy has enjoyed the full support of
all strata of people because it serves their interests. While
people may have differing opinions on a given subject,
being soft on some and tough on others, it would be a
mistake to try and divide members of the Politburo
simplistically into hawks and doves when it comes to
foreign affairs. All the leaders are elected by the people
to represent their interests. As a small country, Vietnam
wants to live in peace with other nations. In this regard,
Vietnam’s national interests conform to the interests of
all countries in the world community — that is, peace,
stability and development.
In order to create a favorable environment, regionally
and internationally, for the reconstruction and defense of
the country, Vietnam attaches great importance to the
development and improvement of the relations with its
neighbors and the major powers, while unceasingly
maintaining traditional, friendly relations with old allies
all over the world.
Dialogue on U.S.-Vietnam Relations  |  26
27 |  The Institutional Setting
Frankly speaking, during the Cold War Vietnam was not
able to maintain good relations with most of its neighbors
or with all the great powers because of the confrontation
between the two major blocs. Just after regaining inde-
pendence, Vietnam sought to establish good relations
with its neighbors, but again failed to do so due to foreign
interventions. This could be seen clearly in Vietnam’s
relations with the United States, France, and the United
Kingdom. In the atmosphere of the Cold War and facing
the danger of losing national independence again,
Vietnam had no other alternative but to lean to the social-
ist camp for national defense and economic rehabilitation.
That is why Vietnam immediately started to normalize
relations with all its neighbors and the major powers
when the Cold War ended. As a result, Vietnam was able
to find a negotiable solution to the Cambodian crisis in
cooperation with its friends in ASEAN. Vietnam fully
normalized relations with its neighbors and became a
member of ASEAN in 1995. In addition, normal diplo-
matic relations between Vietnam and China were
resumed in 1991. And thanks to the efforts of both
sides, Vietnam and the United States established diplo-
matic relations in 1995 and signed a bilateral trade
agreement in 2000. At present Vietnam has diplomatic
relations with about 170 countries in the world. It is rec-
ognized that Vietnam is now a country, not a war, and it
can be said that Vietnam’s foreign policy has deep roots
in domestic requirements and considerations.
The Impact of Policymaking Processes and Institutions
on Vietnamese Foreign Policy (especially toward the
United States before normalization)
Although Vietnam and the United States had already
normalized diplomatic relations in 1945, destiny kept
the two countries at loggerheads for half a century.
History will show which side was responsible for this
stalemate. From the Vietnamese side, however, it was
Vietnam’s policymaking processes and its institutions
that did not allow a quick decision on every question,
especially those relating to Vietnam-U.S. relations. The
two examples below clearly illustrate this point. 
The first concerns attitudes toward the question of U.S.
contributions toward healing the wounds of war in
Vietnam, as stipulated in Article 21 of the Paris
Agreement on Vietnam in 1973. To make the
Vietnamese side confident in the U.S. commitment on
this matter, President Richard M. Nixon even sent a 
letter to Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong in
February 1973 promising that Washington would provide
Vietnam with $3.25 billion in reconstruction aid over a
five-year period. Subsequently, the United States and
Vietnam started to negotiate in Paris from March to July
1973 on the question of how to use this aid. By the end
of July 1973, the two delegations hammered out a docu-
ment describing in detail not only the list of goods to be
supplied to Vietnam, but also the procedures for imple-
mentation. After finishing this job, the U.S. delegation
left Paris saying they had to report to the president. They
never returned to Paris again, however. Given the diffi-
culties facing President Nixon as a result of the Watergate
scandal, the Vietnamese leaders decided to wait. 
When Jimmy Carter replaced Nixon’s successor Gerald
R. Ford as president of the United States, he decided to
start the process of normalizing relations with Vietnam.
In July 1977, the United States did not veto Vietnam’s
application to the United Nations and commenced
negotiations on normalizing relations with Vietnam
without conditions. Nevertheless, the negotiations pro-
ceeded very slowly because the U.S. delegation, headed
by Richard Holbrooke, would not agree to discuss the
question of U.S. reconstruction aid as stated in the 1973
Nixon letter. Given the complexity of the situation in
the world at that time and in the United States itself,
Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed that
Vietnam should hasten the process of normalizing rela-
tions with the United States by giving up the demand
for reconstruction aid. This proposal won the support of
three key members of the Politburo — General Secretary
Le Duan, Premier Pham Van Dong, and Le Duc Tho,
the chief negotiator of the Paris Agreement with Henry
Kissinger. They wanted a consensus within the
Politburo, however, and asked the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to explain the situation to other members of the
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Politburo in order to win their support. As a result of
these deliberations, the Vietnamese side could only initi-
ate the agreement on the normalization of relations with-
out conditions in October 1978. By then it was too late.
Carter decided to normalize relations with China first and
delayed the normalization of relations with Vietnam. An
opportune time didn’t come for another 17 years.
The second episode concerns our handling of the ques-
tion of MIAs. This is a more complicated question. It is
difficult for us to achieve a consensus on the handling 
of this question not only in the Politburo of the Party,
but also among different agencies of the government and
especially among the people. There were many factors
that made it difficult to reach a national consensus,
although the Vietnamese side realizes this is a humani-
tarian question.
First, the United States maintained a hostile attitude
toward Vietnam after the war by colluding with China,
and by imposing an economic embargo against Vietnam.
Vietnam’s reaction was: why should we cooperate with
them when they try to isolate us and remain hostile to
us? Second, although ordinary people realize that this is
a humanitarian question, they of course also think about
the fate of Vietnam’s MIAs. Many Vietnamese think the
United States should do more to help Vietnam on this
issue. This is also a humanitarian question for Vietnam.
Third, the war mentality still haunted the Vietnamese
people’s spirit, especially within the military. The suspi-
cion could not be overcome overnight. To let U.S. heli-
copters hover over people’s heads in searching for U.S.
MIAs reminded them of the wartime atmosphere. Some
people still doubted whether the United States was really
searching for their MIAs, and suspected that it was
instead trying to make an excuse to carry out spy mis-
sions. Fourth, most of the Vietnamese people, including
many leading figures in the Party and Government,
raised questions over U.S. sincerity: why shouldn’t the
U.S. normalize relations first and settle the question of
MIAs later? The United States still has thousands of
MIAs from World War II and the Korean War; why did
they focus so much attention on their MIAs in Vietnam?
These questions show that Vietnam met many difficul-
ties in settling problems with the United States, which
for decades was considered the No.1 enemy.
However, the Sixth Party Congress in 1986 and especial-
ly Politburo Resolution No. 13, passed by the Politburo
in May 1988, adopted new approaches in foreign policy.
At the same time, the attitude of the United States
became more flexible and realistic. This was apparent in
talks between Vietnam’s Foreign Minister and the U.S.
Secretary of State in 1988 and especially in the decision
of President George Bush to send a personal emissary on
MIAs, General John W. Vessey, to Vietnam during the
same year. 
Conclusion
Although the relations between the two countries have
been fully normalized with the ratification of the
Vietnam-U.S. trade agreement, it does not mean that
bilateral relations can develop rapidly. As a result of
Vietnam’s processes of foreign policymaking and its
institutions, no decision about improving the relations
with the United States can be made without caution or
suspicion. So far, U.S. policy toward Vietnam in many
cases has not helped to accelerate Vietnam’s policymak-
ing processes, and sometimes it makes it worse due to
U.S. double standards.
The second factor that does not permit Vietnam to go
faster in its relations with the United States is the suspi-
cion still haunting the Vietnamese people when dealing
with the United States. Former President Bill Clinton
made it clear that there was an ulterior motive of the
United States toward Vietnam in his speech on the 
decision of the U.S. to normalize relations. He said that
normalizing relations would “advance the cause of free-
dom in Vietnam, just as it did in Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union.”1 So in a word, the two sides
1 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President in Announcement on Normalization of Diplomatic Relations with Vietnam, July 11,
1995. Available at: http://www.ibiblio.org.
need more confidence-building measures in order to
improve bilateral relations.
In Vietnam, the United States is still seen as an ambi-
tious great power that wants to impose its will on other
countries. Every move toward more rapid improvement
of relations with the United States should be consid-
ered carefully and cautiously. In spite of continuing
suspicions, however, Vietnam will try its best to
improve relations with the United States based on our
supreme national interest. Vietnam will treat the
United States on an equal footing, without leaning
toward other big powers against the United States. The
ball is now in the U.S. court. 
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Introduction: The Advantages of a “Weak” State
Since the time of the Vietnam War, the U.S. Congress
has strongly influenced American policy toward
Vietnam, in ways that have both promoted and hin-
dered the relationship. Congress’s role in foreign policy-
making in general — and toward Vietnam in particular
— often seems confusing to non-Americans. The consti-
tutional division of powers in the United States means
that the U.S. often appears to have a cacophony of voic-
es speaking on foreign policy, representing interests that
are global, national, and highly local. 
While the division of foreign policy powers may frus-
trate foreign countries by creating doubts about the abil-
ity of the presidents to deliver on promises, a relatively
weak (in structural terms) executive can confer enor-
mous advantages to a country in international negotia-
tions. Skilled presidents can use their lack of ultimate
decision-making power to demand concessions, on the
grounds that if concessions are not obtained, the agree-
ment will not be ratified by the legislature.  
Moreover, having multiple voices on foreign policy
allows a country to experiment with foreign policy
options that a unitary government might consider too
risky or threatening. Indeed, executive branch officials
occasionally use members of Congress to float trial bal-
loons by proposing initiatives that the president is
unwilling or unable to initiate at the moment. In the
case of Vietnam-U.S. relations, for instance, Congress’s
seat at the foreign policymaking table allowed individual
members in the 1980s and 1990s to take the lead in has-
tening the normalization process. 
This paper identifies the ways Congress influences U.S.
foreign policy in general and U.S. policy toward
Vietnam in particular. It is divided into three parts. The
first two discuss the tools that the members of Congress
use to affect foreign policy, and the factors that tend to
heighten or diminish Congress’s foreign policy influence.
The third section explores the shifts in congressional
attitudes toward Vietnam and offers some predictions
for the future.  
Congress’s Foreign Policy Tools
The authors of the U.S. Constitution, suspicious of
overbearing executive authority, deliberately divided for-
eign policy powers between the executive and legislative
branches. Congress’s role in foreign policy formation
derives from Article 1 (principally, Sections 7 and 8) of
the Constitution, which grants Congress certain powers,
including the power to raise revenue, regulate interna-
tional commerce, declare war, raise and support a mili-
tary, and to “make all Laws” deemed “necessary and
proper....” Additionally, Article 2 (Section 2) gives the
Senate the special powers of confirming presidential
appointees, and of ratifying treaties. 
The bifurcation of authority often makes it difficult to
identify when and where a particular U.S. policy origi-
nated, decide when a proposal actually influences policy,
and determine when a modification creates a new
policy.1 As a general rule, the president, as the head of
state, is the initiator of U.S. foreign policy, with the
Congress playing a reactive role. On this point, the his-
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1 Richard F. Grimmet, Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress, CRS Report RL30193, June 1, 1999, p. 1.
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torian Edwin Corwin made an observation on U.S. for-
eign policy that is still relevant today: “While the presi-
dent is usually in a position to propose...the Congress [is]
often in a technical position at least to dispose. The ver-
dict of history, in short, is that the power to determine
the substantive content of American foreign policy is a
divided power, with the lion’s share falling usually,
though by no means always, to the president.”2
The Budget Process
Congress’s most important foreign policy tool is the
power of the purse. The president’s need to have
Congress pass the annual budget provides members of
Congress with a vehicle to restrict the president’s free-
dom of action or require the president to undertake
new foreign policy initiatives. Often, these congressional
measures take the form of amendments to (or inser-
tions into) appropriations legislation that the president
is unlikely to veto.3 The passage of the so-called
Jackson-Vanik amendment is one example of Congress
using the budgetary process to affect foreign policy. 
In 1974, the Nixon administration was attempting to
normalize trade relations with the Soviet Union, as 
part of its policy of détente. Congress defied the
administration by passing amendments to the Trade
Act of 1974 that made the granting of Most Favored
Nation (MFN) treatment to most communist countries
conditional upon those countries liberalizing their 
emigration policies.4 As is well known in Vietnamese
government circles, another requirement of the
Jackson-Vanik amendments is that the United States
must sign a bilateral trade agreement, which is subject
to congressional approval, before commercial relations
can be fully normalized.
Congressional Oversight 
Congress also influences U.S. foreign policy through its
ongoing oversight of executive branch activities. The
most common examples are hearings, which may be
held by any congressional committee on any subject
within its jurisdiction. Hearings provide members with
an opportunity to shape U.S. policy by raising questions
for public discussion. During the Vietnam War, for
instance, Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings
contributed to public opposition to U.S. policy in
Southeast Asia.  Members of Congress can also use their
oversight duties to support a particularly controversial
presidential policy. As will be discussed below, President
Clinton’s normalization of relations with Vietnam was
made politically possible by the bipartisan public sup-
port and prodding given by several members who were
veterans of the Vietnam conflict, most notably Senators
John Kerry, John McCain, Bob Kerrey, and Chuck Robb. 
Other examples of congressional oversight include con-
ducting investigations and imposing reporting require-
ments on the executive branch, such as the requirement
that the president report to Congress on human and
religious rights conditions in various countries. The
Senate’s confirmation and treaty-approving powers also
provide it with a powerful means of exercising oversight,
and influence, over the president’s foreign policy.
Additionally, members of Congress frequently travel to
foreign countries to oversee and take positions on U.S.
foreign policy.
Congressional Resolutions  
Every year, individual members of Congress introduce
large numbers of resolutions expressing the sense of the
House, Senate, or both. When passed, these resolutions
in effect become the official policy of the legislative
2 Edward S. Corwin, The President, Office and Powers, 1787-1957 (New York: New York University Press, 1984), p. 171, as cited in Grimmet, p. 1.
3 Grimmet, p. 17.
4 Grimmet, p. 18.  Over the years, this emigration requirement has become interpreted to mean liberalization of human rights more broadly defined.
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branch. They therefore may be considered a channel of
communication between the Congress and the president,
and between the Congress and foreign countries.5
Resolutions generally are considered to be a weak tool;
since they are not legally binding, the executive branch
often ignores them. However, resolutions can play an
important role in gauging the level of congressional sup-
port or opposition to controversial policies. For instance,
as will be discussed below, in 1994 President Clinton
waited to order an end to the U.S. trade embargo on
Vietnam until after the Senate had passed a resolution
supporting such a move. 
The Determinants of Congressional Influence
Congress’s ability and willingness to modify and initiate
foreign policy has ebbed and flowed over the years, as
the relative power of the two branches changed in accor-
dance with the needs of the day. The degree of congres-
sional influence depends on two primary variables: the
presence or absence of a foreign policy crisis, such as a
war; and the particular issue-area involved.
Foreign Policy Crises
Typically, the pendulum swings toward the presidency
during times of foreign policy crises, which place a pre-
mium on having one national voice and quick, central-
ized decision-making. Thus, the following historical
periods are often considered to be ones of presidential
dominance:
z 1789-1820s (formation of the republic; War of 
1812)
z 1861-1869 (American Civil War; Reconstruction 
period)
z 1898-1918 (Spanish-American War, World War I)
z 1936-early 1970s (World War II, Cold War, and 
Vietnam conflict)
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the distrust of the
presidency brought about by Watergate and the failure
of U.S. policy in Vietnam led Congress to reassert its
role in forming U.S. foreign policy. Individual members
of Congress such as Senator William Fulbright emerged
as prominent critics of Presidents Johnson and Nixon,
most notably by holding hearings that gave opponents
of the War a platform. It was during this period that
Congress increased its resources greatly, by creating the
Congressional Budget Office and the Office of
Technology Assessment, and by expanding the capacities
of the General Accounting Office and the Congressional
Research Service. 
During the presidencies of Ronald Reagan and the first
George Bush, the pendulum swung back somewhat
toward the presidency, though by most measures, not
nearly to the extent that it had been at the height of the
Cold War. Congress had become too accustomed to a
role in foreign policy, and now had the institutional
power to assert itself. Divided government — with the
Democrats in firm control of the House and often of the
Senate — provided an additional political rationale for
challenging the President’s foreign policy prerogative.
Furthermore, the thawing of the Cold War and the per-
ceived decline in U.S. economic power provided open-
ings for Congress to directly challenge the executive
branch’s foreign policy rationale. Thus, during the
1980s, Congress pushed the Reagan and first Bush
administrations to become increasingly assertive in for-
eign economic policy, particularly in U.S. trade relations
with Japan. Congress also acted to reverse U.S. policies
toward South Africa and Latin America.
Congressional influence over foreign policy peaked again
during the 1990s. The removal of the Cold War rudder
that had guided U.S. policy for 50 years led to a search
for a new paradigm. Bill Clinton captured the presidency
in 1992 with an explicitly domestic agenda; foreign policy
was to be a secondary concern. Congress threw itself
into the vacuum, particularly after the Republicans
secured a majority in both Houses in 1994. The Clinton
5 Grimmet, p. 14.
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years saw Congress force the executive branch to under-
take initiatives ranging from major policy commitments,
such as the development of a missile defense system to
more narrow ones like the imposition of conditions on
military relations with Indonesia. In contrast, normaliza-
tion with Vietnam was a case where the Clinton admin-
istration, with the assistance of individual members of
Congress, was out in front of the majority in Congress.
The current consensus on the administration of George
W. Bush is that the war on terrorism has swung the bal-
ance of power back toward the presidency. It remains to
be seen, however, whether this shift is temporary or
long-standing. The longer a sense of crisis persists, the
longer and more successfully the President is likely to
seek congressional deference in foreign policy.
Issue Areas: Trade and Human Rights
Congressional influence over foreign policy also varies by
issue area. In general, Congress is best able to take the
initiative, or block presidential initiatives, on narrow
issues. In part, this is due to the difficulties of marshal-
ing hundreds of lawmakers to support a broad policy
initiative. Also, it is due to Congress being in many ways
closer to the American people. Members of Congress
often find themselves to be the best voice of interests,
particularly economic ones that percolate up from
American society. Many of these interests tend to be
parochial, and thus their advocates often find them
passed over by the executive branch, which has to be
concerned with the broader elements of U.S. foreign
policy. It is not surprising, for instance, that complaints
about Vietnamese catfish imports entered the policy
domain through the Congress, during the Senate’s 
confirmation hearings of U.S. Trade Representative
Robert Zoellick.
Human rights have become another issue tailor-made for
Congress to assert itself. Since Congress does not have
the responsibility for executing foreign policy, it has the
luxury of insisting that political and religious freedoms
be included on the U.S. foreign policy agenda.
Additionally, allegations of human rights abuses are
often most forcefully raised by members of exile com-
munities and non-governmental organizations, groups
that members of Congress are better prepared to hear
and represent than the executive branch. 
Congress has been principally responsible for institution-
alizing human rights on the U.S. foreign policy agenda.
Even when promoting human rights has been official
policy, presidents typically find it difficult to maintain
this priority while managing broader security and 
economic concerns, as Presidents Jimmy Carter and
Clinton discovered. To counter this tendency, Congress
has used all its tools available to try to elevate the impor-
tance of human rights. In 1975, Congress required that
the State Department monitor and report to Congress
on human rights conditions in all recipients of U.S. for-
eign aid. In 1998, Congress elevated religious rights on
the foreign policy agenda by passing the International
Religious Freedom Act, which was signed by President
Clinton. The law created the U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) and the
State Department Office of International Religious
Freedom. The latter is headed by an ambassador at large,
who is subject to Senate approval and must report to
Congress annually on the state of religious freedom in
other countries. The law also identified sanctions to be
placed on countries if they are found to have engaged in
or tolerated particularly severe forms of religious perse-
cution.6 The House International Relations Committee,
Senate Foreign Relations Committees, and the USCIRF
have held hearings on the religious rights situation in
selected countries.
Congress and U.S. Policy Toward Vietnam 
For the past 25 years, Congress has taken a special interest
6 See Vita Bite, Religious Persecution Abroad: Congressional Concerns and Actions, CRS Report 97 968F, January 15, 1999. 
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in Vietnam, at a level out of proportion to Vietnam’s
actual strategic or economic importance to the United
States. In 2000, for example, the monthly report that
the Congressional Research Service (CRS) produces on
Vietnam, The Vietnam-U.S. Normalization Process,
received nearly twice as many requests from congression-
al offices as the CRS’s monthly report on U.S.-Japan
relations. Since the end of the Vietnam War, no presi-
dent has been able to act on Vietnam without producing
intense, often impassioned congressional responses.
Congress’s peculiar fascination with Vietnam has been
primarily due to the emotional legacies of the Vietnam
War, particularly after the Vietnamese withdrawal from
Cambodia and the resettlement of most of the “boat
people” effectively removed Vietnam from U.S. strategic
thinking in Southeast Asia. Until the early 1990s, the
vestiges of the war hurt Vietnam’s standing in Congress.
This situation gradually reversed itself over the course of
the 1990s, to the point where the desire to close the
chapter on the Vietnam War actually helped the U.S.-
Vietnam bilateral trade agreement (BTA) sail through
both Houses in 2001. The agreement’s leading propo-
nents on Capitol Hill were Vietnam War veterans. And
American unions offered little opposition to the pact in
part because their rank and file viewed it as an “end of
War” issue. 
Congress’s Role in the Normalization Process
Until the mid-1990s, congressional interest in Vietnam
was dominated by a desire to obtain a full accounting
for U.S. prisoners-of-war/missing-in-action (POW/
MIAs). In 1977, both Houses passed resolutions oppos-
ing U.S. aid to Vietnam following Hanoi’s refusal to
provide information on American POW/MIAs until
after it received a promise of billions of dollars in aid. 
A widespread belief pervaded Capitol Hill that Vietnam
was “warehousing” several hundred remains and releas-
ing them incrementally to gain tactical advantage in
negotiations with the United States. Faced with strong
pressure from veterans groups, Congress throughout the
1980s continued to insist that normalization could not
occur until Vietnam cooperated in providing informa-
tion on POW/MIAs, a position that became official U.S.
policy. Members of Congress also expressed their con-
cern about human rights in Vietnam, focusing on the
plight of political prisoners, and about the situation of
Vietnamese refugees.
Starting in the early 1990s, Congress began to take a
more supportive view of normalization. A major con-
tributor to this change was the bipartisan Senate Select
Committee on POW/MIA affairs, which between
August 1991 and December 1992 conducted what many
consider the most extensive independent investigation of
the POW/MIA issue undertaken.  Chaired by John
Kerry and vice-chaired by Senator Bob Smith, the com-
mittee’s report concluded that there was some evidence
that POWs were alive after the U.S. withdrawal in 1973,
and that although there was no “conspiracy” in
Washington to cover up live POWs, the U.S. govern-
ment had seriously neglected and mismanaged the issue,
particularly in the 1970s.  Perhaps most importantly, the
committee’s televised hearings were cathartic for many
Americans; they played a major role in defusing much of
the passion that had surrounded the POW issue. The
committee is an excellent example of how Congress can
use its oversight and investigative powers to influence
U.S. policy.
Legislatively, a turning point was passed on January 27,
1994, when, following months of high-level interaction
with Vietnam on resolving POW/MIA cases, the Senate
approved a resolution urging the lifting of the U.S. trade
embargo on Vietnam. The following week, President
Clinton formally ended the embargo. The language of
the Senate resolution, attached to authorizing legislation,
proved controversial in the House, but ultimately survived.
Following the lifting of the embargo in 1994, each step
toward normalization confronted passionate yet declin-
ing opposition from Congress. As before, the key to
overcoming opposition was progress on the POW/MIA 
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issue. The increased support for normalization is indicat-
ed by the steadily increasing support for presidential
waivers of the Jackson Vanik amendment restrictions
(see Figure 1), and by the overwhelming margins by
which the U.S.-Vietnam BTA was passed in late 2001.7
A number of factors were responsible for the shift in
congressional opinion on Vietnam.  Most importantly,
Vietnamese-U.S. cooperation on resolving POW/MIA
issues began to convince members of Congress that the
Hanoi regime was sincere about improving relations and
could be a reliable partner. Other signs of change in
Vietnam — the withdrawal from Cambodia, the doi moi
economic reforms, the change in leadership following
the Sixth and Seventh Party Congresses in 1986 and
1991 — contributed to the transformation in percep-
tions on Capitol Hill. Changes in Congress and the
United States helped as well. The passage of time and
the U.S. victories in the Cold War and the Gulf War
had dulled the emotional edge of Vietnam War-era
issues. Also, the leadership of several members of
Congress who were veterans of the Vietnam conflict was
crucial in convincing colleagues that it was time to 
support bilateral normalization. Additionally, led by
Senators John Kerry, John McCain, Bob Kerrey, Chuck
Robb and Ambassador Pete Peterson (a former congress-
man), these members worked behind the scenes to per-
suade the Clinton administration that the time was right
to accelerate the normalization process. President Clinton
initially was reluctant to do so because throughout his
first term he was dogged by allegations that he had avoid-
ed military service in Vietnam in the 1960s. Without the
bipartisan political cover afforded by these veterans in
Congress, it certainly would have taken the Clinton
administration longer to push a policy of normalization.
Human Rights
With the defusing of the POW/MIA issue, Vietnam’s
human rights record has emerged as the sorest point of
bilateral contention. In particular, congressional critics of
normalization have seized upon human rights as a vehi-
cle for opposing the policy. These members, who tend to
come from the far right on the political spectrum, are
kept well-informed of accounts of persecution by overseas
Vietnamese, exiled ethnic minority groups, and religious
organizations. Congressional critics have intensified their
campaign in recent years, even as most individual
Vietnamese began to enjoy more personal freedom than
perhaps at any time since Vietnamese reunification.
Until recently, the legislative results of their efforts 
generally were confined to a number of resolutions
condemning the Vietnamese government for persecuting
one or more groups. Their most ambitious project to
date, the Vietnam Human Rights Act (H.R. 2833),
sought to up the ante.
The act was introduced by Congressman Chris Smith in
late June 2001 and passed the House in a 410-1 vote in
early September. It ultimately stalled in the Senate due
to an anonymous “hold” placed on the measure by at
7 These restrictions prohibit the President from normalizing commercial relations with selected socialist and formerly socialist countries if they do not meet cer-
tain requirements regarding freedom of emigration.
Figure 1: House Votes on Vietnam’s Jackson-Vanik Waiver, 1998-2002
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least one member.8 Its supporters were able to achieve
such a lobsided victory in the House in part because the
act was weakened to such an extent that even the cham-
pions of U.S.-Vietnam normalization could vote in
favor, particularly since they knew that it was unlikely to
pass the Senate. As originally proposed, the act would
have created a congressional-executive commission on
Vietnam to monitor how well Vietnam lives up to inter-
nationally recognized human rights standards. It would
have withheld bilateral, non-humanitarian aid unless
Vietnam received a presidential certification that it is
meeting certain human rights conditions. U.S. support
for aid from international financial institutions would
have been subject to a similar requirement. The bill also
required that additional money should be allocated
toward promoting democracy in Vietnam, through sup-
port of non-governmental organizations and Radio Free
Asia broadcasts.
Realizing that most of these measures were likely to
doom the bill in the House, its sponsors allowed most
of them to be eliminated or significantly watered
down. The commission on Vietnam was eliminated.
The final bill banned only increases in non-humanitarian
aid absent an affirmative presidential certification. U.S.
support for international institution aid is effectively
freed of any conditionality. Most importantly, the bill
allowed the president to waive the provisions of the act
even if Vietnam is not found to have met its human
rights standards.
Although the act stalled in the Senate, it is likely that in
the future its supporters will try to circumvent the
“hold” by inserting the act’s provisions into an amend-
ment to another bill.
Congress’s Likely Role in Future U.S.-Vietnam Relations
Congress’s perception of Vietnam has undergone a
remarkable transformation over the past decade, from
that of a war to a country. In large measure, this shift
may be attributed to the Vietnamese government, which
through its actions has demonstrated an eagerness to
undertake domestic reforms, cooperate with the United
States on POW/MIA cases and other issues, and rejoin
the international community. Because of these steps by
Hanoi, wartime legacies moved from blocking to aiding
the normalization process.  
In the coming years, however, Vietnam will be less able
to use the war to its advantage on Capitol Hill, as histo-
ry’s resonance fades and becomes largely confined to the
few remaining normalization issues between Vietnam
and the United States. The war may also remain a sub-
text — albeit a diminishing one — of clashes over
human rights, as many minority ethnic and religious
groups in Vietnam fought with U.S. and South
Vietnamese forces. In other areas — such as trade and
security issues — U.S. relations with Vietnam will be
treated on their own terms, judged by their present
strengths and future potential. In particular, with U.S.-
Vietnam trade likely to increase significantly in the next
few years, Vietnamese officials will have to brace them-
selves for a high level of congressional attention to bilat-
eral economic relations and Vietnam’s implementation
of the BTA.  
Also, contrary to conventional wisdom, the war on ter-
rorism is likely to increase congressional scrutiny of
Vietnam’s human rights situation. Unlike other Asian
countries — such as Indonesia — that are the targets of
human rights accusations, Vietnam as yet has little to
offer the U.S. in combating terrorism. Hanoi may there-
8 "Holds" are informal devices that permit a single senator or any number of senators to stop — sometimes temporarily, sometimes permanently — floor con-
sideration of measures or matters that are available to be scheduled by the Senate. A hold, in brief, is a request by a senator to his or her party leader to delay
floor action on a measure or matter. It is up to the Senate majority leader to decide whether, or for how long, he will honor a colleague’s hold. Scheduling the
business of the Senate is the fundamental prerogative of the majority leader, and it is done in consultation with the minority leader. Holds are unique to the
Senate. Although there have been attempts to end the practice of anonymous holds, the practice still continues. See Walter Oleszek, “Holds” in the Senate,
CRS Fact Sheet on Senate Legislative Process: 98-712 GOV.
fore prove to be a “safe” outlet for human rights propo-
nents, who may find their arguments on other countries’
abuses falling on deaf ears. Furthermore, the Jackson-
Vanik waiver process will continue to provide an annual
vehicle for Congress to continue to monitor Vietnam’s
domestic situation closely; a vehicle that few other coun-
tries have to face. As mentioned earlier, Vietnam’s most
important backers in Congress have been veterans of the
Vietnam War. The challenge for Vietnam will be to
identify new champions of the bilateral relationship —
perhaps looking in the ranks of the Vietnamese-
American community — who can help to carry it into 
the future. 
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Discussing differences in the foreign policy approaches
of the United States and Vietnam, a foreign diplomat in
Vietnam observed that U.S. foreign policy is issue-related,
whereas Vietnamese foreign policy is more an extension
of the lines and policies set by the Vietnamese
Communist Party. Vietnam’s foreign policy direction is
relatively consistent within the five-year periods between
the National Congresses of the Communist Party. The
main tenets of foreign policy are codified in the political
report of each Party Congress, and are further defined
by Party Central Committee meetings (plenums). In this
context, decisions by the government and the National
Assembly on foreign policy matters often have their
origins in Party lines and policies. National Assembly
decisions focus on the ratification of international agree-
ments, foreign policy orientations that are expressed in
annual resolutions, and specific bilateral issues handled
on a case-by-case basis.
Constitutional Power of the National Assembly in
Foreign Affairs
The National Assembly’s power in foreign policy,
according to article 84 (13) of the 1992 Constitution
(amended in December 2001), is to “decide on the fun-
damental external policies; to ratify or annul interna-
tional treaties signed in person by the State President;1
[and] ratify or annul other international treaties signed
or acceded to at the proposal of the State President.”  In
practice, the role of the National Assembly has changed
significantly over the years, especially in the period since
doi moi began. During the course of current administra-
tive reform and following the trends toward globaliza-
tion, many debates for a more efficient government have
addressed the need for further renewal of the organiza-
tion and operation of the National Assembly. The
amendments to the 1992 Constitution at the very end
of 2001 inserted a number of changes to facilitate a better
functioning National Assembly. To name only a few:
confidence votes were introduced; full-time deputies
(e.g., those who have no other profession aside from
being a member of the National Assembly) were
increased from 8 percent to 25 percent of the total; and
the oversight function over the issuance of legal docu-
ments was transferred from the People’s Procuracy sys-
tem to the National Assembly at the national level and
the People’s Councils at the local levels. The role of the
National Assembly in foreign policymaking cannot be
isolated from this broader course of change.
Questions and Approaches
In order to describe the changes in the operation of the
National Assembly in foreign policymaking, this chapter
will discuss the following main questions: 
z How does the National Assembly help to implement
Party guidelines or decide fundamental policies in 
external relations?
z To what extent is the National Assembly actually 
involved in foreign policy as an actor in the formu-
lation or implementation process?
z What is the role of the Foreign Affairs Committee 
and other committees in matters of external relations?
The Vietnamese National Assembly in Foreign Policymaking
Pham Quoc Bao
Director of Foreign Affairs Department
Office of the National Assembly
1 "Resolution No. 51/2001/QH10 on Amendments and Supplements to a Number of Articles of the 1992 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,"
Official Gazette, no. 9-10 (8-15 March 2002), p. 7. 
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In addressing these questions, examples are given to
familiarize foreign readers with the National Assembly’s
foreign policymaking procedures. The chapter concludes
with a brief case study on how the National Assembly
discussed and ratified the new bilateral trade agreement
between Vietnam and the United States. 
Functional Role of the National Assembly in 
Foreign Policy
The Constitution recognizes the National Assembly’s
supremacy in lawmaking, policymaking, and oversight
of government activities. This supreme position, as com-
pared to other state bodies, derives from the constitu-
tional role of the National Assembly as “the highest rep-
resentative organ of the people and the highest organ of
state power in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.”2 This
supremacy could be interpreted as: (i) among other state
agencies, the National Assembly is the body with the
highest state power to decide state affairs at the macro-
level; and (ii) there is a division of labor between the
state agencies, and the National Assembly is vested with
the power to deal with certain types of issues of a funda-
mental nature. In a word, it is the body that can coordi-
nate and overrule decisions of other state organs where it
is permitted to do so by the Constitution. 
Foreign affairs issues that are discussed and decided by
the whole National Assembly are of the following
nature: 
General orientations and strategies. Debate by the
National Assembly on foreign policy orientations for the
coming year occurs at its year-end session, and usually
focuses on issues that are multilateral in nature. To facili-
tate the debate, the government (often the Minister of
Foreign Affairs on behalf of the Prime Minister and the
President of State) reports to the National Assembly
about the foreign affairs activities of the state and pres-
ents the government’s viewpoint on world issues. The
National Assembly then enters into floor debate, some-
times preceded by small group discussions, to review
these activities and viewpoints before voting to adopt
general foreign affairs orientations and strategies in the
form of a statement to be included in a legally binding
resolution on socio-economic tasks for the coming year.3 
Specific bilateral issues. Debate on bilateral affairs is
usually avoided unless a particular issue draws the atten-
tion of lawmakers, or a review of bilateral issues is need-
ed to ratify a bilateral agreement. If a particular issue
attracts the attention of members of the National
Assembly, the matter could be placed on the agenda of a
session and may result in a resolution of the whole
National Assembly, which expresses the attitude of the
Assembly toward the specific issue. Unlike the legal nor-
mative resolutions, this type of resolution is non-binding
and political in nature. In the May 2000 session, many
members of the National Assembly called for discussion
and a statement after some U.S. Congressmen intro-
duced a human rights resolution into the House of
Representatives which, in the view of these members,
constituted interference into Vietnam’s internal affairs.4
2 See Article 83 of the 1992 Constitution in The Constitutions of Vietnam: 1946-1959-1980-1992 (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1995), p. 183.
3 According to Article 20(1) of the Law on the Promulgation of Legal Documents, enacted in 1996 and amended in 2002, "resolutions are issued by the National
Assembly to decide the socio-economic development plans, national fiscal and monetary policies, policies on nationalities, religion, external relations, defense,
security." See Official Gazette, no. 2 (31 January 1997), p. 14. Article 20 was not amended in 2002.
4 At this session, when members of the National Assembly received information that a non-binding resolution had been introduced into the U.S. House of
Representatives criticizing both the human rights situation in Vietnam and the role of the Vietnamese Communist Party (as stipulated in Article 4 of the
Constitution), many members urged the National Assembly Standing Committee to bring the matter to the whole National Assembly for discussion and appro-
priate action, such as approval of a resolution to condemn the U.S. House resolution. The Standing Committee then instructed the Foreign Affairs Committee of
the National Assembly to study the issue. The Deputy Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Phan Quang, also requested a meeting with U.S. Ambassador
to Vietnam, Douglas "Pete" Peterson, on May 18 to present the Committee’s views on the resolution. Subsequently, a written report of the Foreign Affairs
Committee was sent to the delegations of the National Assembly for their information; the matter ended there, and, in this case, did not result in a resolution.
For further information, see "Uy ban Doi ngoai cua QH Viet Nam Phan ung ve Nghi quyet cua Ha Vien My Can thiep Tho bao Cong viec Noi bo cua Viet Nam"
[Foreign Affairs Committee of Vietnam’s National Assembly Reacts to Resolution of the U.S. House of Representative Rudely Interfering in the Internal Affairs
of Vietnam], Nhan Dan, 19 May 2000, p.8; and Congressional Record. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Record Online via Government Printing Office
[www.access.gpo.gov], May 3, 2000, pp. H2417-H2422.
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International agreements. The National Assembly also
discusses and approves ratification of international agree-
ments with foreign governments or organizations,
including both multilateral and bilateral agreements.
International agreements that are signed by the President
of State must be ratified by the National Assembly.
Agreements not signed by the president, but by other
state authorities, must either be ratified by the president
or submitted by the President to the National Assembly
for ratification if approval by the legislature is deemed
necessary. Successful debate on an agreement by the
National Assembly leads to the adoption of a resolution
for ratification by the Assembly, which provides enforce-
ment rules and instruction to the government to make
necessary diplomatic and executive steps to implement
the agreement. This type of resolution is legal normative
and binding in nature.
National Assembly procedures for discussing and ratifying
international treaties are relatively similar to the discus-
sion and adoption of resolutions in general. The flow
chart in Figure 1 illustrates this process by showing the
normal way in which the National Assembly raises and
deals with issues that end up in a resolution. For example,
if the president proposes ratification of an international
agreement with the National Assembly before a regular
session takes place, the National Assembly Standing
Committee (NASC) will likely forward it to the Foreign
Affairs Committee for study and examination.
Subsequently, the Foreign Affairs Committee will issue
an “examination report” regarding the NASC’s propos-
al. If it is satisfied with the result, the NASC will circu-
late the report and proposal to delegations of the
National Assembly for discussion and solicitation of
constituents’ opinions. Feedback and opinions from the
delegations will serve as grounds for the NASC to decide
whether to include the matter in the agenda of a National
Assembly session. 
In a session, members of the National Assembly listen to
reports from the government and the committees — 
followed by group discussion, floor debate, and adop-
tion of a resolution, to be drafted by the Foreign Affairs
Committee and the secretarial board of the session
(Doan Thu ky Ky hop), formed by the members of the
National Assembly. If at any stage the National Assembly
is not happy with the draft of a resolution, or a majority
vote is considered to be unlikely, the chairperson of the
session can ask the National Assembly to postpone the
voting to allow for additional study, group discussion,
and floor debate prior to the vote. 
Regarding ratification of international agreements in
particular, the role of National Assembly committees is
very important. An international agreement often
involves at least two committees of the National
Assembly. First, the Foreign Affairs Committee is in
charge of examining an agreement with respect to for-
eign affairs policy, general principles, and international
law. Second, as with any bill, the Law Committee is in
charge of examining the agreement with respect to its
“constitutionality, legality and uniformity” with the cur-
rent legal system5 and for recommending changes to the








































Figure 1: National Assembly Procedures for Adopting a Resolution or Bill
5 Article 32(3) of the Law on the Promulgation of Legal Documents, Official Gazette, no. 2 (31 January 1997), pp. 16-17.
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ment might also involve a different professional field of
responsibility overseen by another committee of the
National Assembly (e.g., the land border agreement
reached between Vietnam and China involved the com-
petency of the National Defense and Security
Committee). To avoid duplication, the Foreign Affairs
Committee will then chair a “joint examination meeting”
with input from other committees. An examination
report presented by representatives of the Foreign Affairs
Committee will include all viewpoints and deliberations
by that and other committees. 
Foreign Affairs Activities of the National Assembly
External relations activities are carried out by the
Chairman of the National Assembly, groups within the
National Assembly, and by parliamentary friendship
groups of Vietnam. These actors engage in parliamentary
diplomacy and cooperation by participating in inter-par-
liamentary institutions and forums, and by carrying out
exchanges with other parliaments on a bilateral basis.
The National Assembly believes that these activities help
to promote understanding, peace, security, and coopera-
tion among peoples of different nationalities. Toward
this end, representatives of the people conduct dialogue
with other parliaments to consolidate and support coop-
eration among governments. 
For example, the National Assembly has participated in
the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) since 1976, inher-
iting its membership in this body from the former
Republic of South Vietnam. The National Assembly
sends delegations to IPU sessions and has participated
actively in all IPU forums. In practice until now, the
Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee has headed
Vietnam’s delegations to the IPU. Other participants in
the delegation are National Assembly members invited
from different committees and constituencies, and are
chosen according to the topics of IPU meetings. As a
result of support from the Swedish Parliament (Riksdag)
within the IPU support program, the National Assembly
has installed a computer network and connection to
constituencies in all 61 provinces, and has learned and
applied many experiences of modern parliamentary life
as it works toward efficiency, openness, and transparen-
cy. For instance, the solicitation of public views on
major draft laws has occurred on an increasing basis dur-
ing doi moi. In addition, live broadcasts of “Question
Time,” where members of the Assembly question cabinet
members, have been carried out regularly since 1998,
and the official website of the National Assembly was
inaugurated in 2000. 
In Southeast Asia, the Vietnamese National Assembly
was admitted as a full member of the ASEAN Inter-
Parliamentary Organization (AIPO) in September 1995
at the 16th AIPO General Assembly in Singapore. In
September 2002, the National Assembly hosted the 23rd
AIPO General Assembly meeting in Hanoi as the
group’s chair. Many members of the National Assembly
in different committees and constituencies have attended
AIPO general assembly meetings and ad-hoc committee
meetings. This is the best opportunity for members of
the National Assembly to be involved in the negotiation
and formulation of multilateral foreign policy.6
Role of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National
Assembly
The Foreign Affairs Committee is one of seven special-
ized committees of the National Assembly.7 Like the
other specialized committees, the Foreign Affairs
Committee examines and prepares legislative matters
within its issue area that are scheduled to be discussed in
6 Vietnam’s National Assembly is also a member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Francophone (APF), and is a founding member of the Asia-Pacific
Parliamentary Forum (APPF). In 1999, the Vietnamese National Assembly joined the Asian Association of Parliaments for Peace (AAPP). In addition, it is a mem-
ber of the Asian Forum of Parliamentarians for Population and Development (AFPPD), the International Medical-Parliamentarians’ Organization (IMPO), and the
Asia-Pacific Parliamentarian Cooperation for Environment and Development (APPCED).
7 For further information on the structure and functions of the National Assembly, see "The National Assembly in a Nutshell," Nghien cuu Lap phap, Special
English Edition of the Legislative Studies Magazine (August 2001), pp. 57-65.
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a National Assembly session. In this way, it has a super-
visory role over foreign affairs activities carried out by
the government. It may send a supervisory delegation
abroad to oversee the activities of Vietnamese diplomatic
missions, or dispatch delegations within the country to
oversee foreign affairs-related activities at home. Examples
of the latter include its supervision of border provinces
in 1998 to review the situation of border trade and
smuggling control, and its supervision of the management
of foreign borrowing and foreign aid in 1999, 2000, and
2001. The resulting recommendations of the Foreign
Affairs Committee on these issues led to amendments of
government regulations on border trade control, the
management and use of foreign aid (including ODA and
NGO funds), and a draft decree on debt management.
An example of the role of the Foreign Affairs Committee
in preparing for ratification of an international agreement
is the U.S.-Vietnam bilateral trade agreement (BTA). In
2000, after the signing of the BTA, the Foreign Affairs
Committee asked the Ministry of Trade to brief its
members (as well as members of the Law Committee
and the Economic and Budget Committee) on the
process of negotiating the BTA and the main issues cov-
ered in the agreement. Hearings with representatives of
state agencies and business representatives were also
organized by the committee to identify issues, problems,
and challenges. In addition, during the first six months
of 2001, the Foreign Affairs Committee facilitated meet-
ings with visiting U.S. senators and congressmen in
order to promote understanding and exchanges of views
on the BTA in preparation for ratification.8
After the 9th session (May-June 2001), the NASC
received a proposal from President Tran Duc Luong to
submit the BTA for ratification by the National
Assembly in its year-end session of 2001. Because of the
complexity of the BTA and its relevance to other laws
and regulations in Vietnam, the Foreign Affairs
Committee chaired several hearings with government
agencies to provide information on BTA negotiations,
the main contents of the agreement, and implementa-
tion issues. The Law Committee, Economic and Budget
Committee, and National Defense and Security
Committee attended the hearings and cooperated with
the Foreign Affairs Committee to examine the BTA in
various aspects. The Economic and Budget Committee
discussed economic aspects and implementing measures
of the BTA, while the Law Committee provided views
on the constitutionality of the agreement and its consis-
tency with domestic laws. A roadmap for legal compli-
ance and dispute settlement was discussed. Subsequently,
the Foreign Affairs and other National Assembly com-
mittees reported the results of the examination to the
NASC. The NASC then agreed to send the BTA (and
the opinions of the committees) to the delegations of the
National Assembly for review and feedback prior to the
beginning of the 10th session.
In sum, the Foreign Affairs Committee, like other com-
mittees, is involved in foreign affairs issues in between
National Assembly sessions. It helps the NASC and the
National Assembly prepare views on legislation and policy
concerning foreign affairs in general and the ratification
of international agreements in particular. It also chairs
drafting committees formulating resolutions on the rati-
fication of international agreements.
Case Study: Ratification of the Vietnam-U.S. BTA
This section describes the role of the National Assembly
as a whole in discussing and ratifying an international
agreement during a National Assembly session. The rati-
fication of the Vietnam-U.S. BTA is used as a case study
to illustrate this process.
Approval of the agenda: On November 19, 2001,
before opening the session, the National Assembly met
to approve the working agenda proposed by the NASC.
8 Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee to the National Assembly, dated 5 June 2001, on the foreign relations activities and work of the National Assembly
from the 8th Session (December 2000) to the 9th Session (May-June 2001) of the 10th National Assembly. See Ky yeu Quoc Hoi Khoa X - Ky hop Thu chin
[Record of the 10th National Assembly - Session 9] (Hanoi: Office of the National Assembly, August, 2001).
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In this meeting, the members approved consideration of
the BTA for ratification in this session.9 
Introduction of issue: As noted above, the members of
the National Assembly had already had opportunities to
study and discuss the BTA with their constituencies.
However, the presidium of the National Assembly ses-
sion could not be certain of the result or smooth han-
dling of this issue during the scheduled floor debate.10
As is the precedent, the NASC arranged to hear the
reports of the government and the Foreign Affairs
Committee on the BTA during the first days of the ses-
sion. The report of the Foreign Affairs Committee out-
lined opportunities and challenges facing Vietnam in
implementing the BTA. It also drew the members’ atten-
tion to the volume of new or revised legislation that
would be needed in order to implement the BTA.11  
Group discussion: In general, large National Assembly
delegations like those from Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh
City hold discussions within their own delegations,
whereas smaller delegations often merge into groups to
facilitate discussions on pending legislation. Issues and
questions raised by the members in the group discussions,
together with an unofficial canvassing of the likely voting
result (sought by the Office of the National Assembly),
are recorded in writing and sent to a secretarial board for
compilation. In this case, the group discussion reflected
different opinions about the BTA. In all group discus-
sions, members talked specifically about the Vietnam
Human Rights Act passed by the U.S. House of
Representatives (H.R. 2833) as well as new U.S. labeling
requirements for Vietnamese catfish. Many members
condemned the Vietnam Human Rights Act as clear
interference in Vietnamese internal affairs, saying it
represented a lack of respect toward the independence
and sovereignty of Vietnam. The catfish labeling
requirements were seen as a barrier to trade since these
requirements would create difficulties for Vietnamese
exporters from the Mekong Delta to enter the U.S.
market. 
Drafting the resolution to ratify the BTA: In its posi-
tion as the “examination authority,” the Foreign Affairs
Committee was entrusted with the duty to coordinate
government authorities and other committees of the
National Assembly to respond to questions and com-
ments raised by members in group discussion. It also
was entrusted with the responsibility to propose a draft
of the resolution on ratification of the BTA prior to the
floor debate.
Floor debate: This was scheduled for the afternoon on
November 28, near the end of the session. To start the
debate, the National Assembly Chairman asked the then
Minister of Trade, Vu Khoan, on behalf of the Prime
Minister, to deliver a report dealing with questions and
issues raised by the members in the group discussion. 
Subsequently, 11 members of the National Assembly
registered to speak. The first, Nguyen Huu Khanh from
An Giang Province, said he appreciated the signing of
the BTA because it would boost economic cooperation
between Vietnam and the United States. However, he
also drew attention to the difficulties faced by his con-
stituency in exporting catfish to the U.S. market because
of the new labeling requirements. In introducing this
issue to the floor debate, Khanh warned the government
that it must carefully protect Vietnamese interests in the
course of implementing the BTA. Ten other members —
from Dak Lak, Nghe An, Hanoi, Can Tho, Yen Bai, Ho
Chi Minh City, Ha Nam, Quang Ninh, Vinh Phuc, and
Dong Nai — expressed concerns about the Vietnam
Human Rights Act as well as the catfish issue. Still, most
9 Approval of the agenda items for the session is undertaken through a majority voting mechanism. Preparations for discussing an issue before debate are
important for National Assembly members, as they often oppose projects about which they are not well informed.
10 The presidium is not a formal legal institution, but in practice refers to the persons chairing the session. They are the Chairman of the National Assembly
and his deputy chairmen. The presidium is assisted by the secretarial board of the session with the Chairman of the Office of the National Assembly as its
head.
11 In the first analysis by the Ministry of Justice, about 130 current regulations would be directly affected by BTA implementation; of these, about 53 pieces of
legislation would need to be amended or reissued.  
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expressed support for ratification of the agreement. The
floor debate reflected a mood of mixed sentiment toward
the BTA and its possible implementation. This senti-
ment made it difficult for the Foreign Affairs Committee
and the secretarial board to predict the voting results.
The Foreign Affairs Committee was then asked to report
to the National Assembly on members’ opinions con-
cerning the wording of the draft resolution for ratifying
the BTA. It took considerable time after the floor debate
to work out and finalize a compromise version of the
resolution. In the end, the National Assembly ratified
the BTA on November 28, 2001 when members voted
to approve Resolution 48/2001/QH10 on Ratification
of the Vietnam-U.S. Bilateral Trade Agreement. Passed
by a vote of 278 in favor and 85 against, with 17 absen-
tees, the resolution states that the NASC, government,
and judicial agencies “shall expeditiously formulate con-
crete and [uniform] action programs, [and] amend and
supplement legal documents according to the schedule
of the agreement.”12
Conclusion
In sum, the National Assembly is empowered with
approving the foreign policy orientation of the govern-
ment for each legislative term and for each year. The
government is responsible for carrying out foreign affairs
policy according to this orientation. In addition to this
power, the National Assembly ratifies those international
agreements signed by the president of state and may
review those signed by other governmental bodies. This
constitutional role of the National Assembly is exercised
by the whole National Assembly during its sessions,
while the Foreign Affairs Committee supervises the
implementation of the foreign affairs policy of the gov-
ernment (and examines legislative bills and foreign policy
-related issues) in between the sessions of the National
Assembly, in order to prepare necessary agenda items for
National Assembly sessions. Other committees of the
National Assembly and the Ethnic Council, in their
capacity as standing bodies of the National Assembly,
share this responsibility and cooperate with the Foreign
Affairs Committee in respect to their specialized mission
entrusted by law.
12 The resolution appears in Vietnam Law and Legal Forum 8, no. 88 (December 2001), section on New Legislation, pp. 1-2.
The Societal and 
Economic Environment
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Foreign policy is said to be an extension of domestic
policy. The determinants of foreign policy are therefore
comprised of both long-term and short-term objectives
related to the political, economic, and cultural advance-
ments of a country. In this way, foreign relations activi-
ties must be consistent with and supportive of domestic
pursuits. In times of war, foreign policy and its activities
have to win external support and assistance for the strug-
gle for independence and freedom; in times of peace,
foreign policy can be used to make other nations aware
of the need for (and convince them to render) greater
aid. Broader economic cooperation and enhancement of
trade and investments to the country are also top priori-
ties of foreign relations activities. 
The New Thinking
Major world events taking place at the end of 1980s and
early 1990s caused great changes in many parts of the
globe. The Cold War came to an end and many coun-
tries shifted from an arms race to an economic race.
Economic and social development became of great
importance. Now, growing interdependence among
economies is seen as an inexorable trend, and competi-
tion in the international market has become increasingly
fierce. These trends have significant effects on all coun-
tries, large or small, with no exceptions.
In Vietnam, the economic system of excessive centraliza-
tion of management, red tape, and subsidization
brought about enormous difficulties, severe shortages of
consumer goods and food, and triple-digit inflation. In
the areas of trade and official development assistance
(ODA), Vietnam lost its principal markets and support-
er with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist
governments in Eastern European countries. These events
added even more difficulties to the problems facing the
Vietnamese economy. During the second half of the
1980s and the early 1990s, Vietnam was indeed facing
an economic dilemma. New thinking and new ways of
doing things were sought to meet these challenges. Thus,
the Vietnamese Government launched the doi moi, or
renovation, policy. In Vietnam, we have the proverb
“Cai kho lam lo cai khon” that can be translated as
“Facing enormous challenges, you are even wiser.” This
proverb was very applicable to Vietnam, as it had already
been proven true in the past struggles for independence.
Vietnam’s new thinking in various areas has gradually
developed since the mid-1980s, and great importance
has been attached to economic development. In the
areas of trade and ODA, the urgent need was to diversi-
fy import and export markets and to seek new sources of
ODA. Foreign direct investment (FDI) was recognized
as an important source of capital, while more markets
and more partners were needed.
Foreign Policy in Support of Economic Renovation
Since early in the doi moi period, the core focus of
Vietnam’s foreign policy has been to support economic
development by befriending all countries in the world
community and striving for peace, independence, and
development.1 In the mid-1990s, the main task of for-
eign policy was further defined as “consolidating the
peaceful environment and creating further favorable
Vietnamese Foreign Policy and Economic Renovation
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1 See Communist Party of Vietnam, 7th National Congress (Hanoi: Vietnam Foreign Language Publishing House, 1991), p. 43.
47 |  The Societal and Economic Environment
international conditions to step up socio-economic
development and national industrialization and modern-
ization in service of national construction and defense,
making active contributions to the common struggle of
the world’s peoples for peace, national independence,
democracy and social progress.”2 This policy was updat-
ed again at the beginning of the new millennium, with
greater emphasis placed on international economic inte-
gration. As stated in the political report of the Ninth
Party Congress, convened in April 2001, the “govern-
ment, all the ministries, agencies and enterprises are to
soon design and execute respective international eco-
nomic integration plans with rational roadmaps and
concrete programs of action, promoting the initiatives of
the ministries, agencies and enterprises; to press ahead
with a shift in economic structures and renewal in socio-
economic management mechanisms, further complete
the legal system, and improve the competitiveness of
enterprises and the economy as a whole.”3
The active implementation of this foreign economic pol-
icy since the beginning of doi moi has resulted in several
important developments, including:
z Formulation of the Law on Foreign Direct 
Investments in 1987 and subsequent adjustments to
create better investment conditions. The law and 
related government decrees have helped to attract 
more than $36 billion of registered capital, of which
half has been disbursed. 
z Normalization of credit relations in 1992 with mul-
tilateral lenders such as the World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund and Asian 
Development Bank, paving the way for ODA and 
loans for infrastructure projects and structural 
reforms of the economy.
z Successful negotiations with the Paris and London 
Clubs of international donors in 1993, leading to 
the establishment of the annual Consultative Group
meetings for pledging ODA to Vietnam. Total 
pledged ODA reached $17.5 billion by the end of 
2001, with annual total disbursements exceeding $1
billion since 1998.
z Membership in the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) in 1995. In a related develop-
ment, Vietnam began to fulfill ASEAN Free Trade 
Area (AFTA) tariff requirements in 1996, with inte-
gration into this free trade area to be completed in 
2006.
z Completion of the Framework Agreement on 
Economic Cooperation with the European Union 
in 1995, helping to expand Vietnamese exports 
(particularly garments and textiles, shoes, and 
agricultural products) to this large market.
z Normalization of relations with the United States in
1995, marking the virtual complete worldwide 
recognition of Vietnam and diplomatic relations 
with all major powers and other countries.
z Membership in the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum in 1998.
z Signing of the bilateral trade agreement (BTA) with 
the United States in July 2000 and ratification of 
the agreement by the United States and Vietnam in 
late 2001. The agreement provides Normal Trade 
Relations (NTR) status (formerly known as Most 
Favored Nation, or MFN) to both countries, 
helping to boost Vietnamese exports to the U.S. 
market.
z Application for accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 1994 and continued 
negotiations toward this end. It is hoped that the 
negotiations will result in Vietnam’s entry into the 
WTO within a few years, perhaps as early as 2005. 
After admission, Vietnam will have more opportu
nities to expand its exports to other countries; in 
return, Vietnam will have a higher capability to 
import goods and services from other countries.
2 Communist Party of Vietnam, "Political Report of the Central Committee (VIIth tenure) to the VIIIth National Congress," VIIIth National Congress Documents
(Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1996), p. 77.
3 Communist Party of Vietnam, 9th Party Congress Documents (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 2001), pp. 60-61.
z Continuation of regional and international 
economic integration according to a roadmap 
defined by the Vietnamese Government.
z New emphasis on “diplomacy serving economic 
development,” in which all diplomatic missions in 
foreign countries prioritizes the expansion of 
economic relations with those respective countries.
Diplomacy Serving Economic Development
Peace and stability are the essential preconditions for
economic development. That is why diplomatic activi-
ties are always designed for the purposes of strengthen-
ing peace and stability in Vietnam, and contributing to
peace and stability in the region and throughout the
world. Immediately after the reunification of Vietnam,
many Vietnamese delegations at different levels traveled
to other countries, particularly countries within the Asia-
Pacific region, to explain our long-term policy of peace,
friendship, and mutually beneficial cooperation. Foreign
delegations visiting Vietnam have also stressed the same
ideals. Foreign Ministry officials and Vietnamese diplo-
mats abroad have done all they can to strengthen peace
and stability in Vietnam and in the region, creating
more favorable environments for economic growth. 
Vietnam came out of its wars at a low level of develop-
ment. We needed a large amount of support and assis-
tance in the reconstruction of the country and to help
develop the economy. Like diplomats from other coun-
tries, Vietnamese diplomats are responsible for winning
the support and assistance of the international commu-
nity. Diplomats and other officials have gone out of
their way to project the goodwill, good intentions and
the justifiable goals of the people of Vietnam to the world
community. The results are encouraging, as the world
community has an increasingly better understanding of
Vietnam, and renders greater support and assistance to
the Vietnamese people in their development efforts.
High annual levels of ODA exemplify the international
support that is being provided to Vietnam.
These tasks described above have been the diplomatic
community’s major focus over the past 25-30 years, and
will be carried with greater efforts in the years to come.
However, there also are new areas of diplomacy neces-
sary to further promote economic development. Today,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and all representative
missions of Vietnam in foreign countries are allocating
more time, effort, and resources to facilitate and expand
economic relations between Vietnam and foreign coun-
tries. In this connection, the Foreign Ministry and
diplomatic missions are required to analyze interna-
tional economic relations, forecast global economic
trends, and gather information on economic develop-
ment experiences of other countries. The government
uses this analysis and information when formulating
economic policies, especially those relating to foreign
economic activities.
The Foreign Ministry and diplomatic missions are in a
particularly good position to collect economic and tech-
nical information of various kinds and then forward this
information to economic ministries, provinces, and cities
in Vietnam. Ambassadors and other diplomats can help
the country, an industry, a province, or even an individ-
ual company, by lobbying certain groups or individuals
in their host country with a view to facilitating the
access of Vietnamese goods and services to that country.
Diplomats are expanding their functions to include,
among other tasks, facilitating the introduction of
companies to new markets and partners, assistance in
arranging commercial trips, support for a company’s
marketing activities, and defending the legitimate
interests of Vietnamese companies and business people.
As an example of these trends, two meetings were held
in November 2001, one in Hanoi and one in Ho Chi
Minh City, between Vietnamese ambassadors and con-
suls-general, on the one hand, and Vietnamese business
people from northern and southern Vietnam, on the
other. The purpose of these meetings was to discuss
cooperation to expand Vietnamese exports and to attract
greater foreign direct investment to Vietnam. At this
meeting the heads of Vietnamese representative missions
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in foreign countries gained the opportunity to learn
more about companies’ needs and to discuss issues of
importance to the companies. For their part, business
people gained a better understanding of how Vietnamese
embassies and consulates can promote their business
interests in foreign countries. It was recommended that
this type of meeting should be repeated in the future.
This was the first time that ambassadors and consuls-
general had met the directors of major companies, and
the result was encouraging. It was a good beginning, and
it is hoped that this kind of meeting will continue and
lead to concrete results.
In fact, however, the idea of diplomacy serving economic
development is not entirely new. When the war was
coming to an end, in 1974, the Economic Department
was established in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to help
develop economic relations between Vietnam and other
countries. The Economic Department has since grown
with a better understanding of and greater experiences in
international economic affairs; it coordinates closely
with other departments within the ministry and assists
the ministry in making greater contributions to the eco-
nomic development of the country. 
At the end of 1990s, the Department of Multilateral
Economic Cooperation also was established in the
Foreign Ministry in response to the increasing require-
ments of regional and global integration. This depart-
ment is assigned to study the WTO, APEC, and AFTA.
The department helps the ministry, together with other
ministries, make contributions to and conduct negotia-
tions with these organizations. Also at the end of 1990s,
the Economic Information Division was set up in the
Foreign Press Service Center (a unit of the Foreign
Ministry) to help Vietnamese companies explore eco-
nomic opportunities in foreign countries.
Better Coordination Needed
With globalization increasing rapidly, the number of
ministries, organizations, companies, and people inter-
acting with foreign countries is rising fast. As in other
countries, because so many people and organizations are
becoming involved in the external economic activities,
the question of coordination is very important. Bearing
this in mind, the Foreign Ministry, together with other
ministries, has made recommendations on how to
improve coordination among various ministries and gov-
ernmental bodies — particularly the ministries of Trade,
Foreign Affairs, Planning and Investment, and Finance,
as well as the Office of the Government and the
Vietnam National Administration of Tourism.
Coordination is improving steadily, and has contributed
to achievements and results in the areas of ODA, FDI,
imports, exports, and tourism. 
Within the Foreign Ministry itself, coordination among
the three economic units — the Economic Department,
the Department of Multilateral Economic Cooperation
and the Economic Information Division — has been
positive. However, there is still room for improvement.
The three economic units and regional departments in
the ministry have worked together with the aim of mak-
ing greater contributions to the expansion and effective-
ness of foreign economic relations. With increasing
usage of the Internet, faxes, telephones, and other means
of communication, representative missions in foreign
countries now have more opportunities to establish close
links with other ministries, cities, and provinces in an
effort to enhance the economic development of the
country.
Improved coordination is important in light of the press-
ing development needs of the country. To bridge the
development gap between Vietnam and other regional
countries and improve the living standards of the
Vietnamese people, Vietnam will need $60 billion over
the next five years, of which 40 percent is expected to
come from foreign countries in the form of ODA and
FDI. In addition, Vietnam will need to have an annual
trade expansion of 15 percent. The total trade value of
Vietnam in 2001 was about $30 billion, a small amount
compared to other countries. However, it is a significant
figure if compared with Vietnam’s GDP, constituting
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nearly 100 percent of GDP and forming an important
sector of the economy. Apart from that, labor exports
and international tourism are expected to post double-
digit annual increases.
As economic activities involving foreign countries and
companies continues to expand rapidly, coordination
efforts among departments within Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, among ministries, between ministries and local-
ities, and between representative missions and compa-
nies, will become increasingly vital and complex.
Improvements in coordination will enhance efficiency,
save resources, and make greater contributions to eco-
nomic development. While coordination generally is
good, there is still room for improvement.
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Vietnam’s diplomatic policy, dating back to the restora-
tion of its independence in 1945, reflects the
Vietnamese government’s consistent attachment of eco-
nomic and business interests to foreign relations. This
chapter highlights the role of economic and business
interests in these relations by describing the historical
evolution of the country’s foreign economic policy, the
establishment of the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce
and Industry (VCCI), and the initiation of economic
renovation. The chapter concludes with three case stud-
ies that show how business interests have affected the
development of Vietnam’s relations with South Korea,
Taiwan, and Israel.
Historical Development of Vietnam’s Foreign 
Economic Policy
Although Vietnam’s independence was declared in
September 1945, formally establishing the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam (DRV), French armed forces
returned shortly thereafter to begin a nine-year war of
re-conquest. In January 1950, despite the war, the DRV
expressed its intention to establish diplomatic relations
with foreign countries, and received strong support from
the Soviet Union, China, and other socialist countries.
As early as 1952, it concluded its first trade agreement
with China, and then extended economic and commer-
cial relations to members of the socialist bloc in Europe.
These relations helped to create additional resources to
serve the needs of the continuing war for independence. 
When the war ended in 1954, Vietnam was temporarily
divided into two parts. The DRV (North Vietnam)
embarked on reconstructing and developing an economy
that was very poor, backward, largely dependent on agri-
culture, and with only a few industrial establishments
left by the French. Its very first diplomatic activities
focused on concluding several agreements on economic
cooperation and exchange of commodities with socialist
countries in July 1955; and signing trade agreements
with France in late 1955, with India and Indonesia in
1956 and 1957, and later, with the then United Arab
Republic (the temporary union of Egypt and Syria),
Cambodia, and Iraq. Business relations were opened up
with companies in Japan and Hong Kong in 1955, and
then with many others, including Singapore, Sri Lanka,
the former West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Great Britain, Switzerland, and Sweden.
Perhaps the most noticeable agreement was that with
France, completed soon after the war’s end. With many
other Asian and Western countries, the DRV also
attended to developing trade relations — or at least the
exchange of goods — in the absence of official diplo-
matic arrangements. The total number of economic and
trade partners of North Vietnam increased to 40 coun-
tries in 1965, and 28 of them were non-socialist.
Establishment of Chamber of Commerce 
In April 1963, the Chamber of Commerce (the forerun-
ner of today’s Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and
Industry) was founded to serve and promote the busi-
ness interests of North Vietnam, particularly in relations
with non-socialist partners. The Chamber soon devel-
oped connections with relevant business associations and
institutions abroad, as well as with foreign companies
having an interest in doing business with the North. The
interests of domestic firms were also taken into account,
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and Hong Kong and Singapore became the first places
where DRV trade representative offices were established.
Commercial sections were attached to several embassies
or consulates-general in major business partner coun-
tries, such as Japan and France, to look after and pro-
mote the business interests of the government and local
companies in relation with partners in these countries
and territories.
Between 1964 and 1975, trade and economic relations
between North Vietnam and the world were heavily
influenced by another war, this time with the United
States and its allies. Relations with many countries and
companies were interrupted, and the number of coun-
tries that maintained commercial links with Hanoi
decreased to 27 by 1975. The DRV’s diplomacy and for-
eign affairs in this period concentrated on convincing
various forces in foreign countries to support Vietnamese
people and to demand that the U.S. government with-
draw from the conflict. Further diplomatic measures
were aimed at easing the U.S.-led economic blockade,
and marshaling international support against the U.S.
bombing of roads and key economic centers in North
Vietnam and its prohibition of the entry of foreign mer-
chant vessels into the port of Hai Phong.
The government and Chamber of Commerce made
repeated appeals to the DRV’s trading partners, seeking
continued business ties and commodity exchanges. In
the context of warfare and an economic blockade, the
maintenance of commercial relations with the outside
world was of great economic and political importance
for Hanoi.
When Vietnam formally reunified in 1976, the country
was at a very low level of development with a poor and
backward economy heavily damaged by the war. To
rebuild the national infrastructure, create jobs for the
population, and stabilize the socio-economic situation in
the southern part of Vietnam — which had strong links
with and dependence on foreign markets — the govern-
ment rapidly extended its diplomatic and commercial
relations with many countries in Southeast Asia, the
West, and other parts of the world. Realizing that
Vietnam would badly need foreign investment, the gov-
ernment also issued the Regulations on Foreign Direct
Investment in Vietnam in April 1977. Unfortunately,
just as new relations and economic cooperation were just
being opened up, another conflict in the region, this
time in Cambodia, arose and complicated Vietnam’s for-
eign relations. Vietnam was forced into a position of
economic isolation and suffered a severe trade embargo.
Under such circumstances, Vietnam decided to join the
Soviet-led COMECON bloc in July 1978, and signed a
10-year Economic Cooperation Agreement with the
Soviet Union. Vietnam also entered into economic
cooperation agreements with many Eastern European
countries. Much effort was made to promote the eco-
nomic and commercial ties with other countries but the
results were modest. In the 10 years from 1976 to 1985,
trade turnover grew slowly and 80 percent of the coun-
try’s trade was conducted with COMECON countries.
The economy was stagnant under its centrally planned
mechanism and prolonged external difficulties.
During that period, the Chamber of Commerce intensi-
fied its efforts to help local enterprises overcome difficul-
ties and isolation in foreign economic relations. In 1976,
the Chamber merged with the Saigon Chamber of
Commerce in the south to become a national organiza-
tion. The Chamber quickly established relations with
major chambers of commerce and business associations
in Southeast Asia, Hong Kong, Japan, Australia, West
Germany, France, and Great Britain. Significantly, the
Chamber also established contacts with the American
Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) in Hong Kong and
its counterparts in Singapore, Thailand, and elsewhere 
in Asia.
In addition, the Chamber became actively involved in
developing a new policy proposal to the government for
supporting the establishment of export-import compa-
nies that would be attached to different industries and
localities and allowed to conduct direct trade with for-
eign partners. From 1981-1985, a number of new
export-import companies were established. Although all
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of them were state-run companies operating under the
supervision of different ministries or local authorities,
they broke the monopoly of the Ministry of Foreign
Trade and its 25 trading companies and helped to diver-
sify Vietnam’s export-import trade. While most of the
“old” companies focused on traditional ties with socialist
countries under governmental arrangements, most of the
new companies quickly established business links with
partners in non-socialist countries. Vietnamese diploma-
cy during this period duly took into account the effi-
ciency and enthusiasm shown by these new players, and
tried to help maintain and develop commercial ties
between Vietnam and various countries in the region
and other parts of the world in the context of the com-
plicated political disputes and conflicts in the region.
The Beginning of Doi Moi and Economic Reform
By the end of 1986, Vietnam announced the introduc-
tion of its historic policy of doi moi, initiating a pro-
found and comprehensive reform process with economic
renovation at its core. Vietnam’s foreign policy changed
significantly in the direction of multilateralization and
diversification of external relations. In this new context,
the role of foreign economic relations became especially
important. The Sixth Congress of the Communist Party
of Vietnam affirmed: “Whether the task of stabilizing
and developing the economy in the initial stage as well
as the cause of scientific and technological development
and socialist industrialization in our country will be car-
ried out rapidly or not depends to a large extent on the
expansion and heightening of the effectiveness of our
external economic relations.”1
The external economic policy for the initial phase of
renovation was defined as:
z Promotion of exports in order to meet the need for 
imports; 
z Expansion of economic, scientific, and technological
cooperation with other countries; 
z Diversification of trade partnerships and trading 
activities in an open-door orientation;
z Step-by-step integration of the national economy 
with the world economy to link the domestic mar-
ket with the international market;
z Reform of the export-import management mecha-
nism; 
z Investment in economic, scientific, and technologi-
cal infrastructure.
Bold reform measures were introduced in 1987-1988,
and business and economic interests were stressed in all
domestic and external economic activities. Trade restric-
tions were eased, more export-import companies were
set up, and all companies were given the right to widen
their scope of operations. At the end of 1987, the Law
on Foreign Direct Investment was promulgated and was
considered by foreign investors as one of the most liberal
foreign investment laws in the region.
Doi moi, from its initial days, brought about very posi-
tive results. In agriculture, the annual output of food
grains increased from 18 million tons in 1985 to 21.5
million tons in 1989. From the status of a net importer
of food, Vietnam suddenly had a surplus in food supply
and became the third largest rice exporter in the world.
The production of many important manufactured items
witnessed significant growth — especially consumer goods,
light industrial products, and crude oil (a new export item
of Vietnam). Macro-economic stabilization was gradually
achieved and inflation was put under control.
Encouraged by domestic economic performance as well
as new domestic requirements related to the market
mechanism and open door policy, the external economic
relations of Vietnam expanded and changed rapidly.
From 1986-1990, total export value rose 28 percent
annually, from which hard currency earnings increased
33 percent per year. In 1990, exports from Vietnam to
hard-currency markets yielded earnings of $1.352 billion
1 "Political Report," 6th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam: Documents (Hanoi: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1987), pp. 94-95. 
— more than four times the amount earned in 1985 —
and surpassed the exports to ruble-denominated markets.
As for foreign investment inflows, in the first two years
(1988-1989) after the implementation of the Law on
Foreign Direct Investment, 107 projects were licensed
with total registered capital of over $900 million, and in
1990, 111 projects were licensed with total registered
capital of $803 million. 
In the early 1990s, the Soviet Union and COMECON
bloc collapsed, causing a sudden, sharp decline in exter-
nal financial aid and an interruption of major trade
transactions with Vietnam’s traditional markets. Many
policymakers worried whether Vietnam could provide
substitutes for resources formerly supplied by the social-
ist bloc. However, the newly established economic
mechanism was showing positive effects in Vietnam.
Although the economy suffered from adverse effects for
a short period, it did not collapse or fall into chaos. The
increased demand for exports and imports spurred
Vietnam to quickly expand its commercial ties with
other markets and partners, first with regional countries.
Almost immediately, Japan, Singapore, South Korea,
Hong Kong, Australia, Thailand, and Taiwan replaced
the former Soviet Union and East European countries as
Vietnam’s major trade partners. They supplied Vietnam
with all the important items for which Vietnam had pre-
viously relied on COMECON sources, such as oil, fer-
tilizer, cement, chemicals, and fibers. However, exports
were a more difficult problem: items that were previous-
ly sold in the COMECON bloc now proved to be of
insufficient quality and competitiveness to be sold in the
broader international markets. However, due to the
growth in crude oil output and the increase in other
exports such as rice and other agricultural produce,
seafood, and forest products, Vietnam still succeeded in
developing export markets in the region.
It was the demand for economic development and pro-
motion of business interests that forced Vietnam to seek
ways to escape from its economic isolation, diversify its
trade partnerships, improve its relations with foreign
countries and international institutions, and integrate
into regional and world markets. Starting in the autumn
of 1993, relations between Vietnam and major interna-
tional financial institutions were resumed. Some Western
countries, particularly Japan and France, decided to pro-
vide official development assistance (ODA) to Vietnam.
Between October 1993 and the end of 1995, three inter-
national meetings on ODA for Vietnam were convened
in Paris, where donors made commitments to extend a
total of $6 billion in ODA to support Vietnam’s eco-
nomic reform and development. Foreign investment
flows to Vietnam grew. By the end of 1995, total regis-
tered foreign investment in Vietnam reached $16.7 
billion, of which $5.3 billion had been disbursed. The
foreign invested sector accounted for 6.3% of GDP in
1995. Export-import activities were even more dynamic.
In 1995 export revenue totaled $5.449 billion, while
imports were valued at $8.115 billion. Two-way trade
with Asia-Pacific nations accounted for 70 per cent of
the total, while trade with European states accounted for
20 per cent. FDI and exports became the two engines
for economic growth in Vietnam.
The year 1995 also witnessed three important landmarks
for Vietnamese diplomacy: the admission of Vietnam
into the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN), the conclusion of the Framework Agreement
on Economic Cooperation with the European Union
(EU), and the normalization of relations between
Vietnam and the United States. Following these impor-
tant developments, Vietnam made various efforts in the
late-1990s to enhance bilateral economic and commercial
cooperation with many foreign countries, particularly
those in Southeast Asia and East Asia. It also started
negotiations with the United States for a bilateral trade
agreement, and began expanding relations with Russia
and countries in Eastern Europe, West Asia, Africa, and
North, Central and South America.
With regard to multilateral economic cooperation,
Vietnam participated extensively and intensively in the
cooperation mechanism and programs of ASEAN,
joined the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
forum, took part in the Asia-Europe Economic Meeting
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(ASEM), and applied and began negotiations for mem-
bership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). The
relations with the community of foreign and interna-
tional donors continued to be strengthened with an
ODA commitment of more than $2 billion each year
from 1996-2000. However, foreign investment showed a
sharp decline after 1997 due to the impact of the region-
al financial crisis as well as problems in the domestic
business environment. Export-import performance con-
tinued to grow but at a slower rate, except for 1999-
2000 when export revenue rose sharply due to: (i) an
increase in the international prices of crude oil, coffee,
and seafood; and (ii) the new liberalization of the trad-
ing system in mid-1998 which allowed all enterprises,
including private ones, to export freely.
In sum, historical features and developments of Vietnam
in the 20th century  — particularly 30 years of involve-
ment in prolonged and costly wars, decades of economic
isolation during the Cold War period, and the failure of
centrally planned management systems — have left con-
sequences that remain with us today. Many people there-
fore do not realize how important the role of business is
in foreign relations between Vietnam and other coun-
tries. Alongside political interests, business interests
pushed Vietnam to build, expand, and develop its rela-
tions with other countries; to participate in regional and
international organizations; and to integrate into the
regional and world economy. The wisdom and flexibility
of Vietnam in developing diplomatic relations has
helped the country to avoid the negative impact of
major fluctuations in the world economy, and to over-
come crises in order to survive and grow.
Business Interests in Vietnamese Foreign Affairs: 
Three Case Studies
In bilateral relations, business interests can be even more
important and decisive than other factors at some histor-
ical points. Three examples of this are provided below,
starting with Vietnam’s relations with South Korea.
South Korea. In 1982, when the world was still in the
Cold War period, Vietnam maintained close political
relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (North Korea) since both countries were socialist.
However, business interests prompted Vietnam to
explore and develop trade with the Republic of Korea
(South Korea). The high economic growth and competi-
tiveness of South Korea in supplying some products that
Vietnam needed, as well as the potential of exporting
Vietnamese products to its large and prosperous market,
drew the attention of Vietnamese enterprises. In the
early 1980s, Vietnam had to import large quantities of
fertilizer, agro-chemicals, textile fibers, pulp, and paper
products to meet domestic demand. In addition to
sourcing these items from the Soviet Union, Vietnam
received some hard-currency loans from the Swedish
Government to finance imports from non-socialist mar-
kets through limited tenders. 
At first, because of limits on direct relations between
Vietnam and foreign partners, only a few Japanese and
European firms could bid on the tenders — and in most
cases only Japanese firms could win. Then Vietnamese
firms realized that they could buy these products at a
cheaper price if South Korean suppliers could bid as
well. Also, direct exports of anthracite coal, timber, and
some agricultural products could be more beneficial if
traded among Vietnamese exporters and South Korean
buyers instead of buying and selling through third coun-
tries. The Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry
took the initiative after thorough study and discussions
with major domestic trading companies such as
Agrexport, Textimex, Coalimex, Imexco HCMC, and
Unimex Hanoi. The Chamber submitted a proposal to
the Vietnamese Government seeking permission to open
up direct trade with South Korean firms. With the sup-
port of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry
of Foreign Trade, the government approved VCCI, as a
nongovernmental organization, to contact certain South
Korean firms. 
On the South Korean side, the government in Seoul
assigned Samsung Co. as the first direct trade counter-
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part with Vietnam. In June 1982, the first Samsung
business mission visited Vietnam and signed the initial
contracts, worth a total of about $1 million, with
Vietnamese companies on the basis of counter trade.
The performances of the first contracts were excellent
and encouraged many other Vietnamese firms to become
involved in direct transactions. The two-way trade
expanded fast, and increased ten-fold within five years.
In addition, through arrangements between VCCI and
South Korean universities and economic research insti-
tutes and with the support of South Korean firms, a num-
ber of key Vietnamese economists had an opportunity to
study South Korea’s development experience. Ten years
after it began, as trade between the two nations reached
$100 million, diplomatic relations between Vietnam and
South Korea were officially established. Nowadays, South
Korea is one of Vietnam’s leading trade and investment
partners, and there are regular exchanges of high-ranking
official delegations between the two countries. 
Taiwan. Relations with China over the decades have
made Vietnam cautious in its stance toward Taiwan.
However, the island is undoubtedly an Asian “economic
tiger” and its promising business and investment potential
proved to be attractive to Vietnam. Taking into account
the high interest shown by local companies — particularly
in Ho Chi Minh City where there is a big and active
Chinese-Vietnamese business community — VCCI
suggested that the government allow VCCI and local
companies to start business contacts with the Taiwanese. 
In 1988, the government signaled its approval and
VCCI contacted the China External Trade Development
Council (CETRA), Taiwan’s international trade promo-
tion organization, and arranged business links between
partners on both sides. The relations were conducted
carefully and in a limited way through non-governmen-
tal arrangements. However, ties grew rapidly thanks to
the dynamism and mutual interest shown by businesses.
In the early 1990s, both sides reached agreements on
investment guarantees, double-taxation avoidance, and
the establishment of representative offices for the protec-
tion of each other’s interests. 
Taiwan has been the largest investor in Vietnam for
many years. Even now, Taiwanese investment in
Vietnam is much larger than the investment by main-
land Chinese interests. Vietnam’s diplomacy in this case
proved to be very flexible and efficient in finding appro-
priate channels and formulas to serve the country and its
business interests. 
Israel. Vietnam has long maintained official relations
with many Arab and Middle Eastern countries that have
been in conflict with Israel. However, positive develop-
ments in the Middle East in the early 1990s created an
opportunity for Vietnam to access Israeli economic and
technological development, and Vietnamese businesses
spoke with VCCI about starting commercial contacts
and exchanges with Israel. Recognizing the efficiency of
their trade transactions with Israeli firms based in
Singapore and Hong Kong, VCCI made a proposal to
the government on opening up direct trade between
Vietnam and Israel. Following a quick response from the
government, VCCI hosted the first Israeli business mis-
sion to Vietnam in early 1992, and brought three dele-
gates, including a Vietnamese diplomat, to Tel Aviv in
December of the same year. One year later, official
diplomatic relations were established between the two
countries. Nowadays, despite a relatively small volume of
trade and investment between the two sides, there have
been many opportunities for cooperation in trade, sci-
ence, and technology. 
At present, Vietnam has diplomatic relations with many
countries throughout the world. Vietnam also maintains
commercial relations with 165 countries, among which
80 have signed bilateral trade agreements with Vietnam,
and 72 are committed to applying most favored nation
status to Vietnam. With a steady course of renovation
and with its motto of “being a friend to all countries in
the world,” Vietnam endeavors to promote mutually
beneficial economic and commercial cooperation with
other countries, proceed with international integration,
and contribute to the development of peace, stability,
and prosperity throughout the world.
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It is useful to open with a negative: economic interests
have not been the dominant forces shaping U.S. trade
relations with Vietnam over the past quarter-century.
Those with stakes in the legacy of the war played that
role, such as families who wanted closure on troops
reported as prisoners-of-war or missing-in-action
(POW/MIAs) or veterans who pressed normalization
and mutual forgiveness. But organized U.S. business was
an important supplemental player in the liberalizing
events of the past decade, culminating in the signing and
legislative enactment of the Bilateral Trade Agreement
(BTA). And as the POW/MIA issues continue to fade,
U.S. economic interests are likely to play a growing role
in the years to come.
That impact will not always be positive from a
Vietnamese perspective. A senator from Louisiana can,
and did, act to protect producers in her state by winning
enactment of a law forbidding the use of the word “cat-
fish” to label an important Vietnamese export. This
action was taken in 2001 over the objections of execu-
tive branch and congressional trade policy leaders, and
further entrenched through its inclusion in the 2002
farm legislation. Other special interests will doubtless
intrude in the future — some supportive of expanded
trade relations between the two nations, others not.
For Americans seeking insight into their government’s
policymaking process toward Vietnam, therefore, and
for Vietnamese concerned with influencing that process,
it is important to begin this analysis with discussion of
the general rise of economic and business influence
over U.S. international economic policy during the
past half-century.  
From Subordinate Force to Central Concern
The United States was by far the world’s largest econo-
my throughout the 20th century. Hence economic
diplomacy has been an important instrument of U.S.
influence, and business interests have always played a
role in shaping that diplomacy. Important examples of
U.S. foreign economic policy in the wake of World War
II included the Bretton Woods monetary agreements,
the negotiation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), and the launching of the Marshall Plan
to rescue and restore the economies of war-ravaged
Western Europe. Among recent cases are the granting of
Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status to
China in 2000 upon conclusion of its agreement to join
the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the
November 2001 Doha agreement to launch a new
round of global trade negotiations.
From 1945 through the 1960s, however, U.S. interna-
tional economic policy was not driven primarily by U.S.
economic interests. Rather, it was dominated by broad
foreign policy and national security concerns, particular-
ly the need to buttress Cold War alliances against the
Soviet Union and China by strengthening the economies
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
nations and Japan. The lead agencies shaping policy
were those driven by this agenda: the State Department
and the National Security Council.1 This agenda had
overriding national priority, of course, and a tragic mis-
reading of the nature of the Cold War conflict would
lead the United States into terrible conflict in Vietnam.
But it was possible to subordinate foreign economic pol-
icy to Cold War purposes because the U.S. economy was
The Rise of Foreign Economic Policy in the United States and the 
Role of Organized Business
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1 They were and are part of a broader grouping of agencies (including the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency) that I have labeled else-
where the "security complex."  See Destler, "A Government Divided: The Security Complex and the Economic Complex," in The New Politics of American Foreign
Policy, ed. David A Deese (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), pp. 132-47.
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not only dominant in the world but also well insulated
against the world. As late as 1960, the sum of U.S.
exports and imports totaled only 9 percent of gross
domestic product (GDP).
But this priority did not go unchallenged. From the
early 1950s onward, the U.S. textile industry — one of
the first hurt by global competition — insisted on steps
to limit imports from lower-wage countries. By the
1960s, pressures from Congress and business, reflecting
the rising importance of international transactions to the
U.S. economy, led to policy and organizational steps giv-
ing domestic concerns and interests greater weight. 
The Creation of the USTR. An important early step was
the transfer of trade policy leadership from the State
Department to a new office designed to increase priority
to U.S. business concerns. Members of Congress had
long complained that trade negotiations were led by
diplomats who know foreign nations better than their
own. When President John F. Kennedy sought legisla-
tion in 1962 (parallel to today’s Trade Promotion
Authority, or “fast-track”) authorizing the ambitious new
round of GATT trade negotiations that came to bear his
name, Congressman Wilbur Mills, a Democrat from
Arkansas who was chair of the powerful Ways and
Means Committee, which had jurisdiction over trade
law, insisted that the U.S. negotiating team be led not
by State but a new entity based in the White House.
Kennedy complied with this legislative command, creat-
ing in 1963 a Special Representative for Trade
Negotiations.  
The initial role of this new trade office was to coordinate
overall U.S. policy, balancing foreign policy and domestic
economic interests. Over time, it was to give increasing
attention to the latter. In the 1970s, Congress would
strengthen this office: in 1974 by making it a statutory
entity and giving its head Cabinet rank; in 1979 by forc-
ing President Jimmy Carter to enhance its jurisdiction
and rename it the Office of the United States Trade
Representative (USTR), effective in January 1980.2 
Other policy and organizational steps reflected the grow-
ing weight of domestic interests affected by the global
economy. In 1971, President Richard M. Nixon ordered
a halt to supporting the value of the dollar through the
sale of gold, granting his administration greater flexibili-
ty on domestic economic policy in the run-up to his
1972 re-election campaign, but also bringing an end to
the Bretton Woods fixed-rate currency system. Nixon
also established White House coordinating institutions
for international (and overall) economic policy parallel
to the National Security Council, whose role in econom-
ic matters declined. Every president thereafter replicated
this practice, establishing an institutional advocate for
connecting U.S. foreign economic policy with overall
U.S. economic interests.3 
By this time, oil shocks and global food shortages were
underscoring the increased integration of the U.S. and
global economies. By 1980, the proportion of U.S. trade
(exports plus imports) to GDP had risen to 20.5 per-
cent, a more than doubling in 20 years.4 This meant
growing international trade and investment opportunities
for U.S. businesses, particularly the multinational corpo-
rations. Still, the business interests most likely to take
the political initiative during the 1970s and 1980s were
those hurt by trade — textiles, steel, autos, and semicon-
ductors. Their activism in seeking protection from
imports was exacerbated by the sudden soaring of the
2 For a fuller account of the creation and evolution of USTR, see Destler, American Trade Politics, 3rd edition (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International
Economics and the Twentieth Century Fund, 1995), pp. 19-21 and 107ff.
3 The name and precise shape of the economic policy coordinating institution changed with virtually every administration, until President Bill Clinton estab-
lished the National Economic Council in 1993. For detail on this, see Destler, The National Economic Council: A Work In Progress (Washington, D.C.: Institute
for International Economics, Policy Analysis No. 46, 1996), esp. pp. 1-8.
4 This figure would reach 26 percent in 2000. These percentages are calculated from the figures for GDP and exports and imports of goods and services in
Table B-1 of successive editions of Economic Report of the President, published annually in January or February by the President’s Council of Economic
Advisers.
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U.S. trade deficit in the mid-1980s, to 12-digit figures
unprecedented in global economic history. By contrast,
businesses doing well internationally tended to stay out
of politics unless the President or the USTR urged them
to engage in order to right the political balance.
Things changed in the 1990s. Economic interests
became, for a time, the overriding forces in U.S. foreign
economic policy. And internationally minded business
began to take greater initiative in pressing to keep mar-
kets open and reduce existing trade barriers, particularly
when the trading partner was China.
“The Economy, Stupid”5
Several forces converged as William Jefferson Clinton
began his successful run for the presidency. The Cold
War ended rather abruptly, weakening the influence of
national security concerns on U.S. trade and economic
policy. At the same time, American elites were suffering
a crisis of economic confidence, reflecting sluggish
growth since the early 1970s, recession, and concern that
other nations — Japan in particular — were surpassing
the United States.6 Charging then President George
H.W. Bush with fecklessness in domestic economic
management and international economic competition,
Clinton promised to “focus like a laser beam” on the
nation’s economic problems. During his campaign, he
managed to cut into the Republican Party’s normal busi-
ness support by gaining the backing of high-technology
firms wanting a strong response to foreign competition.
Once in office, he announced a “rebalancing” of U.S.
policy toward Japan with enhanced attention to the
economic dimension. He created a new National
Economic Council (NEC) parallel to the NSC and
charged with development of policy to combat interna-
tional economic competition.  
Clinton cast himself as a centrist “new Democrat” and
free trader, unlike many of his party colleagues who had
followed organized labor’s move to a trade-restrictive
stance. He won congressional approval of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), completed
the GATT negotiations establishing the WTO, and
negotiated commitments to achieve free trade within the
Western Hemisphere and among the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) nations by early in the
21st century. And in the sharp trade conflict with Japan
from 1993-95, U.S. policy was focused not on closing
American markets but on getting Tokyo to open
Japanese markets.
Internationalist business supported these initiatives and
(for the most part) the tough approach to Japan.
Ironically, however, what energized U.S. business leaders
most was the issue where Clinton did not seem to be
giving priority to economics, the U.S. relationship with
China. Due to a law (known as “Jackson-Vanik”) enact-
ed in 1974 with the Soviet Union in mind (and being
applied today to trade with Vietnam), the president had
to decide every year to continue granting normal tariff
rates to Chinese imports. Carter and Ronald Reagan had
done so without controversy. But the Tiananmen Square
massacre of June 1989 transformed American attitudes
toward Beijing, and thereafter George H.W. Bush had
faced annual congressional opposition when he acted to
extend normal trade relations. In his campaign, Clinton
had denounced Bush for “kowtowing” to “the butchers
of Beijing,” and promised that he would link continua-
tion of favorable tariff treatment to China’s human
rights performance.
Organized business was uncomfortable with this stance,
fearing that Clinton might end up delivering on this
trade threat, and believing that curtailing Chinese trade
would lead to retaliation against U.S. companies without
doing anything positive for Chinese citizens. When, in
early 1994, it seemed that Beijing’s recalcitrance on
5 This was the wording of a famous sign posted at Clinton campaign headquarters, reminding workers there of their overriding issue.
6 It was around this time that East Asia specialist Chalmers Johnson made his oft-quoted remark, "The Cold War is over; Japan won."
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human rights might drive Clinton to impose some form
of trade sanctions, business organizations mobilized to
sever the trade-rights linkage. The economic agencies in
the executive branch — Commerce, USTR, Treasury,
and others — did not conceal their sympathy for this
position. This could only undercut whatever leverage on
the matter the United States might have had with
China, and then Secretary of State Warren Christopher
was in fact humiliated when he pursued the human
rights agenda in Beijing that spring. In May 1994,
Clinton bowed to the inevitable and declared that link-
age was no longer effective. Henceforth, the United
States would maintain open trade relations with China
for their own intrinsic value, and pursue human rights
concerns by other means.
The Rise of Business Engagement
Clinton’s China decision marked a “coming of age” for
organized U.S. business as a force lobbying for open
trade. Through most of the post-World War II period,
U.S. firms were divided on trade issues, and those
threatened by global trade tended to be more active
because they absorbed immediate losses from imports,
and because protection — if attainable — would pro-
vide them direct and tangible gains. Those who profited
from export or import trade tended, by contrast, to
stand aside from the political arena. For them, business
was good and tending to it could make it still better.
They saw potential benefit if the USTR could negotiate
reductions in foreign trade barriers, but it was unclear
when such gains would come and which firms would
pocket them. Hence there was a political imbalance
within the business community — the protectionists
cried louder, and were more often heard.
By the 1990s, however, this balance seemed to be chang-
ing. Globalization meant that fewer large industries were
not in some way engaged in, and dependent on, interna-
tional trade and investment. Even longstanding protec-
tionists like textile makers began to see that trade rules
could help them take advantage of foreign opportunities
— and that industry in fact supported the NAFTA
agreement once its details were crafted in ways that gave
it advantage. And the mainstream internationalist compa-
nies — such as Kodak, Motorola, and Caterpillar —
became more dependent on, and committed to, an open
trading system. So, pro-trade organizations like the
Business Roundtable and the National Association of
Manufacturers became more active. One apparent result
was that in the mid- to late-1990s, when the United
States experienced trade deficits and import growth
remarkably similar in magnitude to those of the mid-
1980s, there was not the same broad protectionist
response — the steel industry was vocal, but others
were not.7 And the internationalist businesses were
more active.
They did not just lobby Congress, of course. At least as
important was their influence on the executive branch in
the course of trade negotiations. Businesses frequently
had strong views about which foreign trade barriers were
impeding their sales. And negotiators at USTR and
other executive agencies wanted to know these views —
because they wanted trade negotiations to be effective in
knocking down other nations’ trade barriers, and
because they wanted the support of internationally
minded industries. Indeed, during a major trade round
U.S. negotiators consciously work to build a broad coali-
tion of business supporters, who can help with Congress
when the final agreement is submitted for approval.8
Despite its enhanced activism, however, internationally
oriented U.S. business still did not tend to take the ini-
tiative in support of broad new trade negotiation author-
ity. When Clinton sought renewal of “fast-track” in
1997, in fact, many held back for months fearing that
7 See I. M. Destler and Peter J. Balint, The New Politics of American Trade: Trade, Labor, and the Environment (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International
Economics, Policy Analysis No. 58, 1999), p. 1.
8 For an insightful discussion of how executive branch officials court and "use" business support, see Gilbert R. Winham, International Trade and the Tokyo
Round Negotiation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 315-17.
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the president would tilt too much toward groups seeking
to bring labor and environmental standards onto the
trade-negotiating agenda. As a result, a new coalition of
anti-globalization activists — who did not hold back in
pressing their opposition — succeeded in lining up
enough votes in opposition that the president and then
House Speaker Newt Gingrich were forced to withdraw
the legislation without a House floor vote.
Foremost among the opponents of trade liberalization
was organized labor. Ever since import competition hit
major U.S. industries in the 1960s and 1970s, the AFL-
CIO, the United Auto Workers, and other unions had
pressed to win protection for their products, to slow
down initiatives toward further trade liberalization, and
to put labor rights on the international negotiating agenda.
Through the mid-1990s, they were usually unsuccessful
in blocking trade-liberalizing legislation, though they
were able to woo many labor-dependent Democrats 
to their side of the issue.9 But in 1997, as earlier
noted, they out-lobbied organized business, which was
late to engage.
Business did not make that mistake again in 2000,
when the issue was granting permanent normal trade
status to China. Impressed with the range of Beijing’s
commitments to open its economy, and determined
not to be left behind in this huge and rapidly growing
market, business groups worked assiduously and suc-
cessfully to win enactment of legislation granting the
People’s Republic of China PNTR status. Critical was
the fact that China presented not only a trade opportu-
nity of vast potential magnitude, but also an invest-
ment opportunity. Companies operating inside China
wanted to remain there and expand their operations.
Companies not yet there wanted to be. Having a
China presence and a China strategy was viewed as
essential to a firm’s global competitiveness in the 
21st century.
The Drive to Liberalize Trade with Vietnam
Also of interest to U.S. business was Vietnam. That
nation was much smaller than China, of course, and
seemingly less committed to economic reform. But it
was viewed as having substantial upside potential, with
its large population and capable labor force. American
companies did not wish to be left behind there, but in
the late 1980s and early 1990s, that is exactly what
happened due to the U.S. economic embargo put in
place at the end of the long and bitter war.
The influence of organized business on Vietnam policy
was more limited than on policy toward China. First of
all, their existing stakes were small or nonexistent due to
the embargo — hence it was hard for them to justify
major lobbying. More important was the impact of non-
economic issues: the legacy of bitterness and humiliation
many Americans felt from losing the war, and the deter-
mination of activist families of soldiers missing-in-action
to block any steps toward economic rapprochement
until the government in Hanoi had done all it possible
could to help locate and identify soldiers’ remains. This
was a deeply emotional issue, and not the sort on which
business could easily engage. What was necessary was
advocacy of normalization by Americans who also had
claims to having suffered from the wartime experience.
This came, of course, from Vietnam veterans.
Increasingly, men who had served in combat during the
war made the decision that, as a personal matter, they
would support reconciliation with the former enemy.
And as important as the rank-in-file was their leadership.
Senator John McCain, a former prisoner of war in
Vietnam, lent his formidable name and energy to the
cause. President Clinton believed personally that the
time had come to open up relations with Vietnam, but
his political standing on military issues was weak, owing
in particular to his well-publicized avoidance of Vietnam
service. In military and political parlance, he needed
9 See Destler, "Trade Politics and Labor Issues: 1953-95," in Imports, Exports, and the American Worker, ed. Susan M. Collins (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution, 1998), pp. 389-408.
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“cover.” This the U.S. Senate provided in January 1994
when, following intensive bilateral work in Vietnam on
POW/MIA cases, it passed a resolution calling on the
president to lift the economic embargo. Clinton did so
almost immediately.
Neither the Senate nor the administration saw this
mainly as an economic issue. Of the 42 senators who
voted against lifting the embargo before all MIAs or
POWs were accounted for, 29 were Republicans.10 Had
the matter been framed as a trade issue, the party bal-
ance would surely have been the other way — as it was
consistently on trade with China.  
With Clinton’s action lifting the embargo, U.S. trade
with Vietnam could resume — and some did. But it
labored under a severe handicap, as Vietnamese products
were denied the MFN tariff rates granted to virtually all
other U.S. trading partners. In fact, in the mid-1990s
Vietnam was one of just five countries denied such rates
(in a group that included Libya and Taliban-ruled
Afghanistan). And it was the only one of the five with
which the U.S. did significant trade. This meant that
Vietnamese goods faced not the typical 4 percent tariff
paid on imports from its competitors, but rates averag-
ing around 40 percent.
After the embargo was lifted and diplomatic relations
resumed, however, the way was now clear for the
United States to correct this anomaly by negotiating 
a bilateral trade agreement with Vietnam. As talks pro-
gressed, Clinton employed a provision of the Jackson-
Vanik legislation to provide an annual waiver, which
made Vietnam eligible for certain U.S. government
credits, or investment or credit guarantee programs
(e.g., of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
and the Export-Import Bank). Vietnam received NTR
status when the BTA came into effect on December
10, 2001.11
The Economy Surges, and Priority Recedes
By this time, the overall U.S. priority on foreign eco-
nomic policy had receded from its 1993-95 peak. The
U.S. economy had rebounded spectacularly, entering a
remarkable period of technology-generated growth.
Economic rivals, and Japan in particular, were doing
much worse. In addition, the post-Cold War world gen-
erated its own set of international security challenges —
tensions in the Taiwan Straits, for example, and civil
conflict in the nations of the former Yugoslavia. Clinton,
like his predecessors, found himself pulled into such crisis
issues. The East Asian financial crisis of 1997-99 posed a
new foreign economic challenge, and business lent its
support to the provision of “rescue packages” to limit the
damage to the nations concerned — and to U.S. exports.
Business was joined, in this instance, by organized
labor, and legislation to enhance the resources of the
International Monetary Fund was enacted in late 1998.
Throughout the decade of the 1990s, the U.S. economy
continued to internationalize.  The sum of exports and
imports rose to 26 percent of GDP by 2000. For the
modest and declining share of economic actors engaged
in goods production, the impact of trade was much
greater. The nation entered the 2000 presidential election
season enmeshed more deeply than ever in the global
economy, and seeming — at least in others’ eyes — to
dominate that economy. For much of the world, “global-
ization” and “Americanization” were synonyms. Yet trade
policy was stymied — not due to protectionist pressures,
but rather due to the social issues-based opposition
exemplified by the protesters who disrupted the 1999
ministerial meeting of the WTO in Seattle. And the
domestic stalemate was exacerbated by bitter partisan
conflict that had begun to spill over into the trade policy
realm, particularly in the House of Representatives. 
10 U.S. Senate. 103rd Congress, 2nd Session. S. Amdt. 1266. Congressional Record ONLINE 27 January 1994. Available at http://thomas.loc.gov.
11 On the specific Jackson-Vanik votes, see the chapter in this volume by Mark Manyin. On negotiation of the Bilateral Trade Agreement, see the chapter by
Edward Gresser.
The George W. Bush Administration
George W. Bush emerged from his wafer-thin electoral
victory with an agenda that included restoration of the
“fast-track” negotiating authority that had lapsed under
Clinton, which the new President soon renamed Trade
Promotion Authority (TPA). He also inherited the bilat-
eral agreement with Vietnam, which the Clinton admin-
istration had completed but not sent to Congress for its
necessary approval. For a time, this agreement was
caught up in the politics of the broader trade issue. With
business support for the BTA solid and opposition wan-
ing, Robert Zoellick, U.S. Trade Representative under
Bush, saw it as an attractive component in a comprehen-
sive trade bill that would include the Jordan Free Trade
Agreement, also completed by Clinton, and TPA. But
senior trade Democrats objected, wanting — they said
— to vote separately on those measures that had broad
consensus support. The Democrats prevailed. House
Joint Resolution 51 approving the U.S.-Vietnam agree-
ment was passed by voice vote, as a stand-alone measure,
by the House in September 2001, and by an 88-12 vote
in the Senate a month later. 
Like the resolution to end the embargo seven years
before, these Vietnam trade votes did not reflect the nor-
mal trade-political divisions. In the Senate, only two
Democrats were opposed. On the House vote on
Vietnam trade that year, only 33 Democrats voted to
overturn President Bush’s extension of NTR, together
with 57 Republicans and the House’s two Independents.
Democratic leader Richard Gephardt of Missouri, who
had consistently opposed normal trade with China,
voted with the 172 Democrats to sustain the growing
U.S.-Vietnam trade relationship. U.S. business stood, of
course, in favor of the agreement and NTR, and this
certainly contributed to the overwhelming margins of
support. But at bottom, the House and Senate votes
were about Vietnam more than they were about trade.
In the meantime, the Bush administration pressed
Congress on its larger priority, TPA legislation. House
Ways and Means Chairman Bill Thomas, a Republican
from California, both reflected and exacerbated partisan
divisions by rebuffing senior Ways and Means
Democrats and negotiating a “bipartisan” bill with a
group of moderate junior members of that party lead by
Rep. Calvin Dooley, Democrat of California. Thomas
and Dooley reached constructive compromises on a
range of issues, including how to address labor and envi-
ronmental matters, but Dooley had little leverage with
his colleagues. Senior Ways and Means Democrats
Charles Rangel, Sander Levin, and Robert Matsui
declared the Thomas bill inadequate and proposed an
alternative; when the Republicans refused to negotiate a
compromise, they were hardened in their opposition. In
the end, just 21 Democrats voted in favor, and in a fre-
netic House floor campaign in early December that eked
out a 215-214 victory, House Republican Whip Tom
DeLay of Texas won the deciding votes by granting
demands from textile congressmen to restrict access of
apparel from Andean and Central American nations.
There were partisan tensions in the Senate as well, with
the central Democratic demand being a major expansion
of the assistance program for trade-displaced workers to
broaden coverage and provide, for the first time, subsi-
dized health insurance. But a compromise was reached,
and the legislation was passed by a comfortable 68-30
margin. After a summer conference between the two
houses to reconcile differences in their bills, TPA became
law in August 2002.
U.S. Economic Interests and Future U.S.-Vietnam 
Trade Relations
By promising prompt congressional action on trade
agreements negotiated under its authority, TPA will
strengthen the administration’s hand in the WTO talks
authorized at the November 2001 Doha trade ministeri-
al meeting. USTR Zoellick will also use the renewed
authority to move forward toward a Free Trade Area of
the Americas, and in negotiations for bilateral free trade
agreements with a range of countries and regions.
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Until Vietnam joins the WTO, it will not be a partner
in bilateral and regional FTA negotiations involving the
United States. It will be a bystander in the global trade
talks as well. In addition, as a non-member of the
WTO, it will be subject (like China before 2001) to
unilateral U.S. trade sanctions under the so-called
Section 301 authority, and will not enjoy recourse to the
WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism to review national
anti-dumping rulings. Vietnam will also depend on
annual presidential extensions of NTR tariff treatment.
These extensions are likely to be forthcoming, but they
will offer an opportunity for members of Congress to
highlight concerns about Vietnam generally.
A further disadvantage that Vietnam faces is its small
share of overall U.S. international commerce. Though
U.S.-Vietnam trade has been expanding rapidly in per-
centage terms, it remains, at $2.97 billion in 2002, less
than two-tenths of one percent of U.S. global trade, and
just under two-thirds of one percent of U.S. trade with
the East Asia/Australia region.12 In addition, Vietnam
ranked forty-eighth among nations as a source of U.S.
imports in 2002, and sixty-fourth as a destination for
U.S. exports. For all of these reasons, Hanoi brings a
weak hand to trade negotiations with the United States.
How should it play this hand? Vietnamese officials need
to think in both short-run and long-run terms.
In the short run, they must seek to make the most of
their current situation. This means going beyond estab-
lished negotiating channels and locating and cultivating
allies in the U.S. policymaking process: individuals or
groups who, for their own reasons, favor expanded trade
and interchange with Vietnam. They might begin with
four categories:
z Individuals and groups committed, for non-
economic reasons, to deepening the bilateral 
relationship13;
z Business firms with important investments in 
Vietnam;
z Business firms with important exports to Vietnam; 
and
z Distributors and industrial users of imports from 
Vietnam.
As long as trade remains modest in U.S. terms, the first
of these categories will be the most important in influ-
encing U.S. trade policy toward Vietnam, and the last
will be the least important.
Over the long term, however, Vietnam can aspire to
much greater influence on U.S. trade policy. It is a
nation of enormous economic potential, and it is begin-
ning to realize that potential. A decade or more of
growth at rates achieved by reformist China — or by
Vietnam itself in the mid-1990s — would quickly ele-
vate the economic importance of Vietnam to the United
States, and to the broader Asia-Pacific region as well.   
Whether this can be achieved will depend, in large part,
on domestic Vietnamese economic policy. If there is
renewed commitment to opening up (again, China is
the proper example), then trade with the United States is
likely to continue its rapid rate of increase, and U.S.
firms will increasingly find Vietnam to be a hospitable
place to invest their funds and initiate or expand trade.
U.S. business interests will then give increased political
priority to lobbying on issues affecting Vietnam because
it will be in their interest to do so. And that, over the
long term, is the best way for Vietnam to build political
support for its economic interests in the United States.
12 U.S. Census Bureau figures for exports plus imports: U.S. with Vietnam, $2.97 billion. U.S. International Trade Commission figures for exports plus imports:
U.S. with East Asia/Australia: $458 billion; U.S. global: $1,856 billion. Available at http://www.dataweb.usitc.gov.
13 Included here are certain veterans’ organizations and individuals like Senator John McCain, who unsuccessfully fought to revoke the prohibition on labeling
Vietnamese imports as "catfish."
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In Washington and Hanoi alike, the ratification of the
U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) placed
the final stone in the arch of postwar reconciliation. As
such, the BTA marked the end of one era and the begin-
ning of a new one. And certainly for Americans, it was a
step with historic meaning and emotional significance.
From another angle, though, the BTA was simply one
among a number of major Clinton administration trade
initiatives. Its negotiation and ratification took place at a
moment — perhaps, in the wake of the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks, a moment that has passed — in
which trade policy became central not only to foreign
policy and economic strategy, but domestic politics. And
in this sense, it raised technical issues and domestic
political challenges similar to those raised by the other
major trade debates of the late 20th century.
Its unique character, as the final page in the process of
reconciliation, allowed it to conclude with a degree of
consensus the other trade agreements — the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the creation
of the World Trade Organization, normalization with
China and even the free trade agreement with Jordan —
could not achieve. The following paper reviews the
decisions that successive U.S. administrations made as
the BTA progressed in an effort to understand why this
might be.
The BTA in American Trade Policy
The BTA, to begin with, was one among 306 interna-
tional trade agreements concluded during the Clinton
administration. Most of these were narrow affairs affecting
only very specific companies or industries — agreements
to set textile quotas for Ecuador, settle metal dumping
cases with Russia, or ease sales of cherries to Japan. But a
few were far more ambitious, leading to substantial
changes in the American trade regime — and the BTA
should be placed in this latter group.
In substantive terms, while trade flows between the U.S.
and Vietnam are small, no American agreement in the
1990s made greater market access concessions to a for-
eign partner than did the BTA with Vietnam. And in
political terms, the BTA was matched in complexity by
perhaps only four other agreements — NAFTA, the
Uruguay Round talks that created the World Trade
Organization, the integration of China into the trading
system, and the free trade agreement with Jordan.
The technical challenge. Before reviewing the decisions
leading to conclusion of the BTA, it may be worth look-
ing at its nature.
In technical terms, the American side of the BTA in
essence compressed sixty years of postwar trade policy
into a single commitment. This, of course, was the grant
to Vietnam of “Normal Trade Relations” (NTR, formerly
termed “Most Favored Nation” status, or the tariff levels
applied to goods from the vast majority of American
trading partners).
Owing to a law passed in 1974 (the so-called “Jackson-
Vanik Amendment,” named for its sponsors Charles
Vanik and Henry Jackson, which barred non-market
economies from receiving NTR status), Vietnam had
remained ineligible for any of the eight rounds of tariff
cuts the U.S. had made in the decades since the Second
World War. By the 1990s, this led to a remarkable disad-
vantage. Vietnam’s goods faced tariffs averaging about 40
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percent, while most of the world faced a tariff of about
2.5 percent.
The end of the Cold War, together with Vietnam’s
domestic reform process and ASEAN membership, had
made this policy seem peculiar and anomalous by the
mid-1990s. But the anomaly was the result of a law
passed by Congress, and thus could not be removed by
executive action alone. The Jackson-Vanik law required
two things in turn for a grant of NTR: first, a certifica-
tion by the U.S. government of freedom of emigration
rights (stemming from the law’s original purpose, which
was to encourage free emigration for Jews from the
Soviet Union)1;  and second, conclusion and congres-
sional approval of a bilateral trade agreement.
The political challenge. In earlier years, the second step
might have been routine, and this was in fact the case
when Congress ratified the bilateral trade agreement
with China in 1980. But by the mid-1990s, when seri-
ous work toward the BTA began, approval of any trade
agreement was far from routine.
In an era of peace and sustained growth, trade policy
had become more ambitious, covering services indus-
tries, intellectual property, and other topics as well as
tariff policy. It had become more central to U.S. eco-
nomic strategy and foreign policy as well. And it
became, particularly with respect to developing coun-
tries, more controversial; those who had feared Japanese
competition in the 1980s now wondered whether devel-
oping countries would be able to use low wages to draw
investment and jobs away from the United States.
As a result, the major agreements of the 1990s made up
some of the most difficult debates of the Clinton era.
Such agreements were time-consuming — all five of the
major agreements noted above spanned two or more
administrations — and raised more intense social and
political debates than similar agreements had in the past.
Some of these debates were common to all the major
agreements. To oversimplify slightly, the major agree-
ments passed in the 1990s aroused opposition on eco-
nomic or other grounds from labor unions, textile
industries, some agricultural groups (southern catfish
farmers in the case of Vietnam), and some environmen-
tal associations. This posed an especially difficult dilem-
ma for the Democratic Party, as its base constituencies
were among the groups most critical of the agreements.
On the other hand, the agreements won support on eco-
nomic and strategic grounds from large multinational
businesses, the country’s foreign policy elites, and most
of the press. 
Each agreement also raised some unique issues and
debates. In the case of the BTA there were three:
z First, the BTA brought to the debate a wider set of 
participants than earlier trade agreements. The 
familiar business, labor and foreign policy groups 
were joined by a set of groups for whom trade policy
was new and unfamiliar: Vietnamese-American 
community associations, military veterans of the 
Vietnam War and national veterans organizations 
like the Veterans of Foreign Wars and American 
Legion, and family members of soldiers still listed as
missing-in-action (MIA) in Vietnam and Laos.
z Second, the Vietnam War had been a formative 
experience for many of the administration’s senior 
political and foreign policy officials. For these people,
normalization with Vietnam had an emotional 
significance that earlier trade agreements lacked.
z Third, for the White House political staff in the 
Clinton administration, the president’s opposition 
to the Vietnam War during the 1960s and early 
1970s raised political concern about potential 
exploitation of the BTA by the Republican Party.
The resulting political dynamics were at times quite
difficult for the Clinton administration to manage. As
it moved toward completion of the BTA, the adminis-
1 A former member of Senator Jackson’s staff once privately told the author of this paper that China, and by implication other countries, had been included in
the Jackson-Vanik Amendment by mistake.
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tration had to choose its trade policy priorities careful-
ly, recognizing that support within the Democratic
Party might erode as the number of trade bills grew. It
likewise had to balance its support for trade liberaliza-
tion generally against a need — very strong, as the
2000 elections approached — for party solidarity. And
it had to consider the public’s reaction to a trade nor-
malization project overseen by a president who had
opposed the Vietnam War.
The political process leading to approval of the BTA,
therefore, was slow and at all times affected by other
trade policy and political needs. In retrospect, it had
three phases: an initial one, controlled largely by the
administration and lasting from 1993-1995, which laid
the foundations for trade normalization through a
series of smaller economic steps; a second of negotia-
tions, whose pace was in large part decided by the
Vietnamese government and which lasted from 1996-
2000; and a third from 2000-2001 of ratification,
which Congress controlled. 
Phase I: The Administration’s Choices, 1993-95
To begin with, the administration was faced with political
decisions: whether to proceed with trade normalization
at all, and if so, at what pace. 
These initial decisions were made relatively early in the
Clinton administration’s first term. It inherited from the
previous Bush administration two positive trends. First,
the major American foreign policy dispute with Vietnam
had been resolved with the peace agreement in Cambodia.
Second, the most powerful domestic issue — the fate
of the Americans listed as missing-in-action during the
war — seemed well-handled, as the Defense Department
reported in the course of 1993 that Vietnam was working
in good faith to address the American concerns about
these men. 
Outside these two issues, the administration had few
constraints in setting Vietnam policy. Progress on
accounting for the MIAs was the main concern of the
general public, and of the veterans’ groups most directly
interested in relations with Vietnam. These in turn were
the top concerns of the administration’s political and
foreign policy decisionmakers. The Vietnamese-
American community, in contrast to the Cuban-
American community in debates on trade with Cuba,
was divided — some favored economic engagement as a
matter of principle, others hoped to do business with
Vietnam, and still other groups hoped to maintain
political distance. And at this juncture, the business
constituencies typically most concerned with trade 
policy, though favorable in concept to normalization,
were more concerned with China policy, NAFTA, and
other issues.
During 1993, therefore, the administration decided that
a larger process of normalization, involving both diplo-
matic and economic issues, was feasible in concept and
desirable in practice.2 Some of its senior officials may
have felt that it would have valuable strategic benefits.
But in contrast to normalization with China twenty
years earlier, which had emerged from Cold War strate-
gic calculation, most administration officials simply
seem to have felt that given the passage of time, and
progress on the issues of most concern to the U.S.,
diplomatic and economic estrangement from Vietnam
had become an anachronism. Furthermore, many of the
Clinton administration’s senior officials appear to have
seen in normalization with Vietnam a chance to heal a
wound remaining open since their youth. This seems
clearly to have been the case for the president himself.
In deciding to proceed, the administration also decided
to accept such domestic risks as normalization might
raise at home. Such risks are common to all major trade
agreements, as failure in any major policy initiative dam-
ages an administration. They are perhaps especially high
for a contemporary Democratic administration, given
2 The author thanks Joe Damond and Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky in particular for their recollections of these decisions.
the emotional opposition to trade liberalization among
some of the Democratic Party’s key elements. In the
Vietnam case, these risks were amplified — in retrospect,
overstated — by White House staffers concerned that
normalization might bring a broader political backlash.
Nonetheless, the administration moved ahead. And as
progress on MIA case investigations continued, initiatives
in other areas began to match it. Those steps the admin-
istration could take toward economic normalization, as
opposed to those which required negotiation with Hanoi,
or congressional ratification, proceeded with the formal
end of the postwar trade embargo in 1994, and support
for multilateral loans in 1995. Preparatory work for the
BTA itself began in December 1995, when the first
American negotiating team visited Hanoi.
Phase II: Negotiating the BTA
A year later, the administration was ready to move to
negotiate the trade agreement itself, and the second
phase began.
This was the most complex of all the tasks involved in
full normalization. It was the only one for which the
administration required formal congressional assent, and
it thus required substantial domestic consensus building.
It also involved a great deal of technical work, both to
develop an accurate picture of the Vietnamese trade pol-
icy regime and to set specific negotiating objectives.
And, of course, its conclusion required the approval of
the Vietnamese government.
As a result, this second phase was time-consuming.
From the first negotiating mission in 1995 through the
signature in July 2000, the negotiations took nearly
twice as long as those for NAFTA, and included perhaps
three basic decisions.
Setting negotiating goals. First, the administration set a
general goal for the shape of the agreement and specific
goals for specific chapters within it.
The crucial step in this process was the decision to
approach the BTA not only as the end-point of trade
normalization, but as the first step in Vietnam’s eventual
WTO membership and participation in any future
APEC free trade initiative. This required a much
broader agreement, touching most of the major issues
that the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations had
concluded a year earlier — e.g. services trade, intellec-
tual property, and investment.
The administration thus set broader goals than it had
in previous Jackson-Vanik agreements. It sought sub-
stantial market access, both through reducing formal
trade barriers and through addressing underlying legal
problems (contradictory laws, high degrees of discre-
tion for different ministries, or mandatory discrimina-
tion in some areas between domestic and foreign pro-
ducers) that could effectively nullify market access
commitments. And perhaps looking back to the lost
opportunity of trade normalization with China in
1980, which was followed by nearly 15 years of negoti-
ations on WTO membership, it sought a comprehensive
agreement from which Vietnam could move on to
WTO accession talks with comparative ease. 
As the talks proceeded, the administration carried out a
series of lower-level debates on particular elements of it.
Some of these revolved around the relationship of the
BTA to other priorities. Some in the government argued
that including an investment chapter might reduce lever-
age for the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) program.
Others raised the possibility of withholding MFN treat-
ment in services sectors to maintain leverage for future
negotiations and concessions from Vietnam on WTO
accession. These ideas were ultimately not adopted.
Others reflected the advice of private-sector groups oper-
ating in or hoping to export to Vietnam.
Negotiating with Vietnam. The negotiation of the
agreement is not the principal subject of this paper.
However, in passing, the Vietnam agreement followed a
general pattern of successful trade policy. While most
press coverage of negotiations and agreements stresses
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confrontation and pressure, the most effective tactic is
the ability to make the case that the agreement is in the
interest of the negotiating partner. In this case, the U.S.
was able to stress a very large and simple benefit, in the
grant of NTR that would follow ratification; and also
make a dispassionate case about the disadvantages that
would follow — lost investment, marginalization within
the larger Asia-Pacific economy — if Vietnam remained
static as China entered the WTO. 
The talks moved slowly but reasonably steadily. The
U.S. and Vietnam exchanged market access proposals in
1997, with Vietnam presenting its first comprehensive
offer in April 1998. A further year passed until
Ambassador Richard Fisher and the Vietnamese reached
a comprehensive “agreement in principle” in the summer
of 1999. After this there was a hiatus. Talks on the
agreement’s conclusion broke down at the Auckland Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in
September, and did not reach their conclusion until the
signature in Washington in July 2000.
The perception within the U.S. government was that the
Vietnamese government might not have grasped the full
scope of the commitments it had undertaken, and
balked at making an uncomfortable and unfamiliar
series of decisions. But while negotiators found the
breakdown frustrating, some White House officials —
who hoped to avoid controversy in the immediate
aftermath of the presidential impeachment debate and
the Kosovo conflict in the spring of 1999 — were
more relieved than upset.
Domestic consensus-building. In parallel with its inter-
nal deliberations and the negotiations with Vietnam, the
government began preparing for the third phase of the
agreement — that of ratification — through consulta-
tions with groups interested in trade policy, relations
with Vietnam, or both. These included both groups
always interested in trade agreements (Congress, busi-
ness, organized labor and foreign policy professionals),
and groups with particular interest in Vietnam, includ-
ing MIA families, veterans’ organizations, and
Vietnamese-American community groups.
These consultations seem to have been fairly effective.
Labor unions, which campaigned strongly and emotion-
ally against trade normalization with China, also
opposed the BTA, but devoted little or no time and
resources to the issue. Businesses and foreign policy
specialists endorsed it enthusiastically. Vietnamese-
American groups and veterans’ organizations, initially
suspicious on anti-communist grounds, became more
amenable (although not always favorable) when briefed
on provisions of the talks dealing with transparency,
trading rights, distribution, and other measures which
have socially liberalizing or rule-of-law effects.
Phase III: Ratification in Congress
The first two phases of the process, while prolonged,
seemed well managed by the administration. The last
phase, ratification in Congress, was not.
The BTA, in retrospect, had uniquely strong support
within Congress. A group of Vietnam War veterans —
Senators John McCain and John Kerry, Ambassador
Douglas “Pete” Peterson — who enjoyed great credibili-
ty with other members of Congress on Southeast Asian
affairs — had overseen and supported it from the begin-
ning. And it had the advantage of a legislative proce-
dure, built into the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which
guaranteed a rapid vote.3 
Both the Clinton administration and the succeeding
Bush administration, however, having announced full
support for the agreement, then chose to withhold it
from Congress to address concerns arising from other
trade priorities. Viewed from Hanoi, their behavior may
3 The Jackson-Vanik Amendment authorizes administrations to grant NTR status to "non-market" economies when two conditions are met: certification that the
country in question allows free emigration, and Congressional passage of a Bilateral Commercial Agreement. It also creates a special procedure for 
passage of such agreements:  after administrations submit these agreements to Congress, Congress must vote on them within 90 days and is unable to
amend them. 
71 |  Case Study
appear baffling, comic or even sinister. In the context of
American politics, it may still appear baffling or comic.
Both administrations seem to have badly misjudged the
political situation in Congress and made a simple task
much more difficult. But neither was acting in a sinister
fashion; rather, each was simply attempting to reconcile
different priorities and manage the politics of trade.
Clinton administration decisions. The Clinton admin-
istration certainly viewed the Vietnam trade agreement
as a major achievement and an important element of its
trade legacy. But its top trade policy priorities in the year
2000 were elsewhere. It hoped first to pass Permanent
Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) for China, consistent
with U.S. commitments to the Chinese government on
signature of China’s WTO accession agreement; second,
to minimize splits over trade policy within Democratic
Party during a presidential election; and third, to avoid
creating new problems for Democrats as a Republican
administration took office.
The debate over China, which reached its climax during
a debate in the House of Representatives in May 2000,
had badly fractured the Democratic Party. The party’s
political base by and large viewed PNTR with anger and
fear. Barely more than a third of the Democratic House
members supported the administration when the ques-
tion came to a vote in late May, on what all agreed was
the most important trade and foreign policy debate of
the 106th Congress. As the negotiations on the agree-
ment with Vietnam reached their conclusion in the sum-
mer of 2000, the White House feared that another trade
debate might compound the damage, and decided not
to seek a vote in the fall. 
The administration had a second opportunity to submit
the agreement after a newly elected Congress convened
in January of 2001. Here it again decided not to do so,
based reportedly on the advice from Democrats in the
House of Representatives. While not opposed to the
BTA, they were looking ahead to the trade agenda under
George W. Bush, and hoped to secure a first vote on the
free trade agreement with Jordan to reassure the
Democratic base about the possibility of including labor
and environmental provisions in future trade agree-
ments. Thus, just as the previous Bush administration
had signed NAFTA but delayed submission, so the
Clinton administration left the initiative with the new
Bush administration.
Bush administration decisions. The Bush administra-
tion had a different but in some ways similar problem.
Its top trade priority was Congressional approval of Trade
Promotion Authority (“TPA,” a legislative procedure pre-
viously called “fast track,” is meant to facilitate passage
of future agreements).4 Entering office, it viewed
Democrats as strongly supportive of the BTA as well as
the free trade agreement with Jordan, but as generally
unwilling to support TPA. So it held both agreements
back, hoping to trade endorsement of these agreements
for Democratic support of TPA.
Ambassador Bob Zoellick, the newly appointed U.S.
Trade Representative, memorably characterized this
approach as one designed to force Democrats to make a
“binary decision” on who is for trade and who is against
it. His hopes proved unrealistic, however; congressional
Democrats largely scoffed at the threat, believing that
the administration would not be willing to jeopardize
relations with Vietnam (or Jordan) and would have to
produce the two agreements sooner or later.
This led to a reversal of the typical pattern of congres-
sional trade debates, in which administrations are enthu-
siastic about passing them and Congress is reluctant to
take them up. In this case, the opposite happened —
Congress pressed and pushed an administration to sub-
mit an agreement, with Senate supporters of the agree-
ment finally using their power to block administration
trade policy nominees to force its submission.
4 See "Administration Offers its 2001 International Trade Agenda: Expanding Trade, Expanding Freedom, Expanding Prosperity," at http://www.ustr.gov/releas-
es/2001/05/01-27.pdf.
Passage. In the end, the concerns of the Clinton
administration were misguided and the hopes of the
Bush administration misplaced. The BTA did not split
the Democratic Party, as the Clinton administration had
feared; it was in fact the first trade agreement since the
1980s to draw more Democratic than Republican sup-
port. Neither, contrary to Bush administration hopes,
did the BTA prove of any value as a bargaining chip.
Instead, just as the Clinton administration had initially
decided trade normalization with Vietnam was the right
policy on its own merits and irrespective of other con-
cerns, Congress refused to link the BTA to other admin-
istration priorities.
Conclusion
To sum up, the story of the BTA was in many ways typi-
cal for trade policy in the 20th century. It brought famil-
iar actors and constituencies into the field, to strike poses
familiar from previous debates. And it followed a pattern
of political decisionmaking, technical negotiation and
then debate in the legislature common to all of the most
ambitious trade agreements of the 1990s.
But it is also, of course, a unique story, with subplots
ranging from party politics, through debates within the
Vietnamese-American community and the memories of
military veterans and anti-war protesters. Most striking,
perhaps, is the sharp contrast the conclusion of debate
on the BTA offers to the other major contemporary
trade agreements.
Despite the best efforts of business communities, news-
paper editors and foreign policy elites, the domestic
American controversies over NAFTA, the WTO, China,
and Jordan seem likely to persist for years to come.
Debate on the BTA, by contrast, seems to have ended in
a firm and broadly shared consensus for normal relations
with Vietnam.  And this in turn may reflect a fact of
great interest.
The BTA is a normalization of trade relations with a
particular country, rather than a decision to change
American trade regime in a fundamental way. So as a
matter of trade policy, the debate’s quiet conclusion is
unsurprising. However, as the conclusion to the
American debate over relations with postwar Vietnam, it
is somewhat startling; and it is a sign that this final stone
in the arch of reconciliation is firmly set.  
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Since 1986, Vietnam has been aware of the demand for
international economic integration and has put forward
appropriate policies to realize this process under a gener-
al foreign policy of independence, sovereignty, openness,
diversification, and multilateralization. To this end, the
negotiation and signing of the Vietnam-U.S. Bilateral
Trade Agreement (BTA) represents a significant recent
event in Vietnam’s integration process — one which
included joining the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) in 1995, participating in the ASEAN
Free Trade Area (AFTA), and becoming a member of
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum
in 1998. 
After nine rounds of negotiation, occurring between
September 1996 and July 2000, the two sides reached 
an agreement and signed the BTA on July 13, 2000. 
The BTA is remarkable in that it includes provisions 
covering not only trade in goods, but also trade in 
services, investment, and intellectual property rights. 
In addition, it represents the first trade agreement that
Vietnam has negotiated on the basis of World Trade
Organization (WTO) principles, an important consid-
eration as Vietnam applied to join the WTO in
December 1994 and is in negotiations to facilitate its
eventual WTO accession.  
BTA: Historical Development and Mechanism of
Negotiation
The Ministry of Trade (MoT) of Vietnam is the func-
tional agency that manages Vietnam’s trade activities in
international economic relations, and thus it played the
key role of negotiating and signing the BTA. Due to the
broad scope of the BTA, Vietnam is obliged to make
considerable adjustments to its legal and policy frame-
work. Therefore, other ministries also participated in the
development and negotiation of the BTA — including
Planning and Investment; Finance; Industry; Agriculture
and Rural Development; Science, Technology and
Environment; Justice; Culture and Information;
Fisheries; and Foreign Affairs. The MoT undertook the
role of coordinating these ministries and other agencies
in the process of creating guidelines and carrying out
negotiations on the BTA.
At the same time, because of the importance and impli-
cations of the commitments stipulated in the BTA for
Vietnam’s economy, the MoT consulted enterprises on
the content of the agreement. The MoT carried out
consultations with state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and
private companies regarding detailed commitments
relating to the goods and services that these enterprises
and companies produce.
During the process of negotiating the BTA, the two
sides reached an in principle agreement in the summer
of 1999. However, both countries conducted more
negotiations after this time and agreed to further amend
some articles. The delay in signing from the summer of
1999 to July 2000 was needed in part to give Vietnam
adequate time to ensure the agreement served its national
interests, and also took into proper consideration its low
level of development and its status as a country in the
throes of integration into the world economy. Compared
to the 1999 version of the agreement, Vietnam secured
additional preferential conditions in the final 2000
agreement, e.g.:
z Provisions on telecommunication services were 
adjusted as follows: for services that involve value 
added, U.S. companies can contribute up to 50 
The Bilateral Trade Agreement: Negotiations, Commitments, and
Implementation Issues
Nguyen Van Long
Director General, Office of National Committee for 
International Economic Cooperation, Ministry of Trade
percent of joint venture capital within two years 
(three years in the case of internet services); for 
basic telecommunications (i.e., mobile phones), 
U.S. companies can contribute up to 49 percent of 
the capital within four years; and for fixed-line tele
phone service, the maximum joint venture capital 
for U.S. companies is 49 percent within six years.
z The deadline for abolishing the regulation specifying
that the general director (or first deputy general 
director) of a joint venture company be a 
Vietnamese citizen was extended to three years.
z An article on the legislative level of investment was 
replaced by the stipulation that SOEs are obligated 
to fulfill commitments in this respect if they are 
entrusted by the government to undertake a state 
management function.
z National treatment of deposit-taking activities of 
U.S. banks will be phased in after eight years.
z An article on government procurement transparency
was removed.
z An article on concession balance was removed.
In return, Vietnam agreed with the U.S. request to
reduce the limitation period by one or two years for
U.S. companies providing services to foreign-invested
enterprises in such fields as auditing, architectural services,
and computer and construction design services.
Vietnam’s Commitments in the BTA 
In the agreement, Vietnam made many important
commitments that will affect Vietnam’s socio-economic
status as the BTA is implemented. Therefore, it may be
helpful to provide a brief overview of the commitments
before assessing the effects.
Trade in goods. The content of the commitments per-
taining to trade in goods was relatively comprehensive in
scope. In the agreement, Vietnam committed that
Normal Trade Relations (NTR) will be granted to com-
modities imported from the United States with certain
exceptions. American companies have immediate trading
rights in Vietnam, or will receive such rights as they are
phased in based on a maximum phase-in schedule of six
years. Vietnam also agreed to remove and reduce tariffs
by 20-50 percent on a wide range of industrial and agri-
cultural products which the U.S. has strong potential to
export, such as air-conditioners and refrigerators, electric
motors, ceramic sanitary wares, photographic and film-
related products, mobile phones, milk and dairy products,
processed meat and fish, fruit and vegetables, vegetable
oil, and other goods. These tariff cuts will be phased in
from three to six years after the agreement comes into
effect. In terms of non-tariff barriers, Vietnam agreed
gradually to remove quantitative restrictions, such as the
number and type of licenses, and apply technical, customs,
and sanitary standards under WTO rules and principles.
Furthermore, Vietnam agreed to extend trading rights
(the right to import and export) to U.S. persons and
firms in most sectors, subject to specific “transition peri-
ods” which were set on a product by product basis. 
Intellectual property rights. Chapter II of the agree-
ment covers the commitments of the two parties regard-
ing the establishment, use, exploitation, and protection
of intellectual property rights. Apart from the require-
ments of each side to provide the other with treatment
no less favorable than it accords to its own nationals
regarding intellectual property rights, Vietnam also com-
plies with provisions of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the
WTO in the short-term schedule with respect to all
fields of protection.
Trade in services. Vietnam committed that within two
to seven years after the agreement comes into effect, it
will provide U.S. companies and individuals with market
access to a wide range of sectors and sub-sectors such as
business services, communication and information serv-
ices, construction and related integrated technical services,
education, financial services, healthcare, and tourism.
Investment. Vietnam committed to extend NTR to the
United States with respect to the establishment, expan-
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sion, acquisition, management, operation, sale, or other
disposition of covered investments by the United States.
In addition, Vietnam committed to the gradual removal
of trade-related investment measures (TRIMs) that are
not consistent with the TRIMs Agreement, e.g. the
requirement to develop domestic raw material resources
after five years, the requirement on export after seven
years, and the requirement on investment capital after
seven years. Vietnam shall not nationalize investment
projects and will create favorable conditions with respect
to overall investment policy, such as ensuring that investors
can use land as collateral and have land transfer rights.
Transparency provisions. Vietnam committed to imple-
ment an open and transparent policymaking process in
all areas covered by the agreement.  
The preceding paragraphs constitute a brief outline of
Vietnam’s commitments in the BTA. Through studying
and considering these commitments, we can offer some
comments on the possible effects of implementation of
the agreement on Vietnam’s economy.
BTA Implementation Issues
U.S. Implementation of the BTA. BTA implementa-
tion already has led to considerable growth in Vietnamese
exports to the United States. Since the United States
implemented the BTA by extending NTR to Vietnam in
December 2001, Vietnamese exports to the United
States have grown from approximately $1.05 billion in
2001 to nearly $2.4 billion in 2002. Export growth has
been especially rapid in seafood, clothing, furniture, and
leather products. However, BTA implementation on the
U.S. side has also raised a dispute over new barriers
placed on imports of Vietnamese catfish. 
FDI and Industrial Development. The United States
ranks about tenth among all foreign investors in Vietnam,
with 182 investment projects and total registered capital
of $1.6 billion during the 1988-2002 period. U.S.-
invested projects mainly focus on the fields of industry and
infrastructure construction. The implementation of BTA
commitments on developing the investment relationship
between Vietnam and the United States raises several
issues, of which two are of particular interest. First is the
adjustment of the legal system and policies on invest-
ment, and second is the construction of an appropriate
industrial development policy when the commitments
on investment of the agreement are implemented.
Vietnamese commitments in the BTA are highest in the
area of investment, as compared to other bilateral and
multilateral conventions on investment that Vietnam has
signed and implemented so far. In accordance with the
principle of “most favored nation” treatment, these com-
mitments will be applied to investors from all countries
with which Vietnam has signed agreements on encour-
aging and protecting investment. This requires Vietnam
to adjust some current regulations to create a uniform
legal framework on investment.
Over the past few years, while implementing the policy
on opening the economy to attract foreign investment,
the current system of Vietnamese laws and policies on
investment has been built and adjusted toward removing
discrimination and establishing a uniform legal founda-
tion among foreign investors, as well as between foreign
and domestic investors. The adjustment of investment
laws and policies aims not only at realizing individual
commitments to one or more particular agreements, but
also at improving the Vietnamese investment environ-
ment and enhancing FDI attraction in general.
Consequently, many investment-related commitments
contained in the BTA are consistent with current laws
on investment. However, work that needs to be imple-
mented in the near future includes:
z Formulating an enterprise law applicable to both 
foreign and domestic investors; 
z Perfecting the policy system aimed at improving the
business environment for foreign-invested companies,
focusing especially on policies related to land, 
finance, foreign exchange management, labor, 
technology, and the environment; 
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z Quickly implementing multilateral conventions on 
investment such as the Washington Convention 
of 1965 on the settlement of investment-related 
disputes between the state and citizens of other 
states, and the WTO’s agreement on trade-related 
investment measures. 
Vietnam is a country in economic transition and thus
the development of its industrial sector through the
attraction of foreign direct investment plays an impor-
tant role in the national development strategy. For this
reason, undertaking commitments related to investment
in the BTA (corresponding to TRIMs and WTO terms)
will require the Vietnamese government to change its
protectionist policy for infant industries, and formulate
appropriate new policies for developing its industrial sec-
tor. For example, the BTA stipulates that five years after
it comes into effect, requirements on localization pro-
portions (i.e., the percentage of local vs. imported con-
tent of mechanical, electronic, motorbike, automobile,
and other goods) as well as preferential import duties
should be eliminated. These provisions may result in
Vietnamese industries operating only in the assembly
process or manufacturing of spare parts with low value
added. This example shows that in order to develop its
infant industries, Vietnam will need to make adjust-
ments and promulgate new policies aimed at fostering
domestic industries. 
Services Sector. Vietnam’s services sector has made
remarkable progress over the past few years, both in
terms of productivity growth and in percentage contri-
bution to GDP. In the early 1990s, the growth rate 
of this sector reached more than 10 percent annually;
after 1996, it slowed with the overall economy and in
response to the Asian financial crisis. Along with
Vietnam’s integration into the international economy
and participation in ASEAN, APEC, and the Asia-
Europe Meeting (ASEM), Vietnam has made commit-
ments that have begun to open up the services sector.
External service suppliers are permitted to operate in
most sectors, and Vietnam’s own service industries 
are expanding.
U.S. service suppliers have gradually entered the services
market in Vietnam, mainly in the areas of auditing,
banking, and insurance. It can be said that implementa-
tion of the BTA — in which commitments regarding
trade in services compromise a significant portion of the
Agreement — will facilitate further market access for
U.S. service suppliers. Furthermore, Vietnam’s commit-
ments under the BTA related to services will enhance
the competitiveness of its own service sector, as well as
reduce input costs and improve quality. At the same
time, Vietnam’s commitments to open the services sector
likely will create new competitive pressures. Vietnamese
firms will find it difficult to compete with U.S. compa-
nies, particularly in fields in which the U.S. is traditionally
strong, such as legal consulting, telecommunications,
banking, and finance. It will be a serious challenge for
Vietnamese firms to compete in the coming 5-10 years,
as the phase-in schedule for various service sectors begins
just two years after implementation for such sub-sectors
as accounting, design, consulting, and architecture.
Labor, Employment, and Other Social Issues. Although
employment issues are not directly mentioned in the
BTA, the fulfillment of related commitments is likely to
raise a lot of issues relating to labor, employment, and
other social issues. Vietnam’s Labor Code was enacted in
June 1994 and subsequently amended in April 2002.
Such issues as labor standards have been clearly and
comprehensively stipulated in the code. In recent years,
however, it has become apparent that the awareness of
these labor standards among both employees and
employers is still limited. The current situation requires
a rapid improvement of labor standards in order to be
consistent with the integration process of Vietnam’s
economy in general, and implementation of the BTA in
particular. Labor standards have particular significance
for enterprises exporting goods and services to the U.S.
market.
In general terms, implementation of the BTA will bring
about equality for both U.S. and other foreign businesses
in the Vietnamese market. It will therefore present chal-
lenges for Vietnamese enterprises to cope with rapidly
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transforming production structures toward specialization
and internationalization as well as increasing competi-
tiveness. During this process, the possibility of many
Vietnamese businesses having to face difficulties, con-
traction, and even bankruptcy must also be taken into
account. Many laborers have already become unem-
ployed during the reform process and the number of
redundancies will inevitably increase. Such redundancies
will become a burden on both society and the state
budget and must be addressed and resolved by the
Vietnamese government.  
Finally, the BTA stipulates that investors of both parties
can transfer and recruit foreign managers as well as
employees for their investment and business activities in
Vietnam. Realization of this stipulation will require
prompt revisions and adjustments to existing regulations
and the promulgation of new ones as well.
Conclusion: The Significance of the BTA For Vietnam’s
Integration Process
The BTA marks a significant step in the normalization
process between Vietnam and the United States, and 
creates positive conditions for increasing trade relations
between the two countries. Furthermore, because the
BTA was formed on the basis of existing WTO princi-
ples, it also marks a positive step toward Vietnam’s
integration into the world economy. In 2001, Vietnam
began negotiations on market opening provisions related
to its application for accession to the WTO. The com-
mitments made in the BTA lay the foundation for
Vietnam’s initial offers in these negotiations. According
to some experts, Vietnam’s BTA commitments are not as
comprehensive as those likely to be carried out in nego-
tiations for WTO membership. Successful implementa-
tion of the BTA is thus a prerequisite for Vietnam to
gain a favorable position in international trade relations
and to be well prepared in terms of capacity and experi-
ence for joining the WTO.
The BTA presents a great opportunity for trade and
investment growth between the two countries. At the
same time, implementation of the agreement will result
in tremendous challenges for Vietnamese government
agencies as well as businesses. In the first place, adjust-
ments and improvements must be made to the legal
system and economic policies with a view to ensuring
serious implementation of requirements stipulated in
the BTA. It also is imperative to spur administrative
reform, as well as investment structure reform, in order
to enhance the development and competitiveness of
Vietnamese goods and services under new circumstances
in which tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and other protec-
tionist measures are removed.
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February 3, 1994
President Clinton lifts the trade embargo against
Vietnam, in effect since 1975.
January 28, 1995
United States and Vietnam sign agreements settling
property claims and establishing liaison offices in
Washington, D.C. and Hanoi.
May 15, 1995
Vietnam provides presidential delegation with docu-
ments on missing Americans, later hailed by the
Pentagon as the most detailed and informative of their
kind.
July 11, 1995
President Clinton announces the “Normalization of
Relations” with Vietnam.
August 6, 1995
Secretary of State Warren Christopher visits Hanoi and
officially opens U.S. Embassy.
May 1996
United States presents Vietnam with a blueprint for a
trade agreement.
April 10, 1997
U.S. Senate confirms Douglas “Pete” Peterson, Vietnam
war veteran and former prisoner of war, as U.S.
Ambassador to Vietnam.
May 9, 1997
Ambassador Peterson assumes post in Hanoi;
Vietnamese Ambassador to the U.S. Le Van Bang goes
to Washington.
August 1997
U.S. government, under the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID), begins a commer-
cial law program.
March 11, 1998
President Clinton issues a waiver of the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment for Vietnam, paving the way for OPIC, Ex-
Im Bank, USDA, and MARAD activities in Vietnam.
March 26, 1998
Minister of Planning and Investment Tran Xuan Gia and
Ambassador Pete Peterson finalize signing of the OPIC
bilateral for Vietnam.
July 25, 1999
United States Trade Representative Ambassador Richard
Fisher and Vietnam Trade Minister Tuyen agree to a
bilateral trade agreement in principle.
August 3, 1999
The Jackson-Vanik waiver passes the House by a vote of
297-130.
December 9, 1999
Ex-Im and the State Bank of Vietnam complete the
framework agreements which allow Ex-Im to begin
operations in Vietnam.
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March 13, 2000
Secretary of State William Cohen becomes the first
Secretary of Defense to visit Vietnam since the end of
the war.
May 3, 2000
U.S. House passes House Concurrent Resolution 295,
which urged Hanoi to repeal all laws restricting freedom
of expression.  It is referred to Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations.
July 13, 2000
Vietnam Minister of Trade Vu Khoan and USTR
Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky sign an agreement on
trade relations at USTR.  President Clinton announces
the conclusion of a bilateral trade agreement from the
White House.
July 26, 2000
The Jackson-Vanik waiver passes the House by a vote of
332-91.
November 16-20, 2000
President Clinton visits Vietnam with Commerce
Secretary Norman Mineta, USTR Ambassador Charlene
Barshefsky, Senator John Kerry, First Lady Hillary
Rodham Clinton, and daughter Chelsea.
January 2001
The Vietnam Education Foundation Act of 2000 estab-
lished by an Act of Congress, which will provide annual
funding of $5 million until 2019 for Vietnamese stu-
dents to study in the United States.
April 2001
Vietnam holds 9th Party Congress and confirms
National Assembly Chairman Nong Duc Manh as new
Secretary General of the Communist Party. 
June 1, 2001
President Bush renews the Jackson-Vanik waiver for
Vietnam.
June 8, 2001
President Bush transmits the request for Normal Trade
Relations (NTR) for Vietnam and implementation of
the trade agreement to Congress.
July 26, 2001
The Jackson-Vanik waiver passes the House by a vote of
324-91.
September 6, 2001
BTA passes by voice vote in the U.S. House of
Representatives.  U.S. House passes the Vietnam
Human Rights Act (H.R. 2833) by a vote of 410-1.
October 3, 2001
BTA passes without amendment by 88-12 vote in the
U.S. Senate.
October 10, 2001
Ambassador Nguyen Tam Chien presents Letter of
Credence to President George W. Bush at the 
White House.
October 16, 2001
President Bush signs the BTA into law.
November 28, 2001
BTA ratified by Vietnam National Assembly, 278-85.
December 3, 2001
Ambassador Raymond Burghardt sworn in as U.S.
Ambassador to Vietnam.
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December 7, 2001
BTA signed into law by Vietnamese President Tran 
Duc Luong.
December 10, 2001
U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement signed into
force at a Blair House ceremony with Deputy Prime
Minister Dung, Trade Minister Vu Khoan, and USTR
Ambassador Robert Zoellick.
March 3-6, 2002
The first Vietnamese-U.S. scientific conference on Agent
Orange opened in Hanoi, with the participation of hun-
dreds of U.S. and Vietnamese researchers.
April 8, 2002
Ministry of Justice reports that after an initial review of
all laws issued by ministries and central bodies, approxi-
mately 150 laws were found to have inconsistencies in
relation to the provisions of the BTA.
May 6-7, 2002
Deputy USTR Ambassador Jonathan Huntsman in
Hanoi to open BTA Joint Committee.
May 13, 2002
Farm bill including a catfish provision requiring
Vietnam to rename its catfish product signed by
President Bush.
June 1-8, 2002
Minister of Justice Nguyen Dinh Loc visits the U.S. on
BTA implementation.
June 3, 2002
Jackson-Vanik waiver signed by President Bush.
June 12-22, 2002
Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Manh Cam visits Texas,
New York, Massachusetts, and Washington, D.C.
June 28, 2002
Catfish Farmers of America file an anti-dumping peti-
tion against Vietnam.
July 18, 2002
Ways and Means Committee hearings on Jackson-Vanik
renewal.
July 23, 2002
The Jackson-Vanik waiver passes the House by a vote of
338-91.
August 8, 2002
U.S. International Trade Commission determines that
there is a reasonable indication that U.S. industry is
threatened with material injury by reason of imports of
certain frozen fish fillets from Vietnam.
November 8, 2002
Department of Commerce determines that Vietnam is a
non-market economy for the purposes of anti-dumping
and countervailing duty proceedings.
April 3, 2003
Congressman Chris Smith reintroduces the Vietnam
Human Rights Act (H.R. 1587) into the U.S. House of
Representatives.
June 17, 2003
U.S. Department of Commerce issues its final determi-
nation in the catfish investigation, concluding that
Vietnamese producers have sold frozen catfish fillets at
less than fair value, with margins ranging from 36.84 to
63.88 percent.
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July 15, 2003
Vietnam Human Rights Act is added as an amendment
to the House Foreign Relations Authorization Act (HR
1950).  The authorization bill passes in the House on
July 15 and is sent to the Senate.
July 17, 2003
Vietnam-U.S. Garment and Textile Agreement signed in
Hanoi by Vietnamese Minister of Trade Truong Dinh
Tuyen and U.S. Ambassador Raymond Burghardt.
July 23, 2003
U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) issues its
final determination concluding that catfish imports
from Vietnam have materially injured the U.S. catfish
industry. The ITC’s affirmative determination enables
the Department of Commerce to issue an antidumping
order imposing duties in the range of 36.84 - 63.88
percent.
*Information drawn from website of the U.S.-Vietnam Trade Council
(www.usvtc.org) and news sources.
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U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement
z Trading rights for U.S. firms will be liberalized in 
three to six years.
z Tariff rates on a limited range of industrial and agri
cultural items (about 250) will be reduced by 30 to 
50 percent over three years.
z Quantitative restrictions on most products will be 
removed in three to seven years. Restrictions on 
steel and cement will be removed after six years and 
those on petroleum products after seven years.
z In the services sector, Vietnam will provide more 
market access than low and middle income countries
under the Uruguay round, and only slightly less 
than the larger transition economies.
z Majority U.S. ownership of banks will be allowed 
after three years. National treatment will be granted 
in the possible equitization of state-owned commer-
cial banks. National treatment of deposit-taking 
activities will be phased in after eight years.
z One-hundred percent U.S. equity in financial leasing
and in other leasing activities will be allowed after 
three years.
z Majority U.S. ownership of insurance firms will be 
allowed after three years. Restrictions on the opera-
tion of joint ventures will be eliminated after three 
years (and for wholly U.S.-owned companies, after 
six years). Wholly U.S.-owned firms, will be permit-
ted after five years.
z Immediate introduction of one-hundred percent 
U.S. equity in a range of technical services, including
in legal, accounting, engineering, computer-related, 
and construction areas.
z All WTO-inconsistent measures regarding investment
(e.g., local content requirements) will be phased out
within five years.
z WTO-consistent protection of intellectual property 
rights is to be introduced in 12-18 months.
z All laws and decisions governing issues in the agree-
ment will be published. Administrative or judicial 
tribunals for review will be established, as will the 
right of appeal.
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)
z Tariffs on the vast majority of tariff lines (95 percent,
according to preliminary estimates) on ASEAN 
imports will be reduced to at most 20 percent by 
the start of 2003, and to 0-5 percent by beginning 
of 2006.
z Average tariffs on manufactures from ASEAN coun-
tries will be cut by 50 percent by early 2004.
z Average tariffs on ASEAN imports of textiles, 
leather, wood products, non-metallic mineral prod-
ucts (e.g. glass and ceramic products) and food 
products will fall by more than 60 percent by 
early 2004.
WTO
z Vietnam made its initial offer on specific commit -
ments in services in January 2002.
z The fifth meeting of the Working Party on accession
of Vietnam, held in April 2002, reviewed the status 
of Vietnam’s bilateral access negotiations and action 
plans for implementation of a number of WTO 
agreements, including those related to investment 
and intellectual property rights.
z The sixth meeting, held in December 2002, marked
the beginning of negotiations.
Appendix III:  BTA Implementation Schedule, AFTA, and WTO
Source: The World Bank, Vietnam: Delivering on Its Promise, Development Report 2003 (Hanoi: December 2002), p. 19.
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